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ABSTRACT 
In this study I have argued that BEE/indigenization policies in post-colonial 
Africa have been implemented with the aim that capitalism could be 
appropriated by indigenous Africans. Since capitalism arrived in Africa 
through colonialism, the post-colonial socio-economic policy of 
indigenization was deemed a solution for correcting the economic 
imbalances that were created by colonialism. Some scholars and politicians 
argued that the capitalist values that were mediated to Africa were contrary 
to the Weberian values of the Protestant ethic such as frugality, thrift and 
hard work which became integral to modern capitalism in the Western world. 
For this reason, it was argued that colonialism did not facilitate the 
appropriation of modern capitalism.  
African traditional communitarian values were also deemed to be contrary to 
modern capitalistic values that were mainly based on atomic individualism. 
Contrary to modern capitalistic values of atomic individualism, African 
communitarians argued that African traditional society was communitarian, 
thus refuting the Hobessian contractarian theory of social existence and 
atomic individualism. Communalistic ontology of society as espoused in the 
African kinship system is based on the presumption that persons are 
persons because of their natural common belongingness with others in 
society. The African communalistic ontology of society is also espoused in 
the African ethic of Ubuntu. The ethic of Ubuntu is found to be 
incommensurable with individualistic capitalistic practices. However, there 
are some scholars who have argued implicitly that the ethic of Ubuntu 
should be infused in modern capitalistic practices so that there could be an 
appropriation of capitalism in post-colonial Africa. 
Some post-colonial African scholars have argued that the emphasis that was 
given to communal wellbeing in African traditional society were rather 
inhibitive towards the appropriation of modern capitalism. Scholars who 
argued for the indigenization of capitalism have argued that such a policy 
had nothing to do with the appropriation of capitalism, but a deliberate 
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attempt at creating African capitalists who would end up replacing the 
previous colonial capitalistic class. It was also argued that since capitalism 
was mediated through colonialism, some African nationalists have argued 
that African traditional values were commensurate with socialism. Their aim 
was thus not about the appropriation of capitalism, but rather the 
appropriation of socialism. The argument of African socialism was 
contracted by those historians who have argued that the initial appropriation 
of capitalism in Africa was enabled by Christianity instead of African 
traditional values. 
Finally, it was argued in this study that the indigenization or BEE has been 
supported by many post-colonial African governments as an ethical 
imperative aimed at the redressing the economic inequalities of colonialism 
and apartheid. BEE/indigenization is thus a policy aimed at creating socio-
economic policies that would enable black people to participate in their 
national economies. In this regard, the BEE/indigenization socio-economic 
policy is aimed at promoting the common good. However, the problem 
inherent in this socio-economic policy is two pronged. Firstly, the study 
argued that BEE/indigenization has not led to the economic growth as a sign 
for the appropriation of modern capitalism in post-colonial Africa. Secondly, 
BEE/indigenization policy has been marred by corruption and this has led 
some scholars to question whether it was necessary to create a small class of 
African capitalists at the expense of the majority of the citizens who 
suffered under colonialism and apartheid discriminatory rules. It is was 
argued in this study that the appropriation of capitalism should be done in a 
way that promotes the common good instead of individual greed. 
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 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Brief motivation 
The implementation of the economic indigenisation policies in postcolonial 
Africa has been aimed at ensuring the appropriation of capitalism by 
indigenous Africans. The proponents of economic indigenisation have often 
maintained that it was imperative that Africans should be given the 
opportunity to wrest control of the modern capitalistic means of production. 
In this regard, economic indigenisation which is sometimes articulated by its 
advocates as Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) is also part and parcel of a 
political crusade towards the implementation of the post-colonial African 
political policy of economic nationalism. In the context of post-colonial or 
post-apartheid South Africa, this economic nationalism is an attempt to 
domesticate capitalism through a process that entails active participation of 
indigenous Africans in the mainstream of the economy. However, the 
problem that has beset indigenisation arises from two fronts.  
Firstly, there is no empirical evidence available to support that such an 
economic policy has ever led to the appropriation of capitalism in post-
colonial Africa, rather there is strong empirical evidence that economic 
indigenisation policies have excluded the majority of the population from a 
meaningful participation in the economy. Through indigenization/BEE 
policies, the national economy is in most cases cornered around a few 
individuals who are usually well connected to those in political power. On 
the basis of this observation, indigenisation of capitalism undermines the 
idea of economic nationalism.  
Secondly, the other problem arises from African indigenous values which 
prioritise communal belonging and communal solidarity rather than 
individual entrepreneurship and the pursuit of profit which is presumed to 
be indispensable to the working of modern capitalism. In it partly in the light 
of these succinctly stated two points that this study intends to find out 
whether economic indigenisation or BEE does really lead to the appropriation 
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of the spirit of capitalism in post-colonial Africa or could it be that this type 
of policy is actually hurting the post-colonial African economy? 
1.2 Review of Literature  
There has been a barrage of arguments that have been put forward by 
scholars as well as political practitioners in support of indigenisation of the 
post-colonial African economy as an imperative to the appropriation of 
modern capitalism in Africa. Some post-colonial African scholars have 
supported economic indigenisation/BEE on the grounds that the colonial 
heritage or apartheid political order did not help towards the appropriation 
of capitalism. Colonialism or apartheid is seen as representative of an epoch 
in African history that promoted greed and exploitation of the majority of 
the African indigenous population, thus doing away with values that were 
associated with Western capitalism such as hard work and frugality. In this 
regard, Ali Mazrui is more nuanced when he said, “Capitalism arrived in 
Africa with the imperative of acquisition without the discipline of hard work 
and frugality. The white man himself in Africa set a dangerous example. He 
never washed his own clothes, or cooked his own food, or polished his own 
shoes, or make his own bed. …This luxurious life…was detrimental to the 
spirit of capitalism…” (Mazrui 1990: 493).  
Observations such as those of Mazrui are usually collaborated with historical 
evidence where colonial historians wholly believed that indigenous Africans 
were supposed to be seen as cheap source of labour for the colonialists 
(Johnson 1913: 151). The colonial economy or apartheid economy thrived 
through a process of economic exclusion and predatory against the 
indigenous African populace (Martin and Johnson 1981: 37). The majority of 
the indigenous population was excluded from a meaningful participation in 
the economy through a series of legislations which the settler government 
enacted from time to time. The predatory aspect was facilitated through the 
creation of Native Reserves and Homelands which resulted in a situation 
where the settler colonial community hoarded fertile land and the natural 
resources to itself (Wilson 1923: 86; Murove 1999: 45-46).  
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The colonial practice of exclusion and predatory was usually based on a 
peculiar type of economic nationalism that favoured the settler colonial 
community. One finds that some scholars such as De Klerk arguing that in 
the case of South African settler economic nationalism in the form of the 
Broederbond (brotherhood) was based on promoting Afrikaner economic 
interests in a way that legislatively excluded the majority of the black 
population from the economy (Deklerk 1975: 281-285; Lipton 1985: 14-49). 
In pursuit of Afrikaner economic nationalism against the British economic 
imperialism, with the assistance of the National Party Afrikaners formed 
their own companies such as Santam, Sanlam and Avbob (Adam and 
Giliomee 1983: 146-147). These companies appealed to Afrikaner economic 
nationalism to the exclusion of the majority of the African population. 
Consequently, this practice of Afrikaner economic nationalism could be seen 
as an attempt by Afrikaner people to appropriate capitalism through a 
process of Afrikaner Economic Empowerment. However, it is also critical to 
take note of the school of thought which says that this Afrikaner Economic 
Empowerment was preceded by British economic imperialism whereby 
companies of British origins pursued their economic interests with the 
explicit consciousness of promoting British Imperial economic interests (van 
Onslen 1976: 17-19).  
Another form of economic indigenisation in post-colonial Africa was 
advanced by African politicians who came with the school of thought which 
says that capitalism could not be appropriated in post-colonial Africa 
because African communitarian traditional values were more oriented 
towards socialism than to capitalism. Kwame Nkrumah argued that, “The 
African social system is communistic” (Nkrumah 1968: 74). The gist of his 
argument was that African traditional community society which put 
emphasise on communal values were commensurate with modern socialist 
economic values. These African communalistic values were not 
commensurate with individualistic values which are found in modern 
capitalism as it originated from the West and mediated to Africa through 
colonialism. In similar vein, Jomo Kenyata captured the spirit of African 
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traditional capitalism by coining the kiSwahili term Harambe which means 
“to pull together, or to work together”. In the communal ethos of Harambe, 
Kenyata argued that “there is no really individual affair, for everything has a 
moral and social reference” (Kenyata 1953: 119; cf. Bujo 1997: 164). In other 
words, under Harambe, economic activities were mainly aimed at advancing 
the wellbeing of the community. The same the same economic ethos of 
Harambe was later on echoed by Julius Nyerere (1968: 2) when he coined a 
term Ujamaa, a term a described as literally meaning “family-hood” or “the 
idea of mutual involvement in the family” as a way of capturing African 
socialism which he argued as economic values of traditional African 
societies. He further on states that, “By the use of the word ujamaa, 
therefore, we state that for us socialism involves building on the foundation 
of our past, and building also to our own design”. Here it can be deduced 
that by coining word Ujamaa as a word that was equivalent to socialism, 
Nyerere was aiming at driving home the idea that modern socialism pre-
existed in the African past. Later on he went on to emphasise the pre-
existence of socialism in the African past as follows, “Traditionally we lived 
as families, with individuals supporting each other and helping each other 
on terms of equality” (Nyerere 1968: 258).  Here it can be deduced that 
Nyerere was arguing that modern capitalism was foreign to traditional 
African economic ethic of collectivism.  
Leopold Senghor echoed the same trend of thought when he said “Negro 
African society is collectivist, or, more exactly, communal because it is rather 
a communion of souls than an aggregate of individuals, Africa had already 
realised socialism before the coming of Europeans” (Senghor 1964: 29; cf. 
Mboya 1963: 6-7; Toure 1979: 108; Gelfand 1981: 15). What is implied in the 
socialist argument is not about the appropriation of modern capitalism, but 
the rejection of modern capitalism on the basis that this economic system 
was contrary to African traditional communitarian values. Valentine 
Mudimbe observed that socialism was appealed to in the sense that 
“colonialism incarnated in the name of capital” (Mudimbe 1994: 42; cf. 
Mazrui 1983: 279-294; Bell 2002: 37). In colonial Africa, capitalism and 
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socialism were seen as two sides of the same coin in the sense that in most 
parts of Africa, capitalism was mediated through colonialism. For this 
reason, the end of colonialism was supposed to be dovetailed by the end of 
capitalism.  
However, the question as to whether traditional African values were 
commensurate with socialism remains a controversial one. Given the reality 
of extreme poverty, some scholars such Ali Mazrui have argued for the 
appropriation of capitalism on the grounds of maintaining historical 
continuity rather than trying to socialise the means of economic 
unproductiveness which have currently characterised the post-colonial 
African society (Mazrui 1999: 924). The main concern for Mazrui and other 
scholars who belong to the school of modern economic developmental 
theory is on how post-colonial Africa should cultivate values that can lead to 
the appropriation of the Spirit of capitalism (Hunter 1967: 119-122; Kennedy 
1988: 140-142). 
With the failure of socialism in Eastern Europe and in those parts of post-
colonial Africa who had adopted this economic system for economic 
development, the economic policy, the orientation in post-colonial Africa 
was put more on implementing economic indigenisation policies as a way of 
trying to appropriate the spirit of capitalism. No economic policy has been 
criticised by scholars than economic indigenisation or Black Economic 
Empowerment. Chinweizu argued that, “Decolonisation was generally seen 
as no more than Africanisation, in the sense of putting more Africans into 
the economic structures inherited from colonial times. As for Chinweizu, 
this Africanisation of the economy impacted negatively on the economy 
because those who were supposed to spearhead this policy “had enormous 
appetites for material consumption” (Chinweizu 1999: 777-790; cf. Nkrumah 
1970: 100). Other developmental theorists such as Claude Ake argued that 
Indigenisation policies have maintained solidarity with yester colonial 
capitalists and international capitalism (Ake 1981: 35-36).  
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On the other hand, some scholars have maintained that post-colonial Africa 
can only appropriate the spirit of capitalism by adopting modern capitalistic 
practices as they are practised all over the world. In this regard, economic 
indigenisation is seen as failing the appropriation of the spirit of capitalism 
because of its tendency to promote a “casino mentality” where one can easily 
become a multimillionaire from a few BEE economic deals (Jeffery 2014: 156; 
cf Murove 2010: 62-64). This argument implies that beneficiaries of 
economic indigenisation/BEE are not business persons who earn their 
fortunes through hard work and frugality. What has been of great ethical 
concern is that these beneficiaries of Indigenisation/BEE do make their 
wealth through political connectivity (Jack & Harris 2007: 60). Other scholars 
such as Anthea Jeffery have advanced the argument that in the context of 
post-apartheid South Africa, BEE is actually hurting the economy because of 
its propensity to deliberately transfer wealth to a few politically connected 
individuals who are not necessarily business persons by profession or calling 
in the Weberian sense (Jeffery 2014). 
 
1.3 Problem and Research Question 
Is there any evidence that the economic policy of indigenization/BEE can 
lead to the appropriation of the spirit of capitalism in post-colonial Africa? 
1.3.1 Questions to be asked 
(i) What is the rationale behind the post-colonial economic policy of 
indigenisation/BEE? 
(ii) Can the indigenisation/BEE policy lead to the appropriation of 
Capitalism in post-colonial Africa? 
(iii) Why is it that indigenisation/BEE has benefited a few in most 
countries in post-colonial Africa where this policy was implemented? 
(iv) Is it not possible that indigenisation/BEE is the main reason behind the 
failure for the appropriation of capitalism in post-colonial Africa? 
(v) Is it ethical to implement an economic policy such as 
indigenisation/BEE that favours a minority to the exclusion of the 
majority? 
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1.4 Objectives  
The objectives of this study are: 
(i) To investigate the rationale behind the post-colonial African economic 
policy of indigenisation/BEE. 
(ii) To find out whether indigenisation/BEE policy can lead to the 
appropriation of modern capitalism in post-colonial Africa. 
(iii) To investigate why economic indigenisation/BEE has benefited a 
few in most countries in post-colonial Africa. 
(iv) To determine whether it is not possible that economic 
indigenisation/BEE is the main reason behind the failure for the 
appropriation of modern capitalism in post-colonial Africa. 
(v) To find out whether it is ethical to implement an economic policy that 
favours a minority to the exclusion of the majority 
 
1.5 Theoretical frameworks upon which the research project will be 
constructed. 
A theoretical framework that is adopted in this study is three pronged. 
Firstly, this study applies Marx Weber’s sociological theory of the Protestant 
ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Here my intention is to establish whether 
capitalism came to Africa with the Weberian virtues that were associated 
with the ascendency of modern capitalism such as hard work, discipline, 
thrift and frugality. On the basis of the Weberian sociological theory of the 
Protestant ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism the study argues that economic 
policy of indigenisation cannot lead to the appropriation of capitalism in 
post-colonial Africa.  
Secondly, this study applied Thorstein Veblen’s theory of the evolution of 
institutional economics which says that solidarity between the rich (leisure 
class) and the poor is untenable. Veblen’s theory of the leisure class has 
frequently been echoed by post-colonial developmental economists in a way 
that suggests that economic indigenisation does not necessarily lead to the 
appropriation of capitalism, but simply creates solidarity among the rich. 
Thirdly, the study applied the theory of economic nationalism in its analysis 
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of indigenisation and the appropriation of the Spirit of capitalism. From an 
historical perspective it will be demonstrated that economic nationalism has 
been the stumbling block towards the appropriation of the Spirit of 
Capitalism in colonial and postcolonial Africa because such an economic 
approach is beset with ethical problems such an over exaggerated sense of 
entitlement and acquisitiveness of wealth to the exclusion of the majority of 
the poor. 
1.6 Research Methods  
In the light of what I have said thus far, it should be evidently clear that this 
study is based on an historical analysis of economic indigenisation with 
specific reference to the quest for the appropriation of the spirit of 
capitalism in post-colonial Africa. In this regard, focus is given to the voices 
of those scholars who are critical of the indigenisation of capitalism on the 
one hand, and those who focused on the idea of seeing indigenisation in 
terms of the appropriation of the spirit of capitalism. The study is also 
critical about the idea of equating economic indigenisation with the 
appropriation of the spirit of modern capitalism.  
However, the study presented the arguments of the proponents of economic 
indigenisation as fairly as possible as well as those who are against 
indigenisation as an economic policy in a manner that does not prejudice 
either side of the group. It is on the basis of the persuasiveness of the 
arguments presented in this debate that a position shall be adopted on the 
plausibility or implausibility of indigenisation as an economic policy in post-
colonial or post-apartheid Africa for the appropriation of capitalism in post-
colonial Africa. In this regard, the study carries with it an element of 
advocacy that will be adopted on the basis of the persuasiveness of the 
arguments present. The study is also critical in the sense that it will 
investigate the available literature on economic indigenisation and the 
appropriation of the spirit of capitalism in post-colonial Africa with a 
deliberate aim of establishing whether there is empirical evidence that the 
policy of economic indigenisation has ever produced its intended economic 
purposes. 
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The study is multidisciplinary in the sense that many disciplines such 
economics, ethics, religion, politics and history are interrogated with the aim 
of asserting their contributions to economic indigenisation and the 
appropriation of capitalism in post-colonial Africa debate. The research 
method that has been adopted in this study is mainly theoretical because the 
information that is utilised shall be derived from books, journal articles, 
government gazettes, newspaper articles and the internet. All this implies 
my research is purely derived from researched written sources. 
1.7 Limitations of the Study 
Since this study is mainly concerned with economic indigenization in post-
colonial Africa and the appropriation of capitalism, the topic is too wide for 
a thorough treatment for a doctoral study. In this regard I was not in the 
position to give a comprehensive analysis of all the aspects of economic 
indigenisation. The study is mainly concerned with ethical issues rather than 
issues of policy per se. As a study in applied ethics, my approach will be 
mainly based on whether it is ethical to implement a policy such as 
economic indigenization/BEE that favours a few to the exclusion of the 
majority of the population. In this regard, there is some commitment to 
advocacy instead of being a neutral investigator. In a study area that is 
imbued with ethical controversies, one will be definitely required to take a 
biased position. Whilst the topic of the study gives the impression that the 
study will deal with economic indigenization and the appropriation of 
capitalism in post-colonial Africa, the study discusses post-apartheid South 
Africa and Zimbabwe as examples whilst mentioning other post-colonial 
African states in passing. 
  
1.8 Outline of Chapters 
Chapter 1 –Introduction - This chapter is an introductory chapter which is 
mainly concerned with the scope of the study. 
Chapter 2 – A Comparative Study of Modern Capitalist Values and African 
Traditional Economic Values – In this chapter I intent to provide a 
comparative exposition on modern capitalist values in comparison to 
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traditional values, especially on the understanding of persons and their 
economic relations. This chapter will thus serve as a foundation to my 
discussion of indigenization and the appropriation of modern capitalism in 
post-colonial Africa. 
Chapter 3 – Unhu/Ubuntu and the Indigenisation Discourse in Post-
Colonial Southern Africa – In this chapter I intent to argue that the 
discourse on the imperative of the indigenization is articulated through the 
African communitarian ontology of society as espoused in the ethic of 
Unhu/Ubuntu. It is also argued that the discourse of indigenization through 
the ethical concept of Ubuntu/Unhu and modern capitalism is related to the 
quest of the appropriation of modern ca m               pitalism in post-colonial 
Southern Africa. 
Chapter 4 – Economic Policy of Indigenisation and Global Capitalism – The 
thrust of this chapter is that the economic policy of indigenization in post-
colonial Africa is sometimes presented by its advocates as a reaction to 
hegemony of global capitalism. 
Chapter 5 – Economic Policy of Indigenisation and its Effects to the 
African post-Colonial African Economy – The scope of this chapter is 
mainly to determine whether the post-colonial African policy of 
indigenization is beneficial to the economy or not. 
Chapter 6 – An Ethical Critique of Indigenisation – This chapter will 
investigate whether the economic policy of indigenization is ethically 
justifiable. 
Chapter 7 – Conclusion and Recommendations  
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CHAPTER TWO: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MODERN CAPITALIST 
VALUES AND AFRICAN TRADITIONAL ECONOMIC VALUES 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Since capitalism arrived in Africa through colonialism, the post-colonial 
economic policy of indigenisation was aimed at correcting the economic 
imbalances that were put in place by colonialism. It is common knowledge 
that colonial administrators introduced all sorts of legislations that were 
aimed at giving economic advantage to white settlers at the systematic 
deprivation of the African people. Colonising countries were mostly 
interested in extracting natural resources from Africa for their own 
countries. African people did not benefit from the type of capitalism that 
was introduced to Africa through colonialism. The idea that modern 
capitalism was the handmaid of colonialism became the rationale for the 
African nationalistic drive for the indigenisation of capitalism. In their 
support for the economic policy of indigenisation, some post-colonial 
African scholars have argued that the type of colonialism that was mediated 
to Africa through colonialism was sharply different from the ideals of 
modern capitalism that was then prevalent in Europe. For example, it was 
argued by some African nationalists that capitalism came to Africa without 
the discipline of hard work and frugality. This argument is an echo of Marx 
Weber’s thesis that the protestant ethic of thrift, hard work and frugality 
was a causal factor to the rise of modern capitalism in Western societies and 
North America.  
In the context of colonial Africa, it is alleged by some post-colonial African 
scholars that capitalism was introduced to Africa without those Weberian 
values as emphasis was put on acquisitiveness without hard work. On the 
other hand, there are other post-colonial African scholars who maintain that 
modern capitalistic values that emanated from the Western world through 
the mediation of colonialism were contrary to African traditional 
communitarian values, hence economic policies of indigenisation were aimed 
at promoting the appropriation of capitalism through the inclusion of 
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African indigenous values in the ways of doing business were imperative 
towards the appropriation of modern capitalism. This chapter is structured 
as follows: The first section will investigate the symbiotic relationship 
between colonialism and the advent of capitalism in Africa. In this section it 
shall be argued that the post-colonial economic policies were partly aimed at 
correcting the economic injustices that were entrenched within colonialism. 
In an effort to do away with capitalism, it is argued that many African 
politicians maintained that African traditional values were compatible with 
socialism instead of the values of modern capitalism capitalism. In the 
second section I shall go on to argue that post-colonial African policies of 
economic indigenisation were also related to the observation that capitalism 
was mediated to Africa without those values that were considered 
indispensable to the ascendency of modern capitalism in Western societies 
and North America. The third section will investigate the claim that the post-
colonial economic policies of indigenisation are related to the observation 
that the appropriation of capitalism can only be possible through the 
inclusion of African traditional values. In the light of the discussion offered 
in the above sections, a conclusion to the chapter shall be provided. 
2.2 On the Symbiotic Relationship between Colonialism and Capitalism 
It is common knowledge that modern capitalism was mediated to Africa 
through colonialism. Some African nationalists such as Kwame Nkrumah 
argued that during colonialism Africans became victims of expropriation. As 
he puts it,  
While missionaries implored the colonial subject to lay his ‘treasures’ in Heaven, 
where neither moth nor rust doth corrupt’, the traders and administrators 
acquired his minerals and land. There was no intention of processing locally the 
discovered raw materials. These were intended to feed the metropolitan mills 
and plants, to be exported back to the colonies later in the form of finished 
commodities (Nkrumah 1970: 22). 
The implication of the above quotation is that the type of capitalism that 
was introduced into colonial Africa was based on expropriation of 
resources from the Africans. Even missionary activities among the Africans 
were mainly aimed at facilitating the expropriation of resources from the 
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Africans by traders and colonial administrators. Those resources that were 
expropriated from the Africans by colonialists were not processed locally 
for the economic benefit of the Africans, rather they were send to the 
colonising country for the benefit of metropolitan industries for processing 
and manufacturing.  
The manufactured products which were previously brought into 
metropolitan industries as raw materials were later on exported to African 
colonies as finished products that were later on sold at exorbitant prices in 
the colonial African markets. Here it can be deduced that Nkrumah’s main 
argument was that the capitalism that was brought to Africa through 
colonialism was mainly about exploitation and expropriation of resources 
from the colonised Africans. For Nkrumah colonialism was not about the 
appropriation of capitalism, rather it was about expropriation of African 
resources to the benefit of the colonisers and their metropolitans. Nkrumah 
went on to emphasise the motif of expropriation when he said,  
In her African colonies, Britain controlled the export of raw materials by 
preventing their direct shipment to foreign markets. After satisfying the 
demands of her home industries, she sold the surplus to other nations and 
netted the profits herself. The colonial farmer and worker had no share in those 
profits. Nor was any part of them used in providing public works and social 
services in the colonies (Nkrumah 1970: 22-23). 
In other words under colonialism what Africans only experienced was a 
systematic expropriation of their resources from their own territories for 
the colonising metropolitan economic benefit to the exclusion of the 
colonised countries. All economic policies and activities were always 
implemented with the aim of benefiting the colonial power. However, some 
colonial apologists have argued in defence of colonialism mainly on the 
grounds that the colonialism was an historical epoch that was beneficial to 
the economic development of Africans. For example, a historian by name of 
A. J. Hanna defended colonialism as follows, 
 
…[without colonialism] Africans would still be roughly what they were a 
century ago, had it not been for the introduction of European administration, 
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European instruction, and contact with the European economy. …It has often 
been asserted that investment in Africa involved injustice to the Africans, 
since it was a device for draining the wealth of their continent into the pockets 
of investors in Europe. This is an elementary misconception. The mineral and 
other resources of Africa were useless to the native inhabitants until they were 
developed, and they could not be developed without transport, machinery and 
skill. By making these things available the European investor, however self-
interested he may have been, was serving Africa…(Hanna 1961: 11-17). 
In the light of the above quotation, it is evidently clear that Hanna was an 
apologetic of colonialism and capitalism par excellence. Without colonialism 
African resources would not have been put into effective economic use. The 
colonial historical epoch was providential to the Africans because without 
the introduction of modern capitalism to Africa through colonialism, Africa 
would have remain underdeveloped. African resources were not necessarily 
useful to the Africans because they were not being utilised by Africans 
before the advent of colonialism. In this type of apologia, there is a strong 
conviction that we should be thankful towards the continuation of foreign 
domination of the African economy which was bequeathed upon Africa by 
colonialism.  
However, other African nationalists such as Nyerere have argued that the 
existence of capitalism in post-colonial Africa implied the continuous 
existence of an African economy that is foreign dominated. For this reason, 
Nyerere argued that this foreign domination of the post-colonial African 
economy can only be overcome by the adoption of socialism as an 
alternative economic ideology to modern capitalism. In support of socialism, 
Nyerere argued that traditional African societies were collectivist whereby 
wealth was owned in common. As he puts it, “Traditionally we lived as 
families, with individuals supporting each other and helping each other on 
terms of equality”, hence “The purpose of socialism is the service of man, 
regardless of colour, size, shape, skill, ability, or anything else. …Without the 
acceptance of human equality there can be no socialism” (Nyerere 1968: 198-
258). Thus for Nyerere socialism was a more humane economic system in 
comparison to modern capitalism. The socialist tendencies were found in 
African traditional society whereby Africans were primordially collectivistic 
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by nature in such a way that a sense concern and care for each other were 
the main defining features of social existence.  
Nyerere went as far as indigenising socialism by coining a kiSwahili word 
called Ujamaa – a word that means collectivism. Nyerere went as far as 
establishing Ujamaa villages in which people worked together in pursuit of 
the common good. The economic ideals of Ujamaa were previously 
enunciated by Jomo Kenyata in his socio-economic policy of Harambe, a 
kiSwahili word which means “to pull together” (Bujo 1997: 164). In his 
intellectual support of Harambe Kenyata went on to say that in traditional 
African society, “The habit of corporate effort is but the other side of 
corporate ownership; and corporate responsibility is illustrated in corporate 
work no less than in corporate sacrifice and prayer” (Kenyata 1953: 119). 
Obviously this was another effort that was aimed at making modern 
capitalism more relevant to the post-colonial African indigenous context. In 
the same vein, Kwame Nkrumah argued that socialism was commensurate 
with African communalism. As he put it, “Socialism, therefore, can be and is 
the defence of the principles of communalism in the modern setting. …The 
African social system is communistic. In the African social system the 
foundation of a pauper class is unknown, nor is there antagonism of class 
against class” (Nkrumah 1968: 73-74). In other words, socialism was a 
modern reiteration of African traditional values of communalism and a 
classless society as it existed in the past. Communalism and a classless 
society are thus postulated as the basic characteristics that were 
fundamental to understanding traditional African economic behaviour. 
Leopold Senghor is more nuanced on the idea that values of African 
traditional society were commensurable with socialism. He writes, “African 
society…had already realised socialism before the coming of Europeans…but 
we must renew it by helping it to regain a spiritual dimension” (Senghor 
1964: 29). Put in other words, Senghor is saying that before the advent of 
colonialism in Africa, traditional African society was socialist, hence the 
responsibility of the present generation was to revive African socialism 
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instead of perpetuating modern capitalism which was rather an economic 
system that had a symbiotic relationship with colonialism. 
The issue of the symbiosis between capitalism and colonialism gave rise to a 
phenomenon of economic domination. In the same vein with Nyerere, 
Richard Sklar observed that,  
In Africa, the poorest continental region of the world, capitalism has been 
associated with the humbling experience of alien domination. In the European 
settler states of Eastern, Central, and Southern Africa, black Africans were driven 
from their lands and compelled by despotic forms of rule to supply cheap labour 
for a white capitalist master-class (Sklar 1988: 1).  
Under colonialism modern capitalism was experienced by the majority of the 
African people as the most dehumanising economic system. Under 
colonialism and capitalism the humanity of the indigenous Africans was not 
taken into consideration. For example, during colonialism fertile land was 
looted from Africans in a way that left the majority of the Africans landless 
and sometimes found themselves into places that were called Native 
Reserves which were previously a habitat of wild animals – thus not 
conducive for agricultural production and human settlement (Murove 2016). 
In 1903 the British government set up a South African Native Affairs 
Commission with the aim of crafting a “Native Policy” suitable for South 
African territories. The commission recommended that, “white and blacks 
should be kept separate in politics and in land occupation and ownership 
basis” and that “political power would remain in white hands. Land should 
also be demarcated into white and black areas…” (Meredith 2014: 10-511). In 
the light of the above observation, it is abundantly clear that the 
recommendations of this colonial commission disenfranchised Africans 
economically and politically. Sol Plaatje observed that in the aftermath of the 
Natives Land Act, many native South Africans found themselves without any 
land to graze their cattle and to farm as if they were refugees running away 
from a war torn country (Plaatje 1982: 64-85). It is in recalling the stories of 
colonialism and modern capitalism in colonial Africa that many African 
politicians found in socialism some symbolic resemblance with the pre-
colonial African society. Tom Mboya, the then Kenyan minister of labour 
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wrote an article titled “African Socialism” in an Eastern African Journal 
called Transition in which he had this to say,  
When I think of African Socialism I also have in mind those ideals and attitudes 
of mind in our tradition which have regulated the conduct of our people with the 
social weal as the objective. I think it is worth while emphasizing the fact that 
these ideals and attitudes are indigenous, and that they spring from the basic 
experience of our people here in Africa… (Mboya 1964: 253).  
As for Mboya, the socialist economic ideals were integral to African 
indigenous ideals. For this reason, socialism was an economic system which 
African people could culturally identify with instead of the values of modern 
capitalism. Here it needs to be bone in mind that the discourse of African 
socialism was partly based on the conviction that socialism was an economic 
system which could easily be identified within African indigenous traditional 
values such as those enshrined in communalism and collectivism. 
However, some of the critics of the African socialism discourse have argued 
that the capitalistic economic system which was inherited by post-colonial 
Africa was modern capitalism and not socialism, hence there was a need to 
foster some economic continuity after the demise of colonialism. Ali Mazrui 
(1983: 285-286) argued against this discourse of African socialism as 
follows,  
Many hastily assume that a history of collectivism in a traditional setting is a 
relevant preparation for organized collective efforts in a modern setting. 
Unfortunately, much of the evidence points the other way. Collective effort based 
on custom and tradition and kinship ties leaves Africa unprepared for the kind 
of organised collectivism that needs to be based on command rather than 
custom, on efficiency rather than empathy, on rationality rather than ritual 
(Mazrui 1983: 285).  
Another argument that is raised by Mazrui against African socialism is that 
of “historical continuity” because one finds that most of the “African 
economies have already been deeply integrated into a world economy 
dominated by the West”, hence “African countries that turn socialist 
domestically find that they are still integrated within the world capitalist 
system. The rules of that system are overwhelmingly derived from principles 
evolved in the history of capitalism” (Mazrui 1983: 286). In other words, 
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Mazrui was arguing that the argument for African socialism was irrelevant 
because it overlooks the reality of historical continuity whereby post-colonial 
African economies are currently part and parcel of the Western world 
modern capitalistic economic system. Some scholars have argued that there 
should be a rational explanation as to why modern capitalism managed to 
take root in Africa during the times colonialism. As we shall see in the 
following section, these scholars maintain that African traditional values of 
communalism and collectivism where incompatible with the values that are 
enshrined in modern capitalism.     
2.3 The Incompatibility of African Traditional Values and the values of 
Modern Capitalism 
As intimated in the previous section, those who argue against African 
socialism put their focus on the evolution of entrepreneurs in Africa. The 
thrust of the argument that is proffered by these scholars is that African 
traditional values were inhibitive to the values enshrined in modern 
capitalism. For the sake of clarity, we need to investigate the values of 
modern capitalism that are in most cases presumed by scholars to have led 
to the ascendency of modern capitalism in the Western world. One of the 
prominent scholars who gave a systematic treatise on the values of modern 
capitalism and the ascendency of capitalism in the Western world and 
Northern America is a Germany sociologist by the name of Marx Weber. 
 
2.3.1 Marx Weber’s Thesis of the Protestant Ethic and the Values of Modern 
Capitalism 
Weber’s main thesis was that reformed Protestantism in the form of the 
Puritans became the supporting pillar for the rise of modern capitalism in 
the West and North America. But what did Weber mean by the phraseology 
‘the spirit of capitalism’? Weber provides the reader with thorough exegesis 
from the sermons of the Puritans that show the main elements of the spirit 
of capitalism. In these sermons the main elements that were identified by 
Weber as constitutive of the spirit of capitalism were articulated in the 
sermons of the Puritans as follows: 
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Remember that time is money. …Remember, that credit is money. If a man lets 
his money lies in my hands after it is due, he gives me the interest, or so much 
as I can make of it during that time. …Remember, that money is of the prolific, 
generating nature. Money can beget money, and its offspring, can beget more, 
and so on. …Remember this saying, The good paymaster is lord of another 
man’s purse. He that knows to pay punctually and exactly to the time he 
promises, may at any time, and on any occasion, raise all the money his 
friends can spare. …never keep borrowed money an hour beyond the time you 
promises, lest disappointment shut up your friend’s purse for ever. ‘The most 
trifling actions that affect a man’s credit are to be regarded. The sound of your 
harmer at five in the morning, or eight at night, heard by a creditor, makes 
him easy six months longer; but if he sees you at a billard-table, or hears your 
voice at a tarven, when you should be at work, he sends for his money the 
next day…(Weber 1958: 48-49). 
The implication of those sermons is that one has to be very strict in lending, 
borrowing and spending money. According to Weber the teaching of the 
Puritans put all emphasis on making money and saving it to the extent that 
all human economic relations and activities had no any other meaning 
besides making money and saving it, coupled with a sense of personal 
utmost discipline towards what one does with money. In this life outlook, all 
human relations were thus reduced to money as the prime determining 
factor. As he puts it,  
In fact, the summum bonum of this ethic, the earning of more and more 
money, combined with the strict avoidance of all spontaneous enjoyment of 
life, is above all completely devoid of any eudaemonistic, not to say 
hedonistic, admixture. It is thought of so purely as an end in itself, that from 
the point of view of the happiness of, or utility to, single individual, it appears 
entirely transcendental and absolutely irrational. Man is dominated by the 
making of money, by acquisition as the ultimate purpose of his life. Economic 
acquisition is no longer subordinated to man as the means for the satisfaction 
of his material needs (Weber 1958: 53). 
 
In the light of the above quotation, the making of money excluded any form 
of enjoyment that was to be derived from the money or wealth accumulated. 
The making of money was thus deemed to be an end in itself and not as a 
means to something else. The protestant ethic brought about an ecclesiastic 
economic revolution which did not exist prior to the rise of Protestantism in 
the history of Western Christianity. Before the rise of Protestantism, the 
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ecclesiastical economic teaching of medieval Christianity was primarily 
based on the condemnation of avarice or greed as a sin. The making of 
interest from a loan given was condemned because it was judged as 
synonymous with the sin of avarice. A Church historian by the name of 
Richard Tawney echoed the observation of Weber when he said that, “The 
Reformation released forces which were to act as a solvent of the traditional 
attitude of religious thought to social economic issues, it did so without 
design…” (Tawney 1926: 94). Both Weber and Tawney do agree on the fact 
that reformed Protestantism or the Puritans taught an economic ethic of 
individualism that was based on thrift, frugality and hard work as virtues 
that lead to economic success. This type of ethic encouraged an ethic of 
individualism whereby the whole issue of salvation was interpreted as to 
imply that it was individual souls that were saved and that individuals qua 
individual were accountable for their own actions. The economic historian 
Robert Heilbroner echoed Weber and Tawney when said that as a result of 
the economic teachings of the Puritans, “Acquisitiveness became a 
recognized virtue – not immediately for one’s private enjoyment, but for the 
greater glory of God” (Heilbroner 1972: 33). In the economic teaching of the 
Puritans, the accumulation of wealth was not a sin, rather it was a sign of 
God’s favour or God’s grace to the individual. It was taught by the Puritans 
that greed of the individuals was part and parcel of a divine mechanism 
whereby individuals advance the welfare of society without necessarily 
knowing that they were doing so. For example, a Puritan in the States by the 
name of Heinrich Gossen preached to his congregation that, “God implanted 
self-interest in the human breast as the motive force for progress. By 
following self-interest we follow God’s will” (Cited  in Daly and Cobb 1989: 
89). In other words, greed or self-interest was a virtue that had some divine 
origins and hence this passion had to be obeyed as an expression of one’s 
obedience to God. A Calvinist minister of Boston gave a sermon on economic 
relations in which he had this to say, “where there is scarcity of the 
commodity, there men may raise their price; for now it is a hand of God 
upon the commodity, and not the person” In this regard, capitalistic 
economic activities were thus understood as a calling from God. As a calling, 
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business people were thus presumed to be fulfilling a particular divine 
mandate in their economic activities. Another value of modern capitalism is 
based on individualism. 
 
2.3.2 Modern Capitalism and Individualism 
It is commonly agreed among scholars that modern capitalism is based on 
the values that are enshrined in the doctrine of individualism.  Within this 
doctrine of individualism there are three types of individualism. The first 
type of individualism is what is called by C. B. Macpherson as possessive 
individualism which can be traced from Thomas Hobbes to John Locke. The 
second type of individualism is called the individualism of anti-rationalism 
which originated from Bernard de Mandeville and Adam Smith, the father 
and founder of modern liberal capitalism. On the other hand, the third brand 
of individualism which is commonly known as atomic individualism, is a 
type of individualism which derives from mechanistic physics whereby the 
individual is allegorically imagined as an atom that is self-enclosed and 
cannot be influenced by social relations.   
In possessive individualism, Thomas Hobbes advanced a theory that is 
popularly known as the contractarian theory of morality in which he said 
that human existence was governed by three principles: “competition, 
difference and glory” and these three principles were the reason for conflict 
and strife in human society before humans decided to live under a sovereign 
or a ruler. In his book Leviathan, Hobbes came up with a theory that in their 
state of origins or state of nature before the advent of civilisation, human 
beings did not have any sense of concern for the wellbeing of others except 
their own individual interests. For Hobbes, by nature human beings were not 
inclined to work for the common good. As he put it,  
Whereas the agreement of irrational creatures is natural, that of men, is by 
Covenant only, which is Artificial: and therefore it is no wonder if there be 
somewhat else required (besides Covenant) to make their Agreement constant 
and lasting; which is a Common Power, to keep them in awe, and direct their 
actions to the Common benefit (Hobbes 1962: 99-104).  
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In the Hobbesian individualism, human beings are amoral and asocial by 
virtue of their original nature. The lack of natural agreements in what human 
beings do led to the formation of artificial agreements that are mainly based 
on covenants. These covenants are undertaken under the watchful eye of a 
Common Power whose main duty is to ensure that human beings do abide 
by the promises or covenants they have undertaken. The duty of the 
Common Power is to make sure that human beings end up working in a way 
that ensues in the creation of the common good.  
For Hobbes, human activities are about the quest to have more power over 
other human beings. As he put it, “Riches, are Honourable; for they are 
Power…To be Conspicuous, that is to say, to be known, for Wealth, Office, 
great Actions, or any eminent Good, is Honourable; as a signe of the power 
for which he is conspicuous….Covetousness of great Riches, and ambition of 
great Honours, are Honourable; as signes of power to obtain them” (Hobbes 
1962: 70-71).  In other words, whatever a person does s/he does it for the 
sake of obtaining power over fellow human beings. Acquired riches 
enhanced the individual’s power over others. A society that is primarily 
characterised by completion for power can only be regarded as chaotic.  
Macpherson argued that the Hobbesian society is a society that was 
characterised by competition and strife. The value of a person was thus 
predicated on the price that was available on the market. A human being did 
not have an intrinsic value per se. As he puts it,  
Here, as in Leviathan, the objective value is established by the estimates of 
others, which estimates are based on the usefulness of his apparent power to 
them. Every man’s value is established as prices are established in the market. 
…To speak of the value or price of every man, therefore, is to assume that every 
man is either a seller of his power or a buyer of others’ (or both) (Macpherson 
1983: 39).  
Within this theory of possessive individualism, it is apparently clear that 
Macpherson is arguing that according to Hobbes, individuals’ worthy is 
determined by the market instead of seeing society as an institution of the 
common good. In this regard, what makes individuals to be regarded as 
individuals are their material possessions. This type of individualism was 
23 
 
thus conducive for the possessive market society that was then prevalent in 
the Western world and North America.  
Within this tradition of possessive individualism one finds John Locke 
reducing the role of government to the protection of individual property. As 
he put it, “The great and chief end therefore, of Men uniting into 
Commonwealths, and putting themselves under Government, is the 
Preservation of their Property; to which in the state of nature there are many 
things wanting” [his italics] (Locke 1960: 220). In this mode of thinking 
government is seen as an artificial creation that was brought into existence 
for the sole purpose of protecting individual property. Robert Heilbroner 
interpreted this Hobbesian and Lockean understanding of government as 
follows, “Government is no longer considered to be a natural, timeless 
attribute of all social collectivities but is seen as the creation of ‘individuals’ 
who band together for their mutual safety and protection” (Heilbroner 1985: 
119). For Locke people submit themselves under a government in order to 
solely secure the protection of their properties. Locke went on to say that 
“every Man has a Property in his own Person. This no Body has any Right to 
but himself. Whatever a man removes out of its natural state, he has mixed 
his labour with. By mixing his laour with it, he makes it his property…” [his 
italics] (Locke 1960: 240). In the light of the above quotation, Locke is 
asserting that persons are persons by virtue of being naturally endowed with 
ownership of property. This ownership of property is something that is 
appropriated through one’s labour and this application of labour on 
something makes that particular thing the individual’s property which 
others in society do not have any claim to. The appropriation of property by 
the individual did not need the consent of others in society because a 
person’s labour was exclusively his or her own. From what has been said 
hitherto, it is evidently clear that both Hobbes and Locke were advocating 
the predominance of possessive individualism which was partly causal to the 
ascendency of and appropriation of modern capitalism in the Western world 
and North America. In the light of the above synthetic discussion of Hobbes 
and Locke’s philosophical treatises on individualism which Macpherson 
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called possessive individualism, some foundation was laid for the Western 
world’s appropriation of modern capitalism which was later on adopted by 
other scholars who were more interested in human economic relations. For 
example, many economic historians have identified Bernard de Mandeville 
and Adam Smith as prominent scholars in the conceptual development of 
Laissez Faire capitalism.  
 
2.3.3 Bernard de Mandeville, Adam Smith and the Individualism of 
Antirationalism 
Bernard de Mandeville was a Dutch physician who took conceptual interest 
in the working of the modern capitalistic economy that was then on the 
rapid ascension in the Western world. Mandeville wrote a parody called The 
Fable of Bees in which he argued that private vices which are in most cases a 
result of individual greed were actually beneficial to society as a whole. 
Mandeville maintained that in their economic relations individuals were 
purely egoists. However, whilst individuals were solely self-interested they 
unknowingly end up promoting the common good (Goldsmith 1985: 34-35; 
Murove 2005: 76). Whilst individuals’ economic activities were motivated by 
self-interest without any sense of concern for the wellbeing of others, the 
fact that society ends up benefiting from the economic actions of these 
egoists implies that egoism was good. As Mandeville poetically puts it, 
 
Fraud, Luxury and Pride must live 
While we the Benefits receive 
Do we not owe the Growth of Wine 
To the dry shabby crooked Vine? (Mandeville 1924: 36). 
Mandeville’s understanding of human nature was based on the presumption 
that they were egoists who were barren of any sense of moral concern for 
the wellbeing of others. All human economic actions were based on the 
pursuit of egoistic purposes. Some of the human moral predispositions such 
as virtue and self-denial were, according to Mandeville, purely an illusion 
“because all actions came from self-interest” (Mandeville 1924: 357). As 
Murove puts it,  
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The result of his [Mandeville] deductive reasoning led him to the conclusion that 
all moral conduct has a selfish basis. Someone who might try to help a person in 
a dangerous situation should be understood as selfish because s/he would be 
doing so with the hidden intention of satisfying his or her own need for 
compassion in the sense that the one who helps gets personal satisfaction for 
helping (Murove 2005: 77).  
Thus Mandeville had no any other view of human nature besides the idea 
that they were absolute egoists and moralists would do much good to the 
community if they refrain from teaching people what they are not. Whatever 
action was done by a human being should be understood as motivated by 
greed. Such actions can sometimes be judged as altruistic by the hidden 
intention is that they serve the individual need for being seen by society as 
an altruistic person or a good person. The Mandevelian economic thinking 
on human actions became a pioneering work “of laissez-faire individualism 
in the economic field and as such an anticipator of Adam Smith” (Viner 
1958: 339-240). Thus in Mandeville we find a pragmatic articulation of a type 
of individualism that was conducive to the conceptualisation and 
appropriation of the modern liberal capitalism in Western societies as well 
as in North America. 
In the same vein, Adam Smith echoed Mandeville’s main thesis about laissez-
faire capitalism when he weaved his Wealth of Nations around the idea that 
self-interested individuals were capable of promoting the flourishing of 
wealth without government intervention in the economy. In his most quoted 
passage that is regarded by many scholars as the doctrine of laissez-faire 
capitalism Adam Smith wrote, “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, 
the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to 
their self-interest. We address ourselves not to their humanity but to their 
self-love, and never talk to them of their own necessities, but of their 
advantages” (Smith 1976: 26). In other words, when business people are 
involved in business, we should bear in mind that they are mainly there for 
the pursuit of their self-interests, and not necessarily for the economic 
wellbeing of their fellow human beings. Business people were not in business 
for the purpose of promoting benevolence in society, but mainly for the 
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single minded pursuit of their self-interests. As for Smith, Laissez-Faire 
individualism that was prevalent in liberal capitalism was part and parcel of 
the working of God within the economy. In his earlier book, The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments which he wrote prior to The Wealth of Nations, Smith had 
this to say, 
 …[Though the rich] consume little more than the poor, and in spite of their 
natural selfishness and rapacity, though they mean only their own 
convenience…They are led by an invisible hand  to make nearly the same 
distribution of the necessaries of life which would have been made had the 
earth been divided into equal portions among all its inhabitants; and thus, 
without intending it, without making it, advance the interest of society” [his 
italics] (Smith 1872: 304-305). 
 By asserting that even though the individual was solely self-interested, ‘he 
was led by the invisible hand’, to advance the common good which was not 
part of his intention, Smith was in a way advancing the idea of individualism 
of antirationalism. The individualism of antirationalism is thus based on the 
idea that self-interested individuals end up promoting ends that they did not 
fathom at all or ends that were part and parcel of their own planning. In 
other words, economic actions of egoists within a free market economic 
system give rise to a beneficial economic order that was not intended by 
these egoistic economic actors. In this regard, there was no need for 
government planning with the aim of regulating the functioning of the 
capitalistic free market economic system. Here the belief in individualism of 
antirationalism was partly based on the idea that actions of egoistic 
individuals over a long period of time can give rise to a social spontaneous 
order (Dahrendorf 1989: 183; Polanyi 1968: 69-70).  
The theory of social spontaneous orders was developed by Fredrick Hayek in 
his interpretation of Adam Smith’s concept of the Invisible Hand. Thus one 
finds Fredrick Hayek arguing that human actions can sometimes lead to 
consequences that were originally unintended by the participants. Hayek 
went on to debunk the arguments of those who were critics of Adam Smith’s 
concept of ‘the Invisible Hand’ on the grounds that these critics “cannot 
conceive of an order which is not deliberately made, and partly because to 
them an order means something aiming at concrete purposes which is…what 
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a spontaneous order cannot do” (Hayek 1982: 37-38). In this regard, the idea 
of seeing the actions of egoistic individuals giving rise to a spontaneous 
order undermines the role of society in the making of the character of the 
individual. In his other book titled Individualism and Economic Order, Hayek 
(1948: 4-9) submitted that, “The true individualism which I shall try to 
defend began its development with John Locke, and particularly with 
Bernard Mandeville and David Hume…and Adam Smith. …that the 
spontaneous collaboration of free men often creates things which are greater 
than their individual minds every fully comprehend”. Hayek went on to say 
that the theory of spontaneous order gives rise to “an individualism of 
antirationalism” whereby the individual promotes the general welfare of 
society without necessarily knowing that s/he is doing so. 
The individualism of antiraltionalism was also echoed by Ayn Rand when 
she argued that there was nothing which people can enjoy in common and 
that the very idea of the common good was just an abstract. On this premise 
she argued that government should not plan for the economy with the aim 
of promoting welfare. As she puts it, “the only way a government can be of 
service to national prosperity is by keeping its hands off” (Rand 1967: 141). 
In the light of the above quotation, it can be deduced that Rand’s main 
argument was that an economic system that relies entirely on the free reign 
of self-interest does not need any external interference that is aimed at 
redressing economic inequalities because within the liberal capitalist 
economy things have a tendency of naturally working themselves in a way 
that would benefit everybody in the long run. The modern capitalist 
individualism of antirationalism is also echoed in doctrine of atomic 
individualism. 
2.3.4 Modern Capitalism and Atomic Individualism 
The theory of atomic individualism is based on an understanding of an 
individual as a self-enclosed entity. The theory of atomic individualism 
overlaps with the other two theories of individualism that have been 
discussed above. Other scholars have referred to atomic individualism as 
based on the philosophy of individual liberality or the philosophy of 
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liberalism. The individual is atomised to the extent that s/he is postulated as 
devoid of any relationships with society. As Heilbroner puts it,  
…in [modern Western capitalist societies the individual] is imagined to be a self-
sufficient cell from which a living social organism is constructed. ...These are not 
persons perceived as individuated members of an existing, aboriginal social 
organisation. They are imagined as isolated personages existing without any 
social ties – self-supporting yet mutually dependent hermits, coexisting in a state 
of latent hostility and suspicion (Heilbroner 1985: 120). 
 
Thus in atomic individualism the individual is first and foremost presumed 
to be naturally endowed with an independent existence which is incorrigible 
to the existence of other individuals in society. The overriding ontological 
characteristic of atomic individualism is based on the primacy of individual 
subjectivism. Proponents of atomic individualism accept the existence of 
government only on the premise that it is there to help them into realising 
their self-interests which are presumed to differ radically from other 
individuals’ self-interests. This atomised individualism is the premise of 
modern capitalistic economic liberalism. Robert Nozick comes across as a 
radical individualist by virtue of his advocacy for a society where there is 
minimal state interference within the public sphere of human existence. He 
argued that individuals had “inviolable rights”, Hence, “there is no justified 
sacrifice of some of us for others. The root idea, namely that there are 
different individuals with separate lives and so no one may be sacrificed for 
others, underlies the existence of moral side constraints” (Nozick 1974: 33). 
Within this theory of atomic individualism as espoused by Nozick, the 
existence of the individual cannot be subsumed under the generality of 
social existence because of the prior existence of a truism that individual 
lives are separate from the lives of others. For this reason, what is moral is 
an existential reality that is entirely subjective to the individual existence. 
In atomic individualism the individual is entirely absorbed with his own self-
interest, hence he does not care about the plight of others because as 
individuals we do not have any moral obligation towards those who are poor 
and destitute because according to advocates of atomic individualism, as 
Tibor Machan puts it, “there are no objective goods or objective values, 
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neither the defense of liberty nor any other course of conduct is more 
important than any alternative” (Machan 1993: 2). In other words the 
rightness or wrongfulness of a particular action depends entirely on the 
individual’s subjective evaluation of the choice made by the individual qua 
individual. Nozick put it blatantly that government had no right to charge 
taxes on individual income because it does not own that tax which it charges 
on individuals’ incomes. It is mainly for this reason that proponents of 
atomic individualism claim that the individual is endowed with inviolable 
right to do whatever he so wish with his money and assets. In the light of 
this claim, the theory of atomic individualism suits very well with the free 
market society of modern capitalism. In this regard, the theory of atomic 
individualism presumes that individuals do not need societies for their 
individual wellbeing. In his support of atomic individualism, Samuel Brittan 
argued against the idea of the primacy of society as the foundation for the 
flourishing of the common good when he said, “Collectivities do not think, 
feel, exult, triumph, or despair, and to plan for their benefit is wrong sort of 
high-mindedness” (Brittan 1988: 212). In other words, it is individuals in 
their interiority who ultimately make choices instead of communities. In 
modern liberal capitalism atomised individuals are presumed to be by their 
very nature of individual subjectivity be in the position to appropriate liberal 
capitalistic institutions. It is thus the essence and nature of an atomised 
individual that makes it possible for him or her to appropriate modern 
liberal capitalistic institutions by virtue of being an infinite appropriator 
(Macpherson 1975: 28-29). Modern capitalism theory of atomised 
individualism is based also based on individual endless acquisition of wealth 
as the goal and purpose of the individual’s life. 
A prominent feature that is prominent in atomised individualism in modern 
capitalism is based on the premise that the individual is a utility maximizer. 
All individual actions of the atomised individual of modern capitalism are 
presumed to be aimed at maximising utility for the individual. In the light of 
this goal of utility maximisation, each atomised individual is supposed to act 
after calculating the implication of his or her actions to the maximisation of 
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his or her utility. Alan Hamlin stated that utility maximisation “is personal in 
the sense that the utility to be maximised is my own. Other individuals do 
not enter into the evaluation process…” (Hamlin 1986: 17). In other words, 
the individual in his or her subjectivity is the object of utility maximisation 
to the exclusion of the rest of the members of society. This theory of utility 
maximisation is basically aimed at measuring the atomised individual as the 
subject of mathematisation of the individual’s consuming habits. The objects 
of utility maximisation are individuals as discrete units and not society in 
general. The theory of utility maximisation commensurate well with the 
concept of methodological individualism – a concept that was coined by Max 
Weber. 
Neil Williams (1995: 1) observed that methodological individualism “relies on 
the assumption that one can legitimately abstract away from society a 
primordial atomic individual, and then see what combinations of these 
individuals create a social group [his italics]”. The main underlying 
presumption of methodological individualism is that it is individuals who 
come together to form society, hence society is a sum of individuals who 
compose it. Thus on the basis of this presumption society is only intelligible 
when understood through the intentions, actions and beliefs of individuals. 
It is mainly on the premise of such a presumption that a human being is also 
understood as originally asocial, hence society is a sum of these isolate 
individuals. Groups or collectivities are deemed not to have enduring and 
concrete existence besides individuality. For this reason, Williams 
characterised methodological individualism as an individualistic ontology of 
society. An individualistic ontology of society is also entrenched in the 
writings of Robert Nozick and Samuel Brittan. According to Robert Nozick, 
individuals should be seen as ends in themselves and should not be used to 
further the interests of others. For him, the idea of individual inviolability 
imposes moral constraints on what the state can do in its interaction with 
the individual. He writes,  
The moral side constraints upon what we may do, I claim, reflect the fact of our 
separate existences. They reflect the fact that no moral balancing act can take 
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place among us; there is no moral outweighing of one of our lives by others so as 
to lead to a greater overall social good. There is no justified sacrifice of some of 
us for others. This root idea, namely, that there are different individuals with 
separate lives and so no one may be sacrificed for others, underlies the existence 
of moral side constraints, but it also, I believe, leads to a libertarian side 
constraints that prohibits aggression against another. The stronger the force of 
an end-state maximising view, the more powerful must be the root idea capable 
of resisting it that underlies the existence of moral side constraints. Hence the 
more seriously must be taken the existence of distinct individuals who are not 
resources for others [my emphasis] (Nozick 1974: 33). 
 
What is implied by Nozick in the above quotation is that people should not 
be used in order to further the general wellbeing of society. Doing so 
amounts to violating the principle that as individuals, all persons have a 
separate existence that cannot be subsumed under the social good or 
common good. The type of individualism which Nozick is espousing is 
popularly known as atomic individualism whereby social relations are purely 
superficial. The state is thus not allowed to interfere in the private lives of 
individuals because doing so can only imply the violation of individual 
selves. The presumption is that individuals have autonomous existence from 
society. In this philosophical outlook, individuals are presumed to exist as 
self-defining entities whose identity cannot be subsumed from the generality 
of existence. The theory of atomic individualism is based on some scientific 
presumptions. For example, Rene Descartes who is popularly known for 
giving a synthesis between science and modern Western philosophy argued 
that what can be trusted as existing is geometry and science and that as 
human beings we cannot be sure of the existence of other people. In this 
vein, Descartes wrote,  
While I wanted to think everything false, it must necessarily be that I who 
thought was something; and remarking that this truth, I think, therefore I am, 
was so solid and so certain that all the most extravagant suppositions of the 
sceptics were incapable of upsetting it, I judged that I could receive it without 
scruple as the first principle of the philosophy that I thought (see Russell 1996: 
516).  
The dictum, ‘I think, therefore I am’ implies that a person is defined by his 
or her subjectivity. Thus a human being as ‘a thinking thing’ “is one that 
doubts, understands, conceives, affirms, denies, wills, imagines, and feels – 
for feeling, as it occurs in dreams, is a form of thinking” (see Russell 1996: 
517). Here it can be deduced that Descartes reduced all human experiences 
to the realm of subjectivity. Such a philosophy was very conducive to the 
development of atomic individualism which postulates society as an abstract 
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that does not have any bearing towards the individual’s subjectivity. This 
type of philosophy has some great influence to Nozick’s theory of atomic 
individualism because of the emphasis which he puts on the individual’s 
subjectivity qua individual without any reference to the society where the 
individual belongs. Another western philosopher who had a strong influence 
to the philosophy of atomic individualism is Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz’s 
philosophy as propounded in his book titled Monadology. According to 
Leibniz things existed as substances which cannot be extended and they 
existed as ‘monads’ – thus implying that they are self-enclosed. These 
monads are locked into themselves and have their own conceptualisation of 
the universe in its totality. As he puts it, 
Now this interconnection, relationship, or this adaptation of all things to each 
particular one, and of each one to all the rest, brings it about that every simple 
substance has relations which express all the others and that it is 
consequently a perpetual living mirror of the universe. And as the same city 
regarded from different sides appears entirely different, and is, as it were 
multiplied respectively, so, because of the infinite number of simple 
substances, there are a similar infinite number of universes which are, 
nevertheless, only the aspects of a single one as seen from the special point of 
view of each monad. …Besides, in what has just been said can be seen the a 
priori reasons which things cannot be otherwise than they are. It is because 
God, in ordering the whole, has had regard to every part and in particular to 
each monad; and since the monad is by its very nature representative, nothing 
can limit it to represent merely a part of things. It is nevertheless true that this 
representation is, as regards the details of the whole universe, only a confused 
representation, and is distinct only as regards a small part of them, that is to 
say, as regards those things which are nearest or greatest in relation to each 
monad (Cited in Solomon 1985: 97-98). 
Leibniz’s monads do not interact with each other because in their 
subjectivity each monad mirrors the universe in such a way that there is no 
need to interact with each other. A human body was a monad. These monads 
have been created in such a way that they exist in a state of pre-established 
harmony. Nothing enters or leaves the life of a monad because they are 
deemed to be windowless (Russell 1996: 533). The philosophical 
anthropology of Leibniz thrives on individualism of self-sufficiency whereby 
each individual in society is deemed to be self-sufficient in every respect to 
the extent that s/he does not need help from the other members of society. 
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The very idea that persons exist as windowless monads drives home the idea 
that they cannot be influenced by the existence of other individuals in 
society. Social relations are thus understood as external to the individual. 
Nozick’s theory of atomic individuals augurs well with Leibniz’s 
philosophical anthropology of monadology because for Nozick society has 
been made in such a way that “there are distinct individuals, each with his 
own life to lead” [his italics] (Nozick 1974: 34). In atomic individualism what 
is trivialised is the whole idea of the individual’s responsibility to society to 
which s/he is a member. The individual is basically portrayed as have an 
autonomous existence from that of society. Thus the doctrine of atomic 
individualism is sometimes called the philosophy of liberalism – implying 
that the individual is liberated from society and s/he is at liberty to do what 
pleases her with her wealth. The emphasis that is placed on individual 
autonomy is based on the belief that all individuals are rational and that 
they can make their own decisions for the betterment of their own lives. One 
finds one of the neo-liberal capitalist thinkers, Samuel Brittan stating it 
succinctly that, “Capitalist civilisation is above all rationalist. It is anti-heroic 
and anti-mystical. The spirit that animates it is the very opposite of ‘Theirs 
not to reason why, theirs but to do or die’. The capitalist is forced by 
circumstances to query the way everything is done and endeavour to try and 
find a better way” (Brittan 1988: 9).  Here the presumption is that all people 
are rational and they apply reason to achieve their economic goals. This type 
of reason which is seen as integral to economic liberalism is popularly 
known as instrumental reason. It is called instrumental reason because the 
liberal individual is presumed to use reason to achieve his or her own self-
interests.  Brittan argued that economic liberalism is based on the belief in 
individual freedom to pursue his or her economic activities as well as in free 
speech without any external influence to what she chooses to do. Freedom, 
according to Brittan implies the individual’s ability to spend his or her 
money in a way s/he chooses (Brittan 1988: 37).  This obviously implies that 
the individual should not be constrained by government on how she or he 
wants to spend his or her money.  
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While the ethical theory of utilitarianism is based on the principle of 
promoting ‘the greatest good for the greatest number of people’ as espoused 
by John Stuart Mill, Brittan argued that,  
The traditional economist’s case for a form of market economy has been based 
on what might be called liberal utilitarianism. This is a belief that individual 
desires should normally be satisfied to the maximum degree possible without 
interfering with the desires of others. The utilitarianism involved is a highly 
qualified one. As already mentioned, it seeks to satisfy the people’s preferences 
as shown by their behaviour and not to measure or promote happiness in any 
direct way (Brittan 1988: 37).  
Brittan went on to say that liberal utilitarianism “proceeds on the 
presumption that the individual should usually be regarded as if he is the 
best judge of his own interests” (Brittan 1988: 38). In economic liberalism, as 
stated by Brittan above, one finds that the ethical doctrine of utilitarianism 
is actually given another interpretation which radically differs from that 
which was given by Mill who argued that one should always act in such a way 
that his or her actions should promote the greatest good for the greatest 
number of people. In this regard, actions are supposed to be judged right or 
wrong on the basis of the consequences which the produce. Actions are 
deemed right when they produce happiness that such actions were done. 
Within the scope of this study, of great interest is that utilitarianism is an 
ethical theory that is suitable for welfarism. Early utilitarians such as Jeremy 
Bentham understood welfarism in terms of pleasure and pain. An action was 
good in so far as it produces pleasure, and bad when it produces pain. Act-
utilitarianism maintains that an action is right when it produces more utility 
that the action was done. It is the consequences of actions that lead to moral 
judgement. Human welfare can be promoted when people always act in such 
a way that they keep their promises and are generous to the poor in society 
(Scarre 1988: 439-431). 
According to Brittan, the greatest good has to be restricted to the individual 
instead of society in general. Since the greatest good is the individual good, 
Brittan observed that, “The economic expression of liberal utilitarianism is 
sometimes known as consumer sovereignty…” [his italics] (Brittan 1988: 43). 
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Thus the individual is presumed to be endowed with testes and choices that 
are not necessarily shared with others. It is the individual and her or his 
tastes who is sovereign instead of the state or society as the main foci for 
the promotion of the common good. The idea of ‘consumer sovereignty’ 
refers to the idea that as a consumer, the individual’s tastes should not be 
subsumed under the generality of society. This idea gives an individual an 
autonomous existence. Previously the idea of individual sovereignty was 
expressed by Thomas Hobbes in his book, Leviathan in which is advanced 
the proposition that, “The power of a sovereign is monopolistic in the sense 
that there cannot be any political power that competes with it” (see 
Martinich 1995: 277). In other words, the power of the sovereign is a power 
that is owned exclusively by oneself and cannot be shared with others. While 
in Hobbes’ Leviathan, the sovereign was postulated as the ruler of a state or 
a kingdom. This ruler enjoyed absolute authority over his subjects.  neo-
liberal economists have sometimes argued that economic matters it was the 
individual who was ultimately the sovereign by virtue of the fact that s/he is 
free to make personal choices without any social constraints. For example, 
one finds James Dale Davidson and William Rees-Mogg arguing that 
information technology and the contemporary global neo-liberal capitalism 
was giving rise to the coming of an era of the sovereign individual. As they 
put it,  
The Information Age will be the age of upward mobility. It will afford far more 
equal opportunity for the billions of humans in parts of the world that never 
shared fully in the prosperity of industrial society. The brightest, most 
successful and ambitious of these will emerge as truly Sovereign Individuals. 
At the highest plateau of productivity, these Sovereign Individuals will 
compete and interact on terms that echo the relations among the gods in 
Greek myth” (Davidson and Rees-Mogg 1997: 14-15).  
 
In other words, Davidson and Rees-Mogg’s sovereign individuals will be 
individuals who are self-sufficient and are not in need of society. The same 
attitude of trivialising the importance of society is well stated by Brittan 
(1988: 109) as he advanced three main guidelines for the liberal individual’s 
understanding of economic policy. Firstly, the individual must be seen as 
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“the best judge” of his or her interest in such a way that government policy 
should be tailor-made to fulfil individual aspirations. He labelled this as 
“liberal utilitarianism” in the sense that it gives the individual the freedom to 
decide that which is best for herself or himself.  In this regard, it is not 
society which decides for the individual on what is good for her or him. The 
second policy should be based on “impersonal general rules” whereby policy 
markers minimise their influence on how private institutions should manage 
their affairs. Thirdly, the influence of politics should be minimised so that 
they don’t impinge on individual freedom. According to Brittan, these 
guidelines are an amalgamation of different liberal traditions and they show 
that there is no policy which can be vouchsafed as a guarantee for the 
prioritisation of personal freedom. Those these three guidelines which are 
summarised above are intertwined, sometimes they complement each other 
or conflict with each other. The second guideline, in favour of general rules, 
qualifies the liberal utilitarianism of the first presumption; and the third 
presumption which is against the practice of overextending the political 
area, can make one on occasion less keen on general laws than one would 
otherwise be [his italics] (Ibid). 
 
What is implied by Brittan in the above quotation is that liberalism gives 
precedence to the individual autonomy whereby rules that govern society 
should be impersonal in the sense that such rules should not be 
promulgated with the explicit aim of achieving a particular social goal. In 
this regard, impersonal rules are those rules that usually govern a free 
market economy. In a free market economy, individual actions usually lead 
to outcomes that were not intended by the actors. As we have seen 
previously, Hayek described this as the theory of spontaneous orders, a 
theory that says that “spontaneous collaboration of free men often creates 
things which are greater than their individual minds” (Hayek 1948: 8). 
According to the theory of spontaneous orders, the individual’s actions can 
contribute to something socially beneficially even though s/he did not 
intend to do that. The way how the free market operates is based on 
spontaneous orders because on a free market the individual’s actions are 
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usually aimed at achieving what is to his or her self-interest, and not to the 
interest of society as a whole. For Brittan the ordering and functioning of 
society has to be relegated to these impersonal rules of the free market 
economy. Since individuals are presumed to be free to make choices on a 
free market, it is thus equally presumed that these individuals’ self-interests 
should always prevail.  
 
Paul Heyne is also one of those neo-liberal economists who believed that 
individuals are solely motivated by their private self-interest instead of 
public interest. What we usually interpret as public interest is in actual fact 
private interest. As such, for Heyne, government is there to co-ordinate 
individual private interests and not to promote the common good. He avers, 
“Government is people interacting, paying attention to the expected costs 
and benefits of the alternatives that they perceive. ...A surprising number of 
people assume without thinking about it that ‘government acts in the public 
interest’. But does it really? Does it always do so?” (Heyne 1988: 283). What 
is implied is that government is guided by self-interest in all its decisions 
instead of the popularly presumed public interest. Heyne went on to say 
that, “Those whose decisions make up the sum of government actions will 
pay attention to the information actually available to them and the 
incentives that actually confront them. Economic theory predicts that this 
information and these incentives will tend to be both limited and biased” 
(Ibid). Social conflicts for Heyne should be understood as a conflict of rights, 
especially the right to private property. As he puts it, “Adjudication, or the 
attempt to resolve conflicting claims by seeking to discover existing rights, 
always tries to avoid unexpected decisions or outcomes. It tries to settle 
disagreements over property rights by supporting and reinforcing the 
expectations that are most widely and confidently held” [his italics] (Heyne 
1988: 256). The language of rights is based on the salient presumption that 
individuals are owed rights – that is, that which rights belongs to them.  
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The theory of atomic individualism is also central to the modern concept of 
human rights as it emanated from Western and North American philosophy 
of persons. Ayn Rand writes, 
…a right is the property of an individual, that society as such has no rights, 
and that the only moral purpose of a government is the protection of 
individual rights. …There is only one fundamental right…a man’s right to his 
own life. …the right to life means the right to engage in self-sustaining and 
self-generated action – which means: the freedom to take all the actions 
required by nature of a rational being for the support, the furtherance, the 
fulfilment and the enjoyment of his own life (Rand 1964: 93-94). 
In the light of the above quotation society was just an abstract because what 
was concrete was the individual because s/he was the bearer of rights. The 
individual did not owe society any rights. As she puts it, “As to his 
neighbours, his rights impose no obligations on them except of a negative 
kind: to abstain from violating his rights. …Without property rights, no other 
rights are possible” (Rand 1964: 94). In other words Rand is saying that the 
individual does not have any obligations to the community in which he stays 
except that he should always be on guard that his community does not 
violate his rights. The individual does not owe the community any obligation, 
rather it is the community which owes the individual his rights and these 
rights find their summation in the right to property. All other rights are 
derived from the right to private property. Thus for Rand all morality is 
premised on the right to private property. She writes, “Property rights and 
the right of free trade are man’s only ‘economic rights’ (they are, in fact, 
political rights) – and there can be no such thing as ‘an ‘economic bill of 
rights’ (Rand 1964: 97). In other words, human rights could be group into 
two sets, namely the right to property and the right to free trade. These 
cardinal rights exclude any individual claim to welfare. Rand’s advocacy of 
atomic individualism comes out more explicitly when she said,  
Any group or ‘collective’, large or small, is only a number of individuals. A group 
can have no rights other than the rights of its individual members. In a free 
society, the ‘rights’ of any group are derived from the rights of its members 
through their voluntary, individual choice and contractual agreement, and are 
merely the application of these individual rights to a specific understanding 
(Rand 1964: 102).  
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This understanding of rights is a reiteration of an individualistic ontology of 
society whereby individuals interact with each other as self-sufficient 
members who need nothing from society besides the protection of their 
properties. Since all property was owned on individualistic basis, it also 
implied that society did not have rights.  
Robert Bellah et al characterised North American society as typically steeped 
in an individualistic culture. As they put it, “Anything that would violate our 
right to think for ourselves, judge for ourselves, make our own decisions, 
live our lives as we see fit, is not only morally wrong, it is sacrilegious” (Bell 
et al 1986: 142). This individualism does not recognise the existence of 
communities except individuals and their rights. Individuals are deemed not 
to have any commitments to society besides their own personal self-
interests. An argument that has been raised of critiques of individualism in 
all its forms is that individuals need society to develop their full potentials. 
Alasdair Macintyre observed that,  
The self thus conceived, utterly distinct on the one hand from its social 
embodiments and lacking on the other any rational history of its own, may seem 
to have certain abstract and ghostly character. It is therefore worth remarking 
that a behaviourist account is as much or as little plausible of the self-conceived 
in this manner as of the self-conceived in any other (Macintyre 1983: 31).  
 
In such observations it is evidently clear that individuals will always need 
communities to communicate in a language that is shared within the 
community. Other ethicists such as Charles Taylor have argued against 
atomic individualism in defence of communitarianism by asserting that 
human beings “develop their characteristically human capacities in society” 
whereby “[l]iving in society is a necessary condition of the development of 
rationality, or of becoming a moral agent” (Taylor 1996: 191-197). It is 
mainly in the light of such arguments that one can deduce that individualism 
in all its forms was unintelligible.  
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In post-colonial Africa, because of the general discontent with the values of 
modern capitalism, proponents of the appropriation of modern capitalism 
through economic indigenisation have argued for the need to incorporate 
African traditional values in the modus operandi of modern capitalilsm. 
They argue that the appropriation of modern capitalism can be realised 
through the incorporation of traditional communitarian values in this 
economic system. However, as we shall see in the following sections, 
scholars have held two opposing views with regards to the role of African 
traditional values in the BEE/indigenisation debate and the appropriation of 
modern capitalism in post-colonial sub-Sahara Africa. The first school of 
thought in this debate maintains that values entrenched in modern 
capitalism as we have seen above are incompatible with African traditional 
values. The second school of thought argues that the initial appropriation of 
modern capitalism was enabled by individualistic values that were 
disseminated to Africa through colonialism, Christianity and Islam. 
 
2.4 African Traditional Communitarian Values and the Values of Modern 
Capitalism 
Those who argue against the symbiosis between colonialism and modern 
capitalism buttress their arguments on the premise that African traditional 
society was communitarian and collectivist in its economic outlook therefore 
modern western capitalism can never be appropriated in the African context. 
However, we have seen previously that most of the African nationalists 
appealed to African traditional communitarian values of collectivism in their 
socio-economic construction of what they called African socialism which 
they presumed to be inherent in African traditional societies. In these 
arguments the preoccupation of African nationalists was to appeal to 
African traditional collectivist values with the aim of reconstructing African 
socialism as opposed to the western modern capitalist economic system 
which was seen as the handmaid of capitalism. However, other scholars 
simply argued that modern capitalist values were incompatible with African 
traditional communistic values. 
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The arguments of post-colonial African communitarians can be categorised 
as communitarian ontology of society. In this African communitarian 
ontology of society, African post-colonial scholars refuted the Hobbesian 
contractarian theory of social existence and atomic individualism. The 
African scholars have argued that what makes a person in the African 
communalistic ontology of society is the existential reality of common 
belonging. For example, scholars such as John Mbiti have argued against 
atomic individualism as entrenched in Rene Descartes philosophy in which 
he postulated an individual as a self-enclosed entity by virtue of being a 
thinking thing. Descartes’ philosophy was based on an individualistic 
ontology of society when he said, “I think therefore I am” – Cogito ergo sum 
(Latin). This philosophical dictum of human existence implied that other 
things or other human beings in society could only be known through a 
process of inference from what is known in one’s mind (See Russell 1991: 
547-551; Murove 2016: 79). Thus one finds Mbiti refuting this Cartesian 
individualistic ontology of society by proffering the argument that in African 
traditional kinship system,  
…everybody is related to everybody else…the individual does not and cannot 
exist alone except corporately. He owes his existence to other people, including 
those of past generations and his contemporaries. He is simply part of the whole. 
The community must therefore make, create or produce the individual; for the 
individual depends on the corporate group. …Only in terms of other people does 
the individual become conscious of his own being, his own duties, his privileges 
and responsibilities towards himself and towards other people. When he suffers, 
he does not suffer alone but with the corporate group; when he rejoices, he 
rejoices not alone but with the corporate group…Whatever happens to the 
individual happens to the whole group, and whatever happens to the whole 
group happens to the individual. The individual can only say: I am, because we 
are; and since we are, therefore I am, The is a cardinal point in the understanding 
of the African view of a [person] [my italics] (Mbiti 1970: 136-141). 
 
In the light of the above quotation, communalistic ontology of society as 
embedded in the African kinship system is based on the presumption that 
persons are persons or attain their personhood because of their natural 
common belongingness to society. A human being is originally social by 
nature. It because of the reality of common belonging that individuals attain 
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their ultimate wellbeing. In this African communalistic ontology of society, 
the individual is an individual because of the prior existence of community 
and not by virtue of insulated rationality. The same observation was made 
by Munyaradzi Murove when he said that, “The mind itself [is] something 
that is mediated or contributed to by the community by virtue of the fact 
that the individual is born and socialised in the community” (Murove 2016: 
79). For us to understand the individual we need to start by understanding 
the community in which the individual is imbedded. This conceptualisation 
of the individual’s existence radically differs from methodological 
individualism which is mainly based on the idea that society was just a sum 
of individuals. The implication of the African communalistic ontology of 
society radically debunks modern capitalistic individualism in all its forms 
as outlined previously. In the same vein, Ifeanyi Menkiti argued against the 
Western individualistic ontology of society on the premise that it postulates 
society as a composition of individuals who happen to come together with 
the explicit purpose of protecting their self-interests. In this regard the 
community is thought of as an “aggregated sum of individuals comprising 
it”. For Menkiti, the Westen understanding of the community and the 
individual is an articulation of “methodological individualism” which has a 
prior commitment to the existence of collectivities (Menkiti 1984: 179). In 
Western individualistic ontology of society, Menkiti said that community is 
understood as a collection of individuals or “a non-organic bringing together 
of atomic individuals into a unit more akin to an association than 
community”. In this individualistic ontology of society, social existence 
becomes bearable on the precondition that such an existence is premised 
“around the postulation of individual rights” (Menkiti 1984: 180). 
 
The existence of community is not something which Africans theorise about, 
rather they live communal lives. The individual’s identity is not a private 
possession, rather it communal in the sense that it was originally 
contributed to by the community. In this regard what it ultimately means to 
be human is to be in communion whereby the individual shares the 
communal values with others. The individual is regarded as someone with 
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Ubuntu (humanness) when s/he lives in harmony with others. As such, the 
individual’s humanness is not premised on the property they have, but on 
his or her ability to live in harmony with others. As we have seen in the 
preceding section, Western and North American attitude to wealth is based 
on the pursuit of self-interest and unbridled acquisitions without any sense 
of care and concern for the community. Whilst modern capitalism focuses 
on the individual as the pinnacle of economic achievements and 
acquisitiveness, African communitarianism puts emphasis on helping fellow 
community members who are in need and making sure that there is peace 
and harmony within the community. In traditional African society the 
accumulation of wealth was based on the principle of sufficiency. In African 
traditional society, as Michael Gelfand put it, “Each [person] is entitled to a 
portion of the land sufficient for his or [her] needs and those of his or [her] 
family. Materially, therefore, members of such a [community] cannot be 
divided into haves and have-nots” (Gelfand 1981:65). In this traditional 
African economic outlook, the instinct to endless acquisitiveness and greed 
was curtailed by traditional ethos of sufficiency which took into account the 
economic needs of others. The traditional African attitude to wealth was also 
based on the individual ontology which was articulated in the ethical concept 
of Unhu/Ubuntu.  
 
2.4.1 The African individual ontology of Unhu/Ubuntu and the African 
Attitude towards Wealth 
It has been the central presumption of this chapter thus far that a cultural 
and philosophical ontology of persons has a strong bearing on that culture’s 
attitude towards wealth. As we have seen in the previously, the Western and 
North American presumption that human beings were solely self-interested, 
always interested in pursuing their self-interests without a sense of concern 
for the wellbeing of community is basically attributed to the ascendency of 
modern capitalism in the West and North America. We have seen previously 
that Marx Weber articulated this presumption more clearly when he 
advanced the theory that there was some early connection between the 
ascendency of modern capitalism in Western and North American society 
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and the Protestant ethic that exonerated greed, hard work and thrift as 
virtues that were cultivated within the domain of the economy. The concept 
of Unhu (Shona)/Ubuntu (Zulu/Xhosa/Ndebele) means humanness 
(Samkange and Samkange 1980: 39; Ramose 1999: 52). This implies humane 
treatment of other people. As Murove observed that in Unhu/Ubuntu, “One 
experiences a sense of dignity and worthiness by the way s/he is treated by 
others. In turn, one affirms the humanness of others by saying la bantu bano 
buntu – these people have humanness or that they are a true embodiment of 
what it really means to be human” (Murove 2016: 173). The ethic of 
Unhu/Ubuntu is based on the presumption that our human existence or the 
individual’s existence and ultimate wellbeing is intertwined with the 
existence and wellbeing of others within the community. This presumption 
is augmented with a Zulu/Xhosa adage which says Umuntu ngumuntu 
ngabantu (a person is a person because of other persons). In other words, 
personhood is something that is derivative from our relationality with others 
within the community. This adage drives home the idea that human beings 
are relational beings. They don’t chose to be relational, rather they find 
themselves or are born in a web of relationships. Mvume Dandala 
emphasised the primacy of relationality in the ethic of Ubuntu when he said, 
“The saying Umuntu ngomuntu ngabantu becomes a statement that levels all 
people. It essentially states that no one can be self-sufficient and that 
interdependence is a reality of all” (Dandala 2009: 260). In the light of 
Dandala’s interpretation of Ubuntu, it is clear that Ubuntu is incompatible 
with the values individualism that are pivotal to modern capitalism in 
Western societies and North America. Within the above adage, we can deduce 
that Ubuntu is pragmatic communitarian ontology of society. In such 
ontology of society, the individual’s is expected to be virtuous in his her 
relationships with others in the community at large. In this regard, having 
Ubuntu is the primary foundation for a good character or humanness. 
 
However, in post-colonial Africa the ethic of Unhu/Ubuntu has generated two 
dominant responses that appear to be epistemologically irreconcilable. The 
first school of thought argues that the communitarian ontology of society is 
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simply incompatible with the modus operandi of modern capitalism 
therefore this communitarian ontology of society could be a contributory 
factor the failure of the appropriation of capitalism in post-colonial Africa. 
This type of argument is also a refutation of the intelligibility of 
indigenisation of modern capitalism in post-colonial Africa. The second 
school of thought maintains that Ubuntu can be incorporated into the 
modus of operandi of modern capitalism in a way that will lead to the 
appropriation of modern capitalism in post-colonial Africa. In this school of 
thought, it is also argued that the indigenisation of capitalism in post-
colonial Africa should have Unhu/Ubuntu as the moral base for this 
economic system. While I shall not go into a detailed discussion of these 
schools of thought on Unhu/Ubuntu, it will be the focus of chapter 3 to give 
an extensive discussion on these two schools of thought. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter my concern was to make a comparative investigation between 
modern capitalistic values that were considered to be indispensable in the 
West and North America to the ascendency of capitalism. The chapter 
started by arguing that there was a symbiotic relationship between modern 
capitalism as it was mediated to Africa from the West and colonialism. 
Because of this symbiotic relationship between modern capitalism and 
colonialism, I have shown that the argument that was proffered by African 
nationalists was that African traditional values of collectivism were 
incompatible with modern capitalism, hence an economic system that was 
based on socialism was more commensurate with African traditional values 
of collectivism. I have also observed that the argument of African socialism 
can be seen as an attempt by African nationalist to indigenise capitalism 
through the claim that pre-colonial society was collectivist. 
However, I went on to discuss modern capitalist values which some Western 
sociologists such as Marx Weber have identified as the explanatory reason 
for the ascendency of modern capitalism in Western societies and North 
America. Weber identified these historical modern capitalist values as thrift, 
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hard work and frugality. I went on to argue that the argument that was 
proffered by scholars is that in post-colonial Africa colonialists did not 
pursue their economic activities on the basis of these Weberian values 
because capitalism within the colonial African context was mainly about 
expropriating natural resources from the colonised African people.  
In the light of the above observations, I went on to discuss whether modern 
capitalist values as they originated from the West and North America were 
commensurate with African traditional values. In this regard it was also 
observed that the modern capitalist values that evolved from the West and 
North America were mainly based on an individualistic ontology of society. 
This individualistic ontology of society differed sharply with the African 
communitarian ontology of society on the grounds that in Africa the 
individual’s wellbeing was indispensable from the wellbeing of the 
community. This claim was authenticated in my discussion of the individual 
ontology that is embedded in the ethic of Unhu/Ubuntu. The Southern 
African concept of Unhu/Ubuntu has been integral to the post-colonial 
Southern African discourse on indigenisation and the appropriation of 
capitalism in that part of Africa. Some scholars have argued about the 
indigenisation of capitalism on the basis of the African individual ontology 
as enshrined in the ethic of Ubuntu/Unhu as we shall see in the following 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER THREE: UBUNTU/UNHU AND THE INDIGENISATION 
DISCOURSE IN POST-COLONIAL SOUTHERN AFRICA 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The ethical concept of Ubuntu is regarded by many scholars as the 
foundation of African ethics in Southern Africa. It is for this reason that 
Ubuntu has been applied in various disciplines such as religion, politics, 
philosophy, business ethics, environmental conservation, just to mention a 
few, with the aim of indigenising these disciplines so that they could be 
epistemologically accessible to the majority of the African people. As I have 
shown towards the end of chapter 2, there are two competing schools of 
thought on the relevance of Ubuntu to modern capitalism in post-colonial 
Southern African capitalistic business context. The first school of thought 
maintains that the ethic of Ubuntu is a suitable ethic that should be made 
integral to a business ethics discourse and practice within the capitalistic 
economic context of post-colonial Southern Africa. It is maintained in this 
school of thought that modern capitalistic business practices should be 
given a local cultural flavour by making the ethic of Ubuntu the mode of 
transmission of the values that should prevail when doing business in post-
colonial Southern African context. 
In the second school of thought there are other scholars who argue that the 
communitarian ontology of society that is espoused in Ubuntu is 
incommensurable with the modus operandi of the global neo-liberal 
capitalism and the individualistic ontology of society that is embedded in 
this economic system. The implication of this argument is that the ethic of 
Ubuntu cannot lead to the appropriation of modern capitalism as presumed 
by the proponents of the indigenisation of modern capitalism in southern 
Africa. The presumption underlying this school of thought is that Africa can 
only appropriate modern capitalism by emulating the Western and North 
American values that gave rise to the ascendency of modern capitalism in 
these societies. In other words, the indigenisation of modern capitalism 
through Ubuntu is seen as a misdirected academic project.  
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Since these two schools of thought remain the main focus of this chapter, 
the chapter is divided into two sections. The first section will discuss the 
contemporary discourse on the ethic of Ubuntu with specific reference to the 
appropriation of modern capitalism in Southern Africa. In the second section 
I will discuss the arguments of those scholars who are against the ethic of 
Ubuntu as a relevant indigenous African ethic for the appropriation of 
modern capitalism in post-colonial Southern Africa. Thereafter I shall come 
to some conclusion for the whole chapter. 
 
3.2 The Ethic of Unhu/Ubuntu and the Appropriation of Modern 
Capitalism 
With the end of socialism in Eastern Europe and the failure of the ‘African 
socialism’ project in post-colonial Africa, modern capitalism remained the 
only economic system for Africa and the whole world. Dietmar Mieth and 
Marciano Vidal observed that the neo-liberal capitalistic economic hegemony 
was analogous to the hegemony of the early Catholic Church. As he put it, 
“This hegemony of the capitalist economic model with neo-liberal stamp has 
made us recall an old, disused theological axiom from ecclesiology: ‘Outside 
the church there is no salvation’. Secularising this axiom, we can ask, ‘Is 
there no salvation outside capitalism?” (Mieth and Vidal 1997: vii). The 
ascendency of neoliberal capitalism to world dominance triggered diverse 
reactions from scholars of diverse academic backgrounds. 
Neo-liberalism has dominated all the world markets in a way that could be 
characterised as imperious. Within this imperious mode, the economic 
wellbeing of all peoples of the world is premised on embracing the policies 
of neo-liberal capitalism without any possibility of an option for a neutral 
stance. Francisco Gómez Camacho stated this imperious nature of neo-
liberal capitalism more succinctly when he said, “Either you are in favour of 
the market, or you are against it; you can take it or leave it, but no 
intermediate position seems to be possible” (Camacho 1997: 3-4).  The global 
neo-liberal economic system is based on an individualistic ontology of 
society, which the proponents of neo-liberal capitalism presume to be 
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globally universalisable. For example, as we have seen in chapter 2, 
Davidsom and Rees-Mogg argued that the current ascendency of neo-liberal 
capitalism to global dominance which is being facilitated by information 
technology is bringing into existence an era of sovereign individuals. As they 
put it, “The Sovereign individual of the new millennium will no longer be an 
asset of the state, a de facto item on the treasury’s balance sheet. After the 
transition of the year 2000, denationalized citizens will no longer be citizens 
at all, but customers” (Davidson and Rees-Mogg 1997: 23). In other words, 
the expansion of neo-liberal capitalism all over the globe was liberating 
individuals from social relations and commitments. It is mainly in the light 
of this brief background to neo-liberal global capitalism that some scholars 
see the ethic of Ubuntu as an ethic that can assist in the appropriation of the 
current neo-liberal capitalism. Thus the ethic of Ubuntu could be applied 
within the modern capitalistic business environment of companies and 
organisations. It was argued that companies would fare well if they adopt 
African values that are enshrined in the ethic of Ubuntu. Barbara Nussbaum 
expressed the above observation more succinctly when she said,  
The South African research and experience demonstrated unequivocally how and 
why Africans, informed as they are by Ubuntu, are masters of the awareness of 
the need to communicate and the processes required to build and maintain 
communal relationships. In American ‘business-speak’, these are ‘social 
technologies’. In southern Africa, they would probably simply be termed 
relationship, or community building (Nussbaum 2009: 242). 
 
In the light of the above quotation Nussbaum is saying that the ethic of 
Ubuntu should be made integral to capitalistic business practices in the 
African context because in the ethic of Ubuntu emphasis is put on the 
humane treatment of people. According to Nussbaum, this humane 
treatment of people can also be applied to the work place. Nussbaum went 
on to argue that the South African King Report on Corporate Governance 
made a deduction to the effect that, “The essence of Ubuntu (humanity) that 
cuts across Africa is based on the premise that you can be respected only 
because of your cordial co-existence with others” (Nussbaum 2009: 248). As 
for Nussbaum, a commitment to an ethic of Ubuntu implies the promotion 
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of harmonious relationships within the workplace. The she sees this 
deduction as generalizable to the West and the US, especially on the idea of 
cultivating an ethos of inclusivity within the business atmosphere. She 
writes,  
Capitalism infused with Ubuntu would help to foster nations truly united 
through generous, co-operative consciousness that recognises the 
commonality of groups as much as the sovereignty of individuals. …Ubuntu 
would help to provide an integrating philosophy, or mechanism, to inform 
transform business relationships between the seemingly separate categories of 
profit and people, politics and economics, material and spiritual. Ubuntu 
would seek to create conditions in which relationships might be mutually 
reinforcing, productive, fair and co-operative within and between companies 
and in their links with national and global networks (Nussbaum 2009:249-
250). 
What is implied in the above quotation is that Ubuntu has the potential to 
contribute to a virtue ethic within a modern capitalistic business 
environment. Whilst it is not clear as to how Ubuntu ethic would contribute 
to virtue ethics in the modern capitalistic business environment, Nussbaum’s 
presumption is that Ubuntu is a virtue ethic which has the potential of 
transforming business institutions and individuals within capitalist 
businesses in a way that will assist in the and promotion of virtuous 
behaviour. In this mode of thought one can deduce that Ubuntu has positive 
contribution to make towards the transformation of global capitalism. For 
Nussbaum, the virtue ethic qualities that are inherent in the ethic of Ubuntu 
make it a relevant ethical tradition to be reckoned within the global business 
arena. Nussbaum concludes by saying, “Hopefully, the principles of Ubuntu 
will spark new ways of thinking for business that challenge us to become 
mature, generous and caring. Were business to be valued according to what 
it did for others, and in the service of humanity, it might help create the kind 
of world that works for all” (Nussbaum 2009: 256). However, in the light of 
the individualistic ontology of society which is inherent in modern liberal 
capitalism, as we have seen in chapter 2, what Nussbaum is advocating as 
the would-be contribution of Ubuntu to global capital capitalism is in 
actuality the exact opposite of the cherished business values of business 
under the global hegemony of neo-liberal capitalism. Here it can also be 
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deduced that advocates of the efficacy of the ethic of Ubuntu in business 
under the global hegemony of neo-liberal capitalism implied the 
appropriation of global neo-liberal capitalism. In other words, the salient 
presumption is that African ethical values such as those enshrined in the 
ethic of Ubuntu should be made integral to neo-liberal capitalistic business 
practices.  
Nussbaum’s convictions about the efficacy of the ethic of Ubuntu and the 
appropriation of global neo-liberal capitalistic business discourse were also 
echoed by Mvume Dandala when he observed that companies would fare 
well ethically when they embrace the values enshrined in the ethic of Ubuntu 
at the workplace. Thus Dandala had this to say, 
Most large companies were started by people with a human face. But as they 
grew in size and stature, Ubuntu receded and companies often became remote 
edifices sometimes even threatening to ordinary people. When Africans are 
involved in a situation where they are expected and encouraged to continue a 
tradition, such as that of quality service within an organisation, the seeds of 
belonging are planted. If this is done, their upbringing, to observe and develop 
values and grow in character, will play its part (Dandala 2009: 273).      
In the above quotation Dandala is admonishing that if only Ubuntu could be 
accepted in companies then African people will feel that they belong and this 
feeling of belonging will eventually lead to appropriation capitalism. Other 
scholars have maintained that as an ethical concept, Ubuntu can promote a 
work ethic of solidarity within the work place. John Mafunisa emphasised 
the ethos of solidarity in Ubuntu when he said,  
Vhavenda warns its tribal members: Munwe muthibi a u tuse mathuthu (One 
finger cannot pick stamped mealies), which translates a, ‘A person can’t perform 
many jobs alone’. It means that in Vhavenda social custom, people’s values and 
needs can only be promoted effectively by a unified effort by all members of the 
society (Mafunisa 2008: 119-120).  
What is implied here is that the adoption of the ethic of Ubuntu would 
promote an attitude of solidarity among employees and their employers. 
Thus in this way of thinking, one finds that the ethic of Ubuntu is portrayed 
as a panacea to work ethic within the context of Africa because of the 
emphasis that is put on the humane treatment of people at the work place. It 
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is mainly for this reason that Mafunisa went on to make the following 
deduction,  
The solution to Africa’s current negative work ethic lies in learning from those 
public employees who successfully find a happy medium between African 
societal values and their employers’ demands for productivity. When training 
future African public employees, one can no longer ignore the fact that their 
mentality is often affected more by the ideal of the common good, than by the 
importance of individual performance, which has often been imported from 
North American management models (Mafunisa 2009: 122). 
In the light of the above quotation, it is abundantly clear that Mafunisa is 
arguing that African poor work ethic arises from the fact that traditional 
African traditional values are hardly integrated in the work environment. 
The hold which African traditional values have on African workers is the 
explanatory reason why Africans prioritise the common good over individual 
performance at the work place. However, needless to say that Mafunisa’s 
argument that African traditional values would promote the ideals of the 
common good goes against the ideal of the appropriation of modern 
capitalism which, as we have seen previously in chapter 2, puts emphasis on 
individual performance qua individual since these individudals are 
ultimately responsible for their actions. Whilst other scholars have wrote 
about the African ethic of Ubuntu with specific reference to its relevance to 
modern capitalism within post-colonial Africa, others have maintained that 
the ethic of Ubuntu has some relevance within the global modern neo-liberal 
capitalist economic system. 
3.2.1 Ubuntu and Neo-liberal Capitalism 
 Amidst the global expansion of neo-liberal capitalism, some African 
scholars have argued in a way that tends to imply that post-colonial Africa 
can only appropriate global neo-liberal capitalism by promoting an ethic of 
human centred solidarity as enshrined in the ethic of Ubuntu. Here the 
presumption of the advocates of the ethic of Ubuntu is that the globalisation 
of neo-liberal capitalism is leading to the domination of rich countries of the 
northern hemisphere over poor countries of the southern hemisphere. This 
way of thinking can be discerned from Mogobe Ramose when he said, 
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Ubuntu is ontologically a -ness and not an –ism. As such it is epistemologically 
oriented towards the construction of knowledge which is undogmatic by 
character. …Ubuntu is one of the core philosophical concepts and 
organisational principles of the Bantu-speaking peoples. The peoples must, in 
the face of economic globalisation, cement strong ties of solidarity among 
themselves first. Here, the desideratum for solidarity is indeed the 
construction of a boundary, and so bounded reasoning is neither alien nor 
necessary repugnant to Ubuntu philosophy. But the delimitation of boundaries 
here is a means to an end rather than an end it itself. Therefore, the Bantu-
speaking peoples must remain open to collaborate with all human beings the 
world over, who are determined to replace the deadly dogma of economic 
fundamentalism with the life-giving logic of –ness, putting the preservation of 
human life through sharing before the relentless pursuit of profit (Ramose 
2005: 114-115). 
 
As for Ramose, the concept of Ubuntu has the capability to resist the 
expansive nature of global neo-liberal capitalism. The economic system of 
neo-liberal capitalism is the antithesis of Ubuntu by the virtue of the fact 
that it puts priority on the pursuit of profits at the expense of human 
wellbeing. Armed with the concept of Ubuntu, Ramose maintained that 
Bantu-speaking people are in the position to collaborate with other people in 
the world who are committed to overcome economic fundamentalism that is 
entrenched in the global neo-liberal capitalism. Thus it is Ramose’s main 
conviction that the concept of Ubuntu cannot be reconciled with the modus 
operandi of the global neo-liberal economic system. The main reason for this 
irreconcilability lied in the fact that the global neo-liberal capitalist system 
dehumanised people as it gives prime value to profit over human wellbeing. 
Through the concept of Ubuntu Ramose believed that the global neo-liberal 
capitalism cannot be appropriated, rather Ubuntu remains the main ethical 
resource for resistance against this economic system through the implied 
human solidaristic social outlook. However, there are some scholars who 
have argued against the ethic Ubuntu as an appropriate indigenous ethic for 
the appropriation of modern capitalism and neo-liberal capitalism. 
   
54 
 
3.3 Arguments against the Ethic of Ubuntu and the Appropriation of 
Modern Capitalism 
Some Western scholars have argued against Ubuntu/Hunhu mainly on the 
grounds that such an ethical concept was a creation of academics which did 
not have any relevance to contemporary society. This is the argument that 
was advanced by a Dutch anthropologist, Wim van Binsbergen when he said, 
In the hands of academic philosophers, Ubuntu/hunhu has become a key concept 
to evoke the unadulterated forms of African social life before the European 
conquest. The world-view (in other words the values, beliefs and images) of pre-
colonial Southern Africa is claimed to survive today, more or less, in remote 
villages and intimate kin relationships, and to constitute an inspiring blue-print 
for the present and future of socio, economic and political life in urban and 
modern environments, at the very centres of the economy and the political 
system. It is thus that Ubuntu/hunhu also serves as a concept in management 
ideologies in the transitional stages of post-apartheid (2002). 
 
In the light of the above quotation, van Binsbergen’s argument is that 
Ubuntu/hunhu is rather being used by African scholars in a way that is 
utopian. In other words, it was unrealistic to expect Ubuntu/hunhu to be of 
practical relevance to the modern capitalistic system which in most cases is 
found in urban areas. van Binsbergen argued that the utopian use of the 
concept of Ubuntu in socio-economic transformation is that the use of this 
ethical concept is not commensurate with the modern realities in the sense 
that this ethical concept does not concur with factual modern economic life 
of the present day because the socio-economic realities of the era in which 
the concept was used are no longer existent. He writes, “Serious problems 
await the intellectual if she or he fails to perceive utopian and prophetic 
statements as such, and instead proceeds to an empirical critique as if such 
statements are meant not primarily to muse and to exhort, but to give a 
factual description”. van Binsbergen went on to allege that the concept of 
Ubuntu and other indigenous African concepts do remain utopian in the 
sense that, “They primarily express the speaker’s dreams about norms and 
practices that allegedly once prevailed in what we are now to be considered 
peripheral places (notably, within the intimacy of allegedly closely-knit 
villages, urban wards, and kin groups)” (van Binsbergen 2000). In the light of 
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the above quotation, the emphasis the argument which is basically being 
made by van Binsbergen is that the ethical concept of Ubuntu/hunhu is being 
used naively without taking into account its implications to the reality of a 
globalised world. Thus he writes,  
If Ubuntu is to be Africa’s great gift to the global world of thought, it is 
primarily not the African villager’s gift, but that of the academic and 
managerial codifiers who allowed themselves to be distantly and selectively 
inspired by village life: ignoring the ubiquitous conflicts and contradictions, 
the oppressive immanence of the world-view, the witchcraft beliefs and 
accusations the constant oscillations between trust and distrust, and merely 
appropriating the bright side (van Binsbergen 2000: 11-12). 
One can easily deduce from the above quotation that van Binsbergen is 
asserting that the contribution of the ethical concept of Ubuntu/hunhu to 
globalisation is not coming from the villagers who live according to the 
values entrenched in Ubuntu/hunhu, but from academics who do not live 
according to value systems of Ubuntu. For him, the belief systems in village 
setting where Ubuntu/hunhu is found are not compatible with the 
modernised African academics. It is mainly for this reason that van 
Binsbergen sees the African academic as someone who is not in the proper 
existential position to speak about Ubuntu/hunhu because of urbanisation - 
a sociological phenomenon that radically differs from traditionalism. On the 
basis of the above argument one can easily deduce that van Binsbergen 
shares a sceptical outlook on the efficacy of Ubuntu/hunhu towards the 
indigenisation of global capitalism and the resultant appropriation of 
capitalism in post-colonial southern Africa. As puts it, “The current Ubuntu 
industry, however, has largely resorted to [d]istantly, and without recourse 
to explicit and systematic methodological and empirical procedures, but 
instead driven by academic philosophers’ and management consultants’ 
intuitive linguistic analyses and childhood reminiscences” (van Binsbergen 
2000: 11-12). 
In the light of the above quotation, van Binsbergen is arguing against the 
efficacy of Ubuntu in the business sphere as well as in the global world of 
business because of the interests of academics and management consultants 
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whose interests differ remarkably from the use of Ubuntu within the African 
traditional village setting. However, it is evidently clear that for van 
Binsbergen Ubuntu is not applicable to business ethics in post-colonial 
Southern Africa. Van Binsbergen’s scepticism towards the efficacy of Ubuntu 
and the appropriation of modern capitalism comes out succinctly when he 
euphemistically characterised the whole discourse on Ubuntu as ‘Ubuntu 
industry’. Van Binsbergen’s analysis of Ubuntu found appreciation among 
Western scholars who argue against the very existence of the ethical concept 
of Ubuntu/Hunhu among Africans within their traditional setting. Such 
scholars have gone as far as claiming that Ubuntu was just a scholarly 
fabrication which is not found among Africans within their traditional village 
setting. Patrick McAllister is among those scholars who appreciated Van 
Binsbergen’s denigration of Ubuntu. He writes,  
While theologians sing its praises and philosophers tease out its imagined 
nuances and implications, Ubuntu has also been appropriated by sectors of 
the business community as a management strategy and embraced by many 
business organisations, where it is construed as a particularly African 
management style that emphasises the importance of good communication, 
dialogue, and solidarity within organisations. Some local and international 
enterprises use the term in their name, seeking to apply in the business 
environment values and orientations which are assumed to exist in village life 
and which are thought to be uniquely African (McAllister 2009: 3).   
 
In the light of the above quotation it is evidently clear that McAllister is of 
the opinion that Ubuntu does not exist, rather it’s an academic creation by 
African scholars. MacAllister’s interpretation of Ubuntu is based on an 
epistemological expropriation of the ethical value that is cardinal to African 
moral outlook because anyone with a grain of knowledge about 
Ubuntu/hunhu and the gist of African moral outlook will not fail to find out 
that this ethical concept is the foundation of African ethics and also the 
basis of human relations in African societies. Here I should like to assert 
with confidence as an African that in Southern Africa Ubuntu/hunhu remains 
cardinal to African indigenous moral outlook. However, this assertion is 
refuted by MacAllister when he avers that,  
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In the context of rural African village life, such as that experienced and 
documented by anthropologists, the term Ubuntu is but rarely heard, claim 
Van Binsbergen, and I have to agree. In twenty four months of intermittent 
residence among Xhosa people in a rural location in Willowvale district, 
Transkei, I hardly ever heard the word, and I would not be able to produce 
evidence that it embodies a rural philosophy or set of values and norms that 
people use as an everyday reference to judge the quality of actions 
(MacAllister 2009: 5). 
MacAllister’s refutation of the authenticity of Ubuntu as an African ethical 
tradition is unintelligible because his refutation is not based on the works of 
African scholars who have written on Ubuntu, rather his main source is what 
the Dutch anthropologist Van Binsbergen’s has written about Ubuntu in a 
way that is rather condescending. The denigration of the relevance of 
African indigenous knowledge system is completely unhelpful in the 
conceptualisation of Ubuntu and its contribution to the appropriation of 
modern capitalism. If one has to look into Western ethical traditions one 
finds that it is not all Western people who are capable of articulating 
Emmanuel Kant’s deontological ethics or John Stuart Mill’s Utilitarian ethics. 
I have also stayed and socialised with Europeans most of my life but I have 
never heard them talking about deontological ethics or utilitarianism. It is 
totally irrational for MacAllister to expect Africans to be speaking about 
Ubuntu among themselves. Ubuntu is mainly about the African 
understanding of a person which is usually expressed in doing or in the way 
one relates to others in community.  
The way a person relates to others shows the presence of Ubuntu or its 
absence thereof. This idea comes out more poignantly when Desmond Tutu 
said, “A person with Ubuntu is open and available to others, affirming of 
others, does not feel threatened that others are able and good, for he or she 
has a proper self-assurance that comes from knowing that he or she belongs 
in a greater whole and is diminished when others are tortured or oppressed, 
or treated as if they were less than who they are” (Tutu 1999: 31). Here the 
implication is that Ubuntu is a philosophy of life which is expressed through 
solidaristic communal existence. This philosophy of life is mainly in doing 
instead of discourse. According to Munyaradzi Felix Murove,  
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A person who is mostly preoccupied with their own self-interest at the expense 
of the wellbeing of the community is not seen as Muntu because to such a person 
relationships with others are only deemed important on the precondition that 
they help to advance personal interest. It is for this reason that people described 
such a person as someone uzicabangela (Zulu) or anozvifunga (Shona) – s/he 
only thinks for himself or herself to the exclusion of the wellbeing of others 
(Murove 2016: 186).   
In other words, a person who is endowed with Ubuntu will always show a 
sense of concern for others and does not live life solely on the dictates of 
self-interest. Thus Murove went on to observe that, “One also finds that such 
a person is described as endowed with nhliziyo emphi (Zulu) or mwoyo 
wakashata (Shona) – a cruel heart. To have nhliziyo emphi means that such a 
person has no concern for the wellbeing of the community or those whom 
s/he lives with” (Murove 2016: 186). Such an observation shows that Ubuntu 
is mainly about doing, that is, what a person does in his or her relationship 
with others rather than being discursive. MacAllister was mistaken when he 
expected to expect Africans to discuss the meaning of Ubuntu among 
themselves because among Africans Ubuntu is understood as an inherent 
moral disposition within each and every individual. As an inherent moral 
disposition, it is expected that the individual will always act in ways that 
enhances the flourishing of Ubuntu in his or her day to day intercourse with 
others in the community. Nhlanhla Mkhize made a similar observation when 
he said,  
In traditional African thought, human beings are born into a human society and 
hence the communitarian and concrete (as opposed to abstract) view of the self. 
Unlike the Hobbesian subjects, who stand in isolation to define themselves as 
solitary, unattached thinkers, the human being in African thought defines the 
self with respect to the quality of his or her participation in a community of 
similarly constituted selves (Mkhize 2008: 39).  
In other words, it is Ubuntu is not about discussing what it means to be a 
person, but living life in a way that shows the manifestation of Ubuntu. It is 
a life that is lived on the principle of relationality and interdependence 
within the community. In African ethical tradition, the essence of a person is 
also based on the idea of common belonging as opposed to atomic 
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individualism as we have seen previously in chatper . Individuals are mostly 
evaluated on the basis of fostering common belongingness in their actions. 
As stated previously, to be a person is to live in communion with others. It is 
the communal context that provides with the foundation for personal 
character. In this regard, John Mbiti puts it well when he said, “The 
individual can only say: I am because we are, and since we are, therefore I 
am” (Mbiti 1969: 108). To be is to belong instead of existing as a monad as 
propounded in the philosophy of Leibnez as we have seen previously. The 
individual ontology that arises from the African understanding of persons is 
indispensable from communal belongingness. The individual’s being is thus 
understood as originally entangled with the existence of others to such an 
extent that what the individual’s being and becoming cannot be understood 
in separation from the existence of others. This also implies that the idea of 
an individual who exists in a state of self-sufficiency is illusory. It is mainly 
for this reason that Ubuntu puts emphasis on community as the main 
characteristic of what it means to be a human being. Human wellbeing 
cannot be attained outside communal belongingness. Leopold Senghor puts 
it well when he observed, “[the African] does not assimilate, he is 
assimilated. He lives in common life with the Other; he lives in symbiosis… ‘I 
think therefore I am’, Descartes writes…The negro-African would say: ‘I feel, 
I dance the Other; I am…” (Senghor 1964: 72-73). In this mode of thought, 
the African understanding of a person places emphasis on communal 
belongingness. Human wellbeing cannot be attained outside communal 
belongingness. What happens in the community does affect the individual’s 
wellbeing. The question that arises is the identity of the individual in the 
ethic of Ubuntu. In the light of the above discussion, it can be deduced that 
the ethic of Ubuntu entails the predominance of an understanding of 
individual identity as something that is derived from one’s natural 
predisposition to social bondedness. 
3.4 Social Identity Theory and Ubuntu 
In the light of the preceding section, it is evidently clear that critics of 
Ubuntu seems to have failed to comprehend the ontological meaning of this 
60 
 
ethical concept when they discussed it as an abstract term that has no 
bearing on the lives of ordinary people. Some scholars such as Jan Stets and 
Peter Burke have maintained that  
…[i]n social identiy theory, a social identity is a person’s knowledge that he or 
she belongs to a social category or group. …A social group is a set of individuals 
who hold a common social identification or view themselves as members of the 
same social category. Through a social comparison process, persons who are 
similar to the self are categorised with the self and are labelled the in-group; 
persons who differ from the self are categorised as the out-group (Stets and 
Burke 2000: 225).  
In other words, social identity theory is based on the individual’s self-
understanding that she or he belongs to a particular community that shares 
common membership. People are regarded as belonging to a particular social 
group on the basis of some shared traits. For example, I would like to 
concretise social identity theory by saying that in Ubuntu, a sense of 
solidarity and common belonging within the community provides the 
individual with a sense of what it means to be a person. However,  Stes and 
Burke went on to say that, self-categorisation and social comparison are 
processes that play a pivotal role. As they put it,  
The consequences of self-categorisation is an accentuation of the perceived 
similarities between the self and other in-group members, and an accentuation 
of the perceived similarities between the self and the other in-group members, 
and an an accentuation of the perceived differences between the self and out-
group members. This accentuation occurs for all the attitudes, beliefs and 
values, affective reactions, behavioural norms, styles of speech, and other 
properties that are believed to be correlated with the relevant intergroup 
categorisation. The consequences of the social comparison process is the 
selective application of the accentuation of effect, primarily to those 
dimensions that will result in self-enhancing outcomes of the self. Specially, 
one’s self esteem is enhanced by evaluating the in-group and the out-group on 
dimensions that lead the in-group to be judged positively and the out-group to 
be judged negatively (Stets and Burke 2000: 225).  
The implication of the above quotation is that the individual can only 
identify with those who belong to her or his group as opposed to those who 
are judged as not belonging to one’s own group. In this understanding of 
social identity, the individual sees her identity solely in terms of belonging 
to a particular group because of the shared values and traits within that 
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group. This type of identity is exclusive or discriminatory in the sense that 
those who are not seen as belonging to the in-group are most likely to be 
seen as less human. In this identity theory, a sense of concern for the plight 
of others is a concern that is restricted to the in-group, and not to humanity 
in general. The out-group is only relevant for comparative purposes aimed at 
boosting self-enhancement. Contrary to this exclusivist theory of social 
identity as espoused by Stets and Burke, in the African ethic of Ubuntu the 
main understanding of individual identity is that the individual’s sense of 
self has been contributed to by others in one’s immediate group and beyond.  
Thus in the ethic of Ubuntu, people are universally recognised as people 
because of their humanness. Even those who are not related by blood of 
kinship are regarded as equally belonging to the community. In traditional 
African culture, the community was not a close knit of tribal relationships, 
rather one finds that the ideal was that everybody should belong. For this 
reason one finds that among the Shona peoples of Zimbabwe there is also a 
concept of Ukama through which people who did not share the same totem 
end up identifying themselves as relatives towards each other. For example, 
Murove made the following observation concerning the ethic of Ukama.   
Someone who observes Ukama or acts in a way that expresses their 
indebtedness to relatedness and interrelatedness is commended as munhu 
chaiye (s/he is the epitome of humanness). Ukama implies our human 
belongingness and the need to actualise this belongingness with acts of 
generosity. As an example; instead of telling someone that they must share 
their food or material possessions with others, one can always put it in a 
proverb that says: Ukama igasva hunozadziswa nokudya (relationships is a 
half measure, it finds fulfilment in sharing). In this proverb a selfish person is 
admonished with a proverbial ethical reminder that Ukama is not a theoretical 
concept, but an existential reality which should be enacted through sharing of 
food and possessions (Murove 1999: 11-12). 
In the light of the above quotation is evidently clear that Shona ethic of 
Ukama is an ethic that fosters our human common belongingness by giving 
primacy to the reality of relationality. Within this ethic one is inculcated with 
the idea that one belongs to the larger family of humanity and one is identity 
is an identity that is inclusively shared with others. In the ethic of Ukama the 
idea of relatedness is not only restricted to human society, rather one finds 
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that through the totemic system which serves as the foundation of this ethic, 
human beings are presumed to share some common origin with the natural 
environment. The founding ancestor of Ukama is the totemic species such 
eland, elephant, lion, zebra, baboon, fish, to name but a few. In this regard, 
Murove argued that there was a belief within the ethic of Ukama that as 
human beings we share the same identity with the natural environment 
(Murove 1999: 24). In other words, what it means to be human and human 
identity cannot be adequately accounted for purely on anthropocentric 
terms because our own very human identities have been contributed to by 
our human societies as well as by the natural environment. Both the 
concepts of Ubuntu and Ukama do show that the doctrines of atomic 
individualism and egoism are an aberration or a misguided philosophical 
doctrines. The doctrines give the impression that society is primarily 
composed of individuals who come together whilst they are already 
possessed with their own personal identities that cannot be subsumed under 
society as an organic whole. At the human existential level, these African 
ethical concepts imply that one should exist in a way that demonstrate a 
sense of common concern for all. This also implies an awareness of the 
reality that as human beings we belong to a web of interdependent such that 
our wellbeing cannot be intelligibly extricated from each other.  
The issue of interdependence has been identified by many African scholars 
as the pinnacle of African African ethics whereby ontologically a person is 
not defined in terms of self-realisation as we have seen with western concept 
of atomic individualism. In the theory of atomic individualism a person is 
understood as self-sufficient and devoid of any social relations. On the 
contrary, in African ethics one finds that a person becomes a persons 
through participation in the life of the community whereby action is 
prioritised as the summation of what it means to be a person. In other words 
persons are understood in terms of their interdependence on other persons. 
This interdependence of persons was well observed by Benezet Bujo when he 
said, 
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It must be recalled that African ethics does not define the person as self-
realisation or as ontological act; rather, it describes the person as a process of 
coming into existence in the reciprocal relatedness of individual and 
community…This means that the individual becomes a person only through 
active participation in the life of the community. It is not membership in a 
community as such that constitutes the identity: only common action make the 
human person a human person and keeps him[sic] from becoming an ‘unfettered 
ego (Bujo 2001: 114-115).   
In other words, African ethics gives primacy to reciprocal relatedness of the 
individual and the community instead of the western understanding of the 
individual as the subject of self-realisation within his or her interiority. 
Within this ethical framework, one comes to identify oneself with the 
immediate community as well as humanity in general. However, Bujo went 
on to say that, “The person is not defined as an ontological act by means of 
self-realisation, but by means of ‘relations’. This means that the human 
person in Africa is from the very beginning in a network of relationships that 
constitutes his inalienable dignity” (Bujo 2001: 117). In other words, 
personal identity is something that is premised on relationships with others. 
Thus one finds Ifeanyi Menkiti arguing against the western contractarian 
understanding of community whereby the community is primarily 
understood as a collection or association of individuals. According to 
Menkiti, this western understanding of community presupposes a view of 
individuals randomly coming together or “a non-organic bringing together of 
atomic individuals into a unit more akin to an association than to 
community” (Menkiti 1984: 180). What is implied here by Menkiti is that the 
African understanding of community presumes it to be an organic whole. As 
we shall see later on in this study, this African understanding of community 
as an organic whole has been integral to the debate on African postcolonial 
efforts and domesticating capitalism through the economic policies of 
indigenisation. However, In the following chapter I shall pay attention to 
African ethics and the indigenisation discourse with specific reference to 
global capitalism.  
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3.5 Conclusion 
The above chapter was mainly about the African ethic of Ubuntu and 
appropriation of modern capitalism. Other scholars have wrote about the 
African ethic of Ubuntu with specific reference to its relevance to modern 
capitalism within post-colonial Africa. Other scholars have maintained that 
the ethic of Ubuntu has some relevance within the global modern neo-liberal 
capitalist economic system. It was observed that some African scholars such 
as Mogobe Ramose believed that the global neo-liberal capitalism cannot be 
appropriated, rather Ubuntu remains the main ethical resource for resistance 
against the contemporary neo-liberal economic system. This resistance 
towards neo-liberal capitalism is deemed to be self-evident in the implied 
human solidaristic social existence that is embedded in the African ethic of 
Ubuntu. On the other hand it was shown that other scholars such as  Wim 
van Binsbergen being sceptical towards the efficacy of Ubuntu and the 
appropriation of modern capitalism. This scepticism came out succinctly 
when he euphemistically characterised the whole discourse on Ubuntu as 
‘Ubuntu industry’ – thus implying that those who see the ethic of Ubuntu as 
suitable for the appropriation of modern capitalism are doing is for business 
purposes that are contrary to the real ontological meaning of the ethic of 
Ubuntu.  
 
Regardless of the sceptical voices against the efficacy of the African ethic of 
Ubuntu and the appropriation of modern capitalism, the current discourse 
on the appropriation of modern capitalism in modern Africa has been 
related to economic indigenisation discourse and the post-colonial 
government economic policy efforts. The idea that the individual’s identity is 
communal by nature played a pivotal role in the post-colonial African 
discourses and policies of indigenisation as a way of appropriating modern 
capitalism. In the following chapter I shall focus will be given on the debate 
of the contribution of African indigenous values to the appropriation of 
modern capitalism in post-colonial Africa. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: AFRICAN TRADITIONAL VALUES AND THE 
APPROPRIATION OF MODERN CAPITALISM  
 
4.1 Introduction 
In the preceding chapter, we have seen that many scholars in post-colonial 
Africa have argued that African traditional values can be used as resources 
for the indigenisation of capitalism in post-colonial Africa. Though 
capitalism was mediated to Africa through colonialism, the values that have 
been central to capitalism are individualism and acquisitiveness or greed. As 
we have seen chapter 3, the traditional liberal capitalistic model of a person 
was based on the idea that s/he was solely self-interested. In this regard, the 
belief is that individuals within a capitalistic society will always behave and 
relate with each other on the basis of pursuing their personal interests, and 
self-interest is considered to be the main source of motivation.  
Capitalistic relations are postulated as originally devoid of any moral 
sentiments or considerations. The other model of a human being is that the 
individual does not need community to succeed in life. Individuals are thus 
presumed to be self-determining in their efforts to achieve whatever they 
want to achieve in life. The community is nothing else than an association of 
individuals. This way of thinking presupposes that modern capitalism 
cannot be appropriated in those societies where the individual is seen as 
subsisting in the community. Those post-colonial African scholars who 
wrote on the problem of modern capitalism in Africa have always argued 
that the emphasis that was given to communal wellbeing in African 
traditional values was inhibitive towards the appropriation of modern 
capitalism. This observation implied that the indigenisation of modern 
capitalism will in actual fact inhibit the appropriation of capitalism in post-
colonial Africa. 
On the other hand, those critics of indigenisation of capitalism in post-
colonial Africa have argued that such a policy had nothing to do with the 
appropriation of capitalism, but a deliberate policy aimed at creating African 
capitalists who would end up replacing the previous colonial class of 
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capitalists. In other words, a deliberate creation of African capitalists 
violates the fundamental capitalistic ideal which says that a genuine 
capitalist should be someone who creates his or her own wealth through 
hard work and frugality. This way thinking also implies that those Africans 
who become rich through indigenisation cannot be considered as genuine or 
authentic capitalists. This chapter is weaved around four sections that arise 
from the issues that were briefly mentioned in this introduction. The first 
section will discuss the African traditional ethical perspective on greed. In 
this section I intend to investigate some of teachings of African traditional 
ethics on greed. The second section provides us with the African traditional 
ethical perspective on individualism. Here the aim is to investigate the 
following question: If modern capitalism is connected to the values of 
individualism, to what extent is the appropriation of modern capitalism 
feasible in a cultural context such as that of Africa that does not condone 
individualism? The third section discusses the debate of African socialism as 
an attempt by African politicians to indigenise capitalism. The fourth section 
will be a conclusion that is constructed on the three sections that were 
discussed in the chapter.  
4.2 A Comparative Analysis between Modern Capitalism and African 
Traditional Values 
One of the main reason which has been identified by other scholars in post-
colonial Africa is that modern capitalism thrived in a social context where 
individual greed was acceptable as integral to the working of the capitalist 
economy. The modern capitalistic presumption of a human being was that 
s/he was an egoist who acts mainly in pursuit of self-interest or utility 
maximisation. It is Adam Smith who is considered as the most important 
thinker about the working of modern capitalism and human behaviour. The 
most famous idea which was advanced by Adam Smith is the idea that 
without external interference or directive from government, the economy 
has a tendency of self-correcting in a way that ensues in the natural 
allocation and distribution of resources to the extent that in the long run all 
who participate in it will ultimately get satisfied. In this way of thinking, 
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Adam Smith was translating the mechanistic worldview of Isaac Newton into 
a social analysis. For example, in his most celebrated book, Wealth of Nations 
Smith reiterated Newton’s laws of gravity and motion as follows: “There is in 
every society or neighbourhood and ordinary or average rate of wages and 
profit…[t]his rate is naturally regulated”. The source of regulation was what 
Smith called the market price. For him the market price is naturally 
predisposed with “a tendency to gravitate around the natural price, but it is 
always being turned back toward the natural price by the force of interest as 
manifested in supply and demand" (Smith 1976: 55-56). The novel idea 
which Smith introduced in capitalist thinking was that without external 
interference or government regulation, the economy can work on its own 
more efficiently. A natural mechanism which was analogous to the force of 
gravity in the Newtonian mechanical law was what he called ‘the pull of self-
interest’ or to put it more pragmatically, ‘the pool of greed’. 
Individual self-interest or greed was an inert individual psychological state 
of being that enables harmony or equilibrium within the economy such that 
government intervention aimed at, let us say, the promotion of social welfare 
would just be superfluous. He writes, “Without any intervention of law, 
therefore, the private interests and passions of men[sic] naturally lead them 
to divide and distribute the stock of every society, among all the different 
employments carried on in it, as nearly as possible in the proportion which 
is most agreeable to the interest of the whole society” (Smith 1976: 630). It 
can be deduced in the above quotation that Smith believed that the passion 
of self-interest which he regarded as the dominant driving force in human 
beings works in a way that facilitates in the allocation of resources in the 
whole economy. Relying on self-interest or individual greed was more 
assuring than governmental interventions in the economy. Robert Heilbroner 
summarised Smith’s economic theory in the Wealth of Nations as follows, 
Two great problems absorb Adam Smith’s attention. First, he is interested in 
laying bare the mechanisms by which society hangs together. How it is 
possible for a community in which everyone is busily following his self-
interest not to fly apart from sheer centrifugal force? What is it which guides 
each individual’s private business so that it conforms to the needs of the 
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group? With no central planning authority and no steadying influence of age-
old tradition, how does society manage to get those tasks done which are 
necessary for survival? These questions lead Smith to a formulation of the 
laws of the market. What he sought was ‘the invisible hand’, as he called it, 
whereby ‘the private interests and passions of men’ are led in the direction 
‘which is most agreeable to the interest of the whole society (Heilbroner 1972: 
52). 
 
According to the above quotation from Heilbroner, one can easily deduce 
that modern liberal capitalism was built around the idea that the free market 
was the arena which helped individuals to pursue their private interests 
without government intervention. The idea of a free market presupposed an 
entity which enjoyed some autonomy from all sorts of constraints that are 
human made. This idea is pivotal to a comprehensive understanding of 
modern capitalism as it was developed by Smith up to our contemporary 
times. The popular economic axiom that is an offshoot of Smith’s free 
market is that the economy usually fares well when the laws of the market 
are respected or are not interfered with through the introduction of 
superficial human laws aimed at regulating the functioning of the economy. 
None interference with the laws of the market always resulted in economic 
outcomes that usually advance the interests of society as a whole. Thus 
Heilbroner caricatured Smith’s understanding of the laws of the free market 
as follows:  
Adam Smith’s laws of the market are basically simple. They tell us that the 
outcome of a certain kind of behaviour in a certain social framework will bring 
about perfectly definite and foreseeable results. Specifically they show us how 
the drive of individual self-interest in an environment of similarly motivated 
individuals will result in competition; and they further demonstrate how 
completion will result in the provision of those goods society wants, in the 
quantities that society desires, and at the prices society is prepared to pay. 
…It comes about in the first place because self-interest is willing to pay for 
(Heilbroner 1972: 53). 
At the heart of Smith’s laws of the free market is the role of self-interest in 
determining human actions on the market and society at large. Through the 
motive of self-interest, the individual behaves in a way that ultimately 
benefits everybody even though that was not the individual’s original 
intention that everybody should benefit. Self-interest was part and parcel of 
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the law of nature or natural law. The concept of Natural Law was based on 
the idea that there is a tendency in things to behave according to a 
predetermined rule. In this regard, Natural Law was a law of the state of 
nature before positive law or human law. Some Christian thinkers such as 
Thomas Aquinas would go as far as to say that Natural law can be known 
through reason. In this way of thinking it became a central dictum of natural 
law among Christian thinkers that, “The known good must be done and its 
opposite – evil must be avoided” (Rommen 1948: 71). Natural law was thus 
identical with the will of God, hence human exceptions were a violation of 
the divinely willed order. Natural law in the strict sense was an unformulated 
law resting directly in nature. From the concept of natural law modern 
Western philosophers developed the idea that human reason was 
autonomous and that existing human laws “constituted unwarranted 
fetters”, a philosophical view that “was closely bound up with the nascent 
socio-philosophical individualism” of the 16th century’s evolution of western 
rationalism which is sometimes known as the age of the enlightenment era. 
(Rommen 1948: 76). One finds that among some of the influential western 
thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes, whom we have seen previously, in human 
existence the evidence of natural law was in selfishness. Hobbes would thus 
characterise human existence under natural law or state of nature as ‘a war 
of all against all’. This universal war which typified human existence under 
natural law was artificially mitigated when humanity decided to submit itself 
under a covenant before a Sovereign Power. In this regard, Hobbes had this 
to say, “Therefore, notwithstanding the laws of nature…if there be no power 
erected or not great enough for our security, every man will – and lawfully – 
rely on his own strength and art for caution for all other men” (Hobbes 1962: 
99). This Hobbesian interpretation of natural law was rather individualistic 
in the sense that his main presumption was that under natural law, human 
beings were asocial and were only concerned with their own self-interests or 
survival without due regard for the wellbeing of others. 
This individualistic interpretation of natural law was integral to Adam Smith 
image of an ideal economic man popularly known as homo eoconomicus. On 
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the market itself this individualistic interpretation of natural was applied by 
Smith whereby self-interest or egoism was the natural driving power in each 
and every individual. Smith would put it thus, “It is not from the 
benevolence of the butcher, the brewer or the baker, that we expect our 
dinner, but from their regard to their self-interest. We address ourselves not 
to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own 
necessities, but of their advantages” (Smith 1976: 26-27). In this quotation 
one can easily deduce that self-interest became part of natural law that 
explains human motivation and actions on the market. When one talks of the 
market, Smith had thus stated it unequivocally that one was talking of 
human economic relations that are driven by egoism as the natural impulse 
in each person.  The idea that self-interest was a manifestation of natural law 
on the market was also intended to give a constraint on the role of the 
government. This idea is well enunciated by Smith as follows,  
All systems of preference or of restraint, therefore, being taken away, the 
obvious and simple system of natural liberty establishes itself of its own 
accord…By directing industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the 
greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other 
cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was not part of his 
intention…” [my emphasis] (Smith 1976: 413).  
It evidently clear that self-interest or greed is being postulated by Smith as 
the manifestation of natural law instead of human law. The metaphor of ‘the 
invisible hand’ emphasises the harmony that exists between natural law and 
the will of God. If individual pursuit of self-interest on the market was 
already in harmony with the will of God, it therefore follows that human 
laws aimed at regulating the functioning of the market were unnecessary. 
This idea was also observed by Heilbroner when he said,  
But self-interest is only half the picture. It drives men to action. Something 
else must prevent the pushing of profit-hungry individuals from holding 
society up to exorbitant ransom: a community activated only be self-interest 
would be a community of ruthless profiteers. This regulator is competition, 
the socially beneficial consequence of the conflicting self-interests of all the 
members of society. For each man, out to do his best for himself with no 
thought of social cost, is faced with a flock of similarly motivated individuals 
who are in exactly the same boat. Each is only too eager to take advantage of 
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his neighbour’s greed if it urges him to exceed a common denominator of 
acceptable behaviour (Heilbroner 1972: 53). 
 
The presence of self-interest in each human being was something that was 
implanted by nature such that from being solely concerned with one’s own 
self-interest, the individual ends up promoting social harmony which was 
previously not part of the individual’s intention. Thus ‘the invisible hand’ 
became for Smith some kind of “a natural law of the universe, a force that 
possessed the awesome power to bring good out of [individual] private 
greed” (Tawney 1926: 51). Since self-interest was synonymous with natural 
law, without any intervention from governmental laws, Smith stated it 
succinctly that “the private interests and passions of men naturally lead 
them to divide and distribute the stock of every society, among all the 
different employments carried on in it, as nearly as possible in the 
proportion which is most agreeable to the interest of the whole society” 
(Smith 1976: 630). This belief in the efficacy of self-interest on the free 
market was the main basis for Smith’s belief that government should not 
interfere with the market because the market has a tendency of self-
correcting its own excesses.  
Another important feature of modern capitalism is that of the image of a 
human being as primarily a utility maximiser.  An economic textbook by 
Richard Lipsey states that the theory of utility maximisation is based on the 
presumption that, “households or individuals try to make themselves as well 
off as they possibly can in the circumstances in which they find themselves” 
(Lipsey 1989: 141). In other words, the main presumption behind the 
modern economic theory of utility maximisation is that individuals will 
always act in a way that results in getting as much as possible from whatever 
they want to eat. This also implies that a human being is greedy by nature 
because s/he will always want to have the maximum quantity of that s/he 
has or what to have. An action is economically condoned if it leads to the 
maximisation of utility.  The individual is thus presumed to exist in a subject 
state of nonsatiety.  Alan Hamlin observed that utility maximisation is 
epistemologically based on instrumental reason or ends rationality. He thus 
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went on to say that, “[in utility maximisation] it is sufficient to note that 
egoism, or self-interest, and commensurability are both required 
components of utility maximisation in its interpretation as a form of ends-
rationality” (Hamlin 1986: 17). It is clear in the light of the above quotation 
that utility maximisation is based on the presumption that human beings are 
pure egoists and as egoists they do not have any other source of motivation 
besides the mundane maximisation of utility.  Herman Daly and John Cobb 
;argued against utility maximisation on the grounds that, “If nonsatiety were 
the natural state of human nature then aggressive want-stimulating 
advertising would not be necessary, nor would the barrage of novelty aimed 
at promoting dissatisfaction with last year’s model. The system attempts to 
remake people to fit its own presuppositions. If people’s wants are not 
naturally insatiable we must make them so, in order to keep the system 
going” (Daly and Cobb 1994: 87-88). The issue of nonsatiety which is central 
to the theory of utility maximisation is an economic invention that has 
nothing to do with human nature. The theory of utility is based on an 
individualistic understanding of a person because the individual is deemed 
to be the unit for the measurement of utility.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
4.3 The Incommensurability between African Traditional Values and 
Modern Capitalism 
The above section provided the reader with a succinct summary of modern 
capitalistic understanding of a person. In this section I shall argue that post-
colonial African scholars as well as African politicians have persistently 
argued that African traditional values were incommensurable with the 
capitalistic understanding of a human person, hence, this economic system 
could not be appropriated in the African context. What has raised a lot 
debate arises from the observation of the failure of modern capitalism in the 
post-colonial African context. This debate has been discussed from various 
perspectives by many scholars. Firstly, the most popular argument of the 
incommensurability of modern capitalism and African traditional values has 
been advanced by African nationalists who in their various ways have argued 
that economically African traditional society was socialistic, hence 
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capitalistic values that are dominantly characterised by individual private 
ownership of wealth did not make sense in the African context.  Secondly, 
there are those who argue that African traditional values such as African 
traditional communitarian values were worlds apart when compared with 
the values of individualism and greed that are enshrined in modern 
capitalism. Still on the question of African traditional values, one also finds 
that there are other scholars who argue that the prestige motive – the ideal 
of sharing wealth with relatives and neighbours does not augur well with the 
modern capitalistic values that prioritise thrift and frugality. Thirdly, there 
are some scholars who agree that African traditional communitarian values 
were incommensurable with values of modern capitalism but then go on to 
argue that the very presence of modern capitalism in the African context was 
mediated by Christianity and Islam.   
 
4.3.1 The Commensurability of African Traditional Values and Socialism 
After the attainment of independence from colonial powers, most of the 
African nationalists became very critical towards the colonially mediated 
capitalistic modes of production and consumption in their newly 
independent countries. Since capitalism was mediated to Africa through 
colonialism, there has been a resentment towards this economic system by 
African nationalists.  Richard Sklar observed that,  
In African social thought, capitalism and socialism coexist as binary concepts 
implanted during the era of colonial rule and anti-colonial struggle. …Each part 
of the binary system corresponds to a political tendency or movement. Political 
and social movements are metaphorical expressions that signify purposeful 
combinations of thought and action. The terms ‘capitalist’ and ‘socialist’ identify 
the elements of an ideological conflict in Africa… (Sklar 1988: 4).  
The debate of socialism versus capitalism came about as a result of the 
African experience of capitalism as an economic system that was introduced 
to the colonised Africans by their colonial masters. The struggle against 
colonialism was also understood as a struggle against capitalism. It is 
because of this historical legacy that Africa has found itself entangled in a 
conflict of capitalism versus socialism – the latter being understood as an 
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economic system that was liberative to those who were subjected under 
colonial rule. The continuous existence of capitalism in post-colonial African 
states was interpreted by African nationalists such as Kwame Nkrumah as 
evidence of the existence of neo-colonialism. In other words, neo-colonialism 
implies the continuous existence of colonialism in post-colonial African 
societies. In his book, Neo-Colonialism, Nkrumah averred that,  
Africa today is the main stamping ground of the neo-colonialist forces that seek 
the domination of the world for the imperialism they serve. Spreading from 
South Africa, the Congo, The Rhodesias, Angola, Mozambique, they form a maze-
like connection with the mightiest international financial monopolies in the 
world. These monopolies are extending their banking and industrial 
organisations throughout the African continent. …Decolonisation is a word much 
and unctuously used by imperialists spokesmen to describe the transfer of 
political control from colonialist to African sovereignty. The motive spring of 
colonialism, however, still controls the sovereignty. The young countries are still 
the providers of raw materials, the old of manufactured goods.  The change in 
the economic relationship between the new sovereign states and the erstwhile 
masters is only one of form. Colonialism has achieved a new guise. It has become 
neo-colonialism, the last stage of imperialism; its final bid for existence, as 
monopoly-capital or imperialism is the last stage of capitalism (Nkrumah 1971; 
30-31). 
 
It is evidently clear in the above quotation that Nkrumah was critiquing 
capitalism on the grounds that it perpetuates the existence of neo-
colonialism in the decolonised African countries. According to Nkrumah, the 
economic dominance of yester colonisers was the explanatory reason for the 
existence of neo-colonialism because these yester colonial powers continue 
to have an economic influence on their yester colonies. It is capitalism which 
Nkrumah saw as entrenching neo-colonialism in decolonised African states 
through monopoly capital as the last stage of capitalism. As for Nkrumah, 
the African continent has become “a playing ground, not only of the cold war 
(an aspect of the fight of capitalism for existence against socialism” 
(Nkrumah 1971: 33). It is clear that the binary economic ideological 
discourse of capitalism versus socialism was also related to African 
nationalists’ effort that were aimed at getting rid of neo-colonialism which 
they saw as symbiotically related to neo-colonialism. Nkrumah’s advocacy 
for socialism was purely a political strategy whose primary purpose was to 
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counter the hegemony of monopoly capital or imperialism. It was Nkrumah’s 
conviction that colonial powers were still dominating the post-colonial 
African scene through monopoly capital. In his earlier work, Africa Must 
Unite, Nkrumah explicitly stated that his advocacy for socialism was based 
on social egalitarianism in post-colonial Ghananian context. Nkrumah 
presumed that socialism was an economic ideology that would promote the 
common good in Ghana whereby prices of goods would be affordable, 
houses and education would be accessible to all Ghananians. Thus he writes,  
In Ghana, we have embarked on the socialist path to progress. We want to see 
full employment, good housing and equal opportunity for education and cultural 
advancement for all the people up to the highest level possible. This means that:-
prices of goods must not exceed wages; house rentals must be within the means 
of all groups; social welfare services must be open to all; educational and cultural 
amenities must be available to everyone. …Production for private profit deprives 
a large section of the people of the goods and services produced. If, therefore, we 
are to fulfil our pledge to the people and achieve the programme set out above, 
socialism is our only alternative. For socialism assumes the public ownership of 
the means of production, the land its resources, and the use of those means in 
fulfilment of the people’s needs (Nkrumah 1970: 119). 
Nkrumah’s argument for socialism is premised purely on egalitarian grounds 
– that under socialism everybody will have access to wealth and the means 
of production.  In the light of the above quotation, one can easily deduce 
that socialism is rather advocated instead of being argued for. Socialism is 
understood as the only plausible economic system that can promote the 
common good. On the other hand, capitalism  is denigrated on the grounds 
that it deprives the majority of the people to have access to wealth whilst 
socialism implies common access to wealth. For Nkrumah, under socialism 
there is public ownership of the means of production and all the national 
wealth which has the fulfilment of people’s needs as the telos of wealth 
instead of individual accumulation. Under capitalism, individual 
accumulation of wealth is a derivation for others. As such, a A 
reconstruction of a post-colonial socialist Ghananian society was a matter of 
building a just society. As he put it, “Our aim is the building of a society in 
which the principles of social justice will be paramount. But there are many 
roads to socialism, and in the circumstances of our present retardedness, we 
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must employ all the forces at our disposal while we fashion others which 
will accelerate our progress towards our goal” (Nkrumah 1970: 120-121). 
Socialism was about reconstruction a society that is based on social justice.   
Since socialism was based on justice, it was thus Nkrumah’s presumption 
that such an economic ideology will inevitably redress issues of social 
inequality that were entrenched in capitalism as it was transmitted to Ghana 
under colonialism.  
Nkrumah’s advocacy for socialism was also based on a matter of principle – 
to promote Ghana’s economic independence. Economic independence was 
the only viable solution to a situation of economic dependence on western 
powers.  For this reason, one finds that Nkrumah was against the modern 
capitalistic idea of foreign investment which he found to be a defeat of 
independence.. . In this regard, he had this to say, “It would simply defeat 
our whole objective of economic independence, for instance, to encourage 
foreign investment in our development and see the flight of capital from 
Ghana exceed or even approximate the totality of such investment” 
(Nkrumah 1970: 123). In other words, foreign investment compromised 
national independence as it leads to the drainage of national wealth in the 
sense that one who invests expects some financial return from the 
investment. For this reason, one can also say that Nkrumah’s advocacy for 
socialism was partly based on economic nationalism – that the nation should 
control its wealth and the means of production. Economic nationalisation in 
post-colonial African states was based on taking over all the extractive 
sectors of the economy.  Socialism provided a wider scope for economic 
nationalisation. In Nkrumah’s way of thinking, it is evidently clear that 
Nkrumah was not interested in the appropriation of modern capitalism, 
rather he was more interested in destroying capitalism and after which he 
would replace it with socialism. As we have seen previously, the continuous 
existence of capitalism in post-colonial Africa implied the perpetuation of 
neo-colonialism. His detest towards modern capitalism is more nuanced 
when he said,  
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The socialist objective implies the universal good of the nation, and in the 
interests of that socialist objective it will be necessary for all of us to forgo some 
immediate personal desire for a greater benefit a bit later on. Speedier 
development out of surpluses or social services in the interest of the community 
confer more advantages upon a greater number of people than would increase 
wages for certain groups of workers. But as productivity rises appreciably and 
the socialist base of the economy extends through increasing public ownership 
of the means of production, the government will not only be able to mobilise a 
greater surplus for use in the interests of the country, but will be in a position to 
reward labour for its greater exertions by increased wages (Nkrumah 1970: 123). 
In the light of the above quotation it can be deduced that Nkrumah equated 
socialism to ‘the universal good of the nation’ whereby the socialist objective 
implies sacrificing present enjoyment for the future greater benefit. 
Increment in productivity results in greater public ownership of the means 
of productions and greater future wages for the workers. One can caricature 
this way of thinking by saying that under socialism everybody will materially 
well off like everybody else. Nkrumah’s socialism was a typical example of 
western classical socialism which was based on Jeremy Bentham’s theory of 
utilitarianism. For western utilitarians, as Ingrid Rima puts it, “Instead of 
supporting the existing social order, their interpretation of the utilitarian 
principle of the ‘greatest good’ proposed a more egalitarian system of 
income distribution, in which individuals would receive the whole product of 
their labour” (Rima 2001: 200). The ethical theory of utilitarianism was based 
on the idea that an action can be considered to be ethical when it promotes 
the greatest good or happiness to the greatest number of people. Joseph 
Schumpeter proffered four arguments against the use of utilitarianism in 
modern economics. He writes, 
First, utilitarianism hypotheses are completely valueless in questions of 
interpretations of history or in questions touching the moving forces of 
economic history. Second, utilitarian hypotheses are worse than valueless in all 
problems involving questions of actual schemes of motivation, for example, in 
such a problem as the economic effects of inheritance. Third, utilitarian 
hypotheses are in fact basic to that part of economic theory that is usually 
referred to as Welfare Economics…We adopt these hypotheses habitually when 
discussing such problems as the effects of transfers of wealth from the relatively 
rich to the relatively poor. …Fourth, in the field of economic theory in the 
narrowest sense of the term, utilitarian hypotheses are unnecessary but 
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harmless. For instance, we can state and discuss the properties of economic 
equilibrium without introducing them (Schumpeter 1986: 134). 
 
Schumpeter’s criticism of utilitarianism is based on the premise that the 
main concern of economic analysis in modern capitalism is the individual 
and his or her interests and not the promotion of the common good as 
implied in the ethical theory of utilitarianism. The way how the economy 
functions renders utilitarian hypotheses useless. If economic analysis is 
based on the understanding of the individual behaviour as an egoist and 
utility maximiser, it becomes illogical for someone to presume individual 
economic actions as orientated towards the promotion of the greatest good 
for the greatest number of people. Other scholars have argued that there is 
no evidence that socialism has been good in creating wealth for the greatest 
number of people. However, it is not clear how socialism in post-colonial 
Africa was going to fulfil the utilitarian functions that were envisaged by 
Kwame Nkrumah. Mazrui argued against socialism on the grounds that that 
such an ideological posturing violated the “issues of historical continuity”. 
Thus he writes, “Most African economies have already been deeply 
integrated into a world economy dominated by the West. African countries 
that turn socialist domestically find that they are still integrated within the 
world capitalist system. The rules of that system are overwhelmingly derived 
from principles evolved in the history of capitalism. In international trade, 
countries seek to maximise their return and acquire profit. The rules of 
business and exchange at the international level, the banking system which 
underpins these exchanges, the currencies used in money markets and in 
meeting balance of payments, are all products of the capitalist experience” 
(Mazrui 1983: 286). What is being argued by Mazrui is that an attempt to 
introduce socialism in the African context would violate the principle of 
historical continuity because post-colonial African economies were fully 
immersed in the global capitalistic system which they inherited from 
colonialism. Mazrui went on to argue that whilst post-colonial African 
countries might adopt socialist policies domestically, the fact that they 
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remain integrated in the world capitalist economic system make them 
remain perennially dependent on that capitalistic system (Ibid). 
 However, instead of arguing for socialism from Marxist perspective as what 
Nkrumah did, some African nationalists argued that African traditional 
values were commensurate with socialist values. As such, one finds that the 
argument was not that of appropriating capitalism, but a rejection of 
capitalism on the basis that capitalistic values were not compatible with 
African traditional values with regards to material things. Julius Nyerere 
argued explicitly that traditional African collectivism was some form of 
socialism. The idea of the commensurability of African traditional 
collectivist values and socialism was well captured by Nyerere when he said, 
Traditionally we lived as families, with individuals supporting each other and 
helping each other on terms of equality. We recognised that each of us had a 
place in the community, and this place carried with it rights to whatever abilities 
and energies we had. The old, and the sick, or those whose crops had been 
destroyed by natural disasters, were not left alone in their suffering. Other 
people shared with them, and did so without any feeling on their side that this 
was charity from the better off, or involved any loss of human dignity for the one 
who was…in need…the community was a unity in which every individual was 
important, and among which goods available were shared without great 
inequality. This attitude, is basically what we mean by saying that traditionally 
African society was a socialist society (Nyerere 1968: 198-199). 
 
In the light of the above quotation one can easily deduce that Nyerere was 
advancing the observation that African traditional society was a knit society 
in which a sense of concern for the wellbeing of others dominated social 
relations. On the basis of this observation he thus concluded that African 
traditional society was a socialist society. Underlying the idea of African 
socialism was a rejection of modern capitalism because of its connection 
with colonialism. William Friedman and Carl Rosberg observed that upon the 
attainment of independence from colonialism, the quest for an African 
indigenous identity gave rise to the discourse of African socialism. As they 
put it, 
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Part of the search for identity consists of discovering ostensible roots of African 
socialism in indigenous society. …The essential contention is that Africa has 
always contained much indigenous socialism. Among the various elements of 
traditional socialism cited are the communal ownership of land (or the 
nonownership of land by individuals on a private basis), the egalitarian character 
of society (or the low degree of stratification), and the extensive network of 
social obligations that led to considerable cooperation. The existence of these 
traditional elements is held to represent indigenous socialism. Not only do they 
represent a set of roots for African socialists, but it is believed that their 
existence will facilitate the creation of modern economic institutions on a 
socialist basis. It is thus held that capitalism is not an appropriate economic 
form because it is ‘unnatural’ to Africa (Friedman and Rosberg 1964: 5). 
 
In the light of the above quotation, the quest for African socialism carried 
with it a rejection of capitalism on the grounds that it was an economic 
system that was not commensurate with African traditional values. Socialism 
was regarded by many African nationalists as native to African indigenous 
values. In other words this had nothing to do with the appropriation of 
modern capitalism, rather, it was an outright rejection of capitalism. The 
focus was thus to indigenise socialism instead of capitalism. In this way of 
thinking, it is evidently clear that capitalism was regarded as foreign to 
African culture. For Leopold Senghor Africans were endowed with a 
particular way of thinking that shows that makes them socialists by nature. 
On the basis of African reasoning had had this to say, “[African reason] is 
essentially instinctive reason, which pervades all these values, because it is 
reason of the impressions, reason that is seized. It is expressed in the 
emotions, through an abandonment of self in an identification with the 
object; though the myth, I mean by images – archetypes of the collective 
soul, especially by the myth primordially accorded to those of the cosmos” 
(Senghor 1964: 50). What is implied in this characterisation of African 
thought is that Africans were by nature not individualistic.  This was a 
rejection of the doctrine of atomic individualism which is central to 
capitalism. In this regard he states it explicitly that, “Negro African society is 
collectivist, or, more exactly, communal because it is rather a communion of 
souls than an aggregate of individuals…”. Hence, “Africa had realised 
socialism before the coming of the Europeans…” (Senghor 1964: 29). The 
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discourse of African socialism was totally about an outright rejection of 
modern capitalism. In the lecture that he delivered at the University of 
Oxford, “African-Style Socialism”, Senghor had this to say,  
Among the values of Europe, we have no intention of retaining capitalism, not in 
its nineteenth-century form at least. Of course, private capitalism was, in its early 
days, one of the factors of progress, just as feudalism was in its time…Today it is 
an out-of-date social and economic system – like federalism, like colonisation. 
And, I would add, like the imperialism in which it found its expression (Senghor 
1964: 264). 
In the light of the above quotation, it evidently clear that the appropriation 
of capitalism has never been an issue for African nationalists such as 
Senghor, rather their preoccupation was in a giving a narrative that should 
give a death knell to it. Capitalism was to be replaced by what he called 
African socialism. In this way of thinking, the ideal was built socialism on 
the foundation of African traditional values. Whilst he said that African 
socialism was going to borrow from some elements of European socialism 
such as such as power of the state being put in workers, collective ownership 
of property, a classless society and a planned economy, African socialism 
was to be based on what he called “economic democracy and spiritual 
freedom” [his italics] (Senghor 1964: 265). What is implied by ‘economic 
democracy and spiritual freedom’ is ability of the majority of the people to 
decide on how the economy should be managed as well as to express their 
spiritual belief systems. Senghor went describe the uniqueness of African 
socialism as follows, 
With this prospect before us, we have decided to borrow from the socialist 
experiments – both theoretical and practical – only certain elements, certain 
scientific and technical values, which we have grafted like scions onto the wild 
stock of Negritude. For this latter, as a complex of civilised values, is 
traditionally socialist in character in this sense; that our Negro-African society 
is a classless society, which is not the same as saying that it has no hierarchy 
or division of labour. It is a community-based society, in which the hierarchy – 
and therefore power – is founded on spiritual and democratic values; on the 
law of primogeniture and election; in which decisions of all kinds are 
deliberated in a Palaver, after the ancestral gods have been consulted; in which 
work is shared out among the sexes and among techno-professional groups, 
based on religions…Thus, in the working out of our African Mode of Socialism, 
the problem is not how to put an end to the exploitation of man by his fellow, 
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but to prevent it ever happening, by bringing political and economic 
democracy back to life; our problem is not how to satisfy spiritual, that is 
cultural needs, but how to keep the fervor of the black soul alive [his italics] 
(Senghor 1964: 265). 
 
Senghor’s main argument which was a commonly shared argument among 
African nationalists hinged on the premise that African traditional society 
was communitarian therefore it was socialist. Capitalism was rejected 
primarily on the grounds that it was based on the values of individualism 
which were considered to be foreign to African culture. These African 
nationalists did not bother to take into account the workings of the 
capitalistic economic system which they had inherited from colonialism and 
how best they could appropriate the same economic system within their 
post-colonial societies. Of interest to these nationalists was on how best to 
end the capitalistic modes of production and not to appropriate capitalism. 
As I said previously, the thrust of African socialism argument was not on 
how to make capitalism work, but how to reject it by emphasising those 
African traditional values that are deemed incommensurate with modern 
capitalisms. In this regard, socialism is discussed as an economic system 
that existed in traditional African communities before the advent of 
capitalism through colonialism or imperialism. In the same vein, one finds 
Tom Mboyo, the then minister of labour in Kenya saying that, 
When I talk of ‘African socialism’ I refer to those proved codes of conduct in 
the African societies which have, over the ages, conferred dignity on our 
people and afforded them security regardless of their station in life. I refer to 
universal charity which characterised our societies and I refer to the African’s 
thought processes and cosmological ideas which regard man, not as a social 
means, but as and end and entity in the society. …When I think of African 
socialism I also have in mind those ideals and attitudes of mind in our 
tradition which have regulated the conduct of our people with the social weal 
as the objective. I think it is worth while emphasising the fact that these ideals 
and attitudes are indigenous, and that they spring from the basic experience 
of our people here in Africa and even here in Kenya. It was not difficult to 
learn and practice them because they were expressed in the language of the 
soil, which our people understood, and not in foreign slogans (Mboya 1964:  
251-253). 
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For Mboya, African socialism emanated from African humanistic values 
whereby a person was regarded as an end in himself or herself. African 
socialism was based on traditional African values that regulated the 
behaviour of people in society. Those values of African socialism were 
indigenous in the sense that they are culturally specific to the African 
context. Here again it can be deduced that the thrust of Mboya’s 
conceptualisation of African socialism was not about the appropriation of 
capitalism, but rather to show how radically African socialism differed from 
modern capitalistic way of thinking in the sense that it fostered a 
collectivistic approach to economic development instead of being 
individualistic as is the case with modern capitalism. Whilst modern 
capitalism mode of thought is individualistic and futuristic, African 
socialism is based on the presumption that African needs to reconstruct 
itself by appealing to the communitarian values of the African past. The 
African socialism discourse was another way of trying to indigenise 
capitalism when seen from the perspective of cultural relevance.  
However, other African nationalists such as Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia 
adopted the term African humanism instead of socialism. In this description 
of this African humanism proffered a scathing critique against modern 
capitalism as an economic system that was inherently anti-humanistic. Thus 
he writes,  
Humanism cannot be reconciled with a class system. …God has made Man to 
be free, free from any want. The only question is whether this freedom is to 
come about peacefully or violently. The haves have been warned. The have-
nots will rise against the haves whether the haves like it or not. …We must 
constantly think of ways and means of controlling and regulating the evil 
intentions in Man for more and more personal wealth. This is important, 
Greed is the starting point towards the creation of of a capitalist society. For 
example, we all know that food is good for the growth of both body and soul. 
But if one does not control and regulate one’s eating habits the body breaks 
down and suffers from all sorts of illnesses. Indeed, lack of attention to diet 
can lead to untimely death. The same is true of greed for wealth. We want 
money to create a good life for ourselves and our families, but this must be 
controlled and regulated so that, like the overblown gourmand, we do not die 
a moral and spiritual death from being too rich. Too much of anything, even of 
the best things, is, without exception, bad in the end! …We need to produce, 
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we must produce, but the result must be common wealth [his italics] (Kaunda 
1975: 20).  
 
It abundantly clear in the above quotation that Kaunda was against some of 
values of modern capitalistic economic system which I have outlined 
previously. For him, a capitalistic society was antihumanistic by virtue of 
dividing society into classes and the primacy that is given to greed or self-
interest. Whilst modern capitalism as it was developed from Adam Smith 
onwards taught that greed was the primary reason for the flourishing of 
wealth and that without individual greed there would not be any industries 
and entrepreneurs, Kaunda’s African humanism is based on a vehement 
detest for greed. People were not supposed to be greedy for wealth and 
though greed was part of human nature, it is also clear in the above 
quotation that Kaunda believed that in a humanistic society that greedy has 
to be controlled and that the goal of wealth production as to ensue in a 
socio-economic condition where such wealth is owned in common. 
Capitalism was to be rejected because it was based on the exploitation of 
fellow human beings by a few who are owners of capital. As he puts it, “Our 
humanism will not allow us to use our superior skills to exploit the less-
endowed by organising them into a labour force which does not get a fair 
return of its work. A humanist accepts that capital must be rewarded, but 
capital alone, without labour, land and management, cannot produce 
anything” (Kaunda 1975: 77). Here again one can easily see that Kaunda was 
wholly against modern capitalism. Like other African nationalists, his 
African humanism was not so much about creating a vibrant or prosperous 
economy, but redistribution of wealth. His anticapitalistic stance is more 
nuanced when he said,  
Participatory democracy in our economic life means that all major means of 
production and distribution be placed in the only safe repository of power, 
which is the people themselves. Just as we are doing everything in our power to 
democratise all our political institutions, so we are under an obligation to do 
precisely the same thing insofar as economic and financial power is concerned. 
…no individual will be allowed to run a business concern that earns him a 
gross profit margin which goes beyond K500,000 per annum. Anything 
beyond this will be taken over either by the State, city, municipal or rural 
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council, township management board, co-operative, credit union, thrift society 
or indeed a public corporation, on agreed terms [his italics] (Kaunda 1975: 79-
81). 
It can be deduced in the above quotation that Kaunda was against private 
ownership of the means of production as it is the practice in a capitalistic 
society. Also, the very idea that there was a stipulated limit to what the 
individual can accumulate does show that Kaunda’s main preoccupation was 
not about appropriation of modern capitalism, but on how to destroy it. In 
Kaunda’s humanist society individual entrepreneurship and dexterity was 
not recognised as it was viewed as an expression of being antisocial. Such an 
attitude becomes a fatal blow to capitalism because individual 
entrepreneurship and dexterity are considered as keystones to economic 
development and national prosperity. Kaunda was not interested in 
appropriating capitalism with the intention of creating wealth, rather his 
main interest was suppressing the modern capitalistic modes of wealth 
creation.  
Like other African nationalists, Kaunda’s African humanism was mainly 
inspired by the belief that traditional African society was collectivist, hence 
modern capitalism incompatible with this traditional collectivist ethos. In 
this vein he writes, “The tribal community was an inclusive society. By this I 
mean the web of relationships which involved some degree of mutual 
responsibility was widely spread. I would describe industrial society as an 
exclusive society because its members’ responsibilities are often confined to 
the immediate family…” (Kaunda 1966: 29). Here the presumption is that 
modern capitalistic industrial society was incommensurate with African 
collectivist values. In this regard capitalism is rejected on the grounds that it 
thrives on the ethic of individualism. Same argument was also made by 
Michael Gelfand when observed that in traditional African society in 
Zimbabwe, 
All clansmen are materially equal in their Tribal Trust Lands, since no land can 
be bought or sold and each man receives just sufficient on which to grow 
enough food for his family. As all the men in the clan area claim to be 
brothers, it is most important in order to avoid jealousies that no one is more 
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wealthy than the rest. If any man finds himself in strained circumstances, one 
of his brothers will help him without expecting repayment. …Western man on 
the other hand is individualistic and acquisitive and likes to add to what he 
already has, is hard to satisfy, has no sooner achieved one goal than he will 
strive for another. He spends his life increasing what he has acquired, adding 
more and more to it and growing wealthier, more powerful and more learning. 
With many people the desire to become rich becomes an obsession. It assumes 
an urge that is never satisfied. A person may become a millionaire but is still 
not content (Gelfand 1981: 15). 
 
In the light of the above quotation, Gelfand is saying that African traditional 
society is characterised by equality and a sense of contentment with the 
material things which one has. In such a traditional setting, the value of 
sharing material possessions with others is highly priced. He contrasts this 
African attitude to material things with the western capitalist societies which 
are dominated by values of individualism and endless acquisitiveness which 
defies any rational explanation. It can be deduced from this way of reasoning 
that Gelfand is arguing that African traditional society was collectivist, hence 
capitalistic values were incommensurate with African traditional values. By 
implication it means that socialist values are commensurate with African 
traditional collectivist values.   
 
The argument of a collectivist African traditional society as commensurable 
with socialism was also made by the former president of Zimbabwe, Canaan 
Banana in his book titled, Towards a Socialist Ethos as follows, “For us the 
ethic of collectivism and the African system of the extended family remains 
the only positive and redemptive force in a world where there is so much 
paralysing coldness and insensitivity to the plight of the marginalised and 
the dispossessed. African tradition and culture maintains that we are our 
brother’s keeper. …We believe that the individual must die in order to find 
his or her self within the context of the collective” (Banana 1985: 13). Again 
one can easily see an appeal to African collectivist values as 
incommensurable with capitalistic individualistic values. The ideal was that 
material possessions should be shared with everybody.  
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A critique that has been made against African nationalists and their 
argument of African socialism is that such an ideological economic stance 
produced disastrous economic consequences in post-independent African 
states. This argument of African socialism was not so must thought of in 
terms of economic development but rather it was mostly politically 
motivated. It seems the argument of African socialism was mainly motivated 
by the general frustration with modern western capitalistic modes of social 
development. This argument was well articulated by Mazrui when he said, 
A…consideration which has contributed to the favourable intellectual climate 
for socialism in Africa concerns the accumulation of frustration over efforts to 
develop Africa through Western patterns of economic growth. Many Africans 
are seeking alternative strategies of social and economic improvement out of a 
sheer sense of desperation at the inadequacies of the first decades of 
independence. In reality, socialist experiments in post-colonial Africa so far 
have not yielded any greater improvement for the masses than other 
experiments. On the contrary, sometimes the social costs of socialism in 
Africa have indeed been rather high (Mazrui 1986: 188-189). 
 
 In other words, Mazrui is arguing that there is no empirical evidence that 
can show that socialism has worked in post-colonial African. The socialist 
experiment in post-colonial Africa has led to a situation of economic decay. 
The economic situation prior to the socialist experiment was far much 
better. Country after country of post-colonial African states that embarked 
on the socialist experiment has experienced economic decay. If socialist 
values were commensurable with African traditional values of collectivism as 
it was claimed by African nationalists they question that arises is, why then 
did African socialism failed in post-colonial Africa? Mazrui’s answer to this 
question is that post-colonial Africa lacked “organisational capabilities” to 
effectively bring about a socialist society. Thus he puts it, “Many hastily 
assume that a history of collectivism in a traditional setting is a relevant 
preparation for organised collective efforts in a modern setting. 
Unfortunately, much of the evidence points to the other way. Collective 
effort based on custom and tradition and kinship ties leaves Africa 
unprepared for the kind of organised collectivism that needs to be based on 
command rather than custom on efficiency rather than empathy, on 
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rationality rather than ritual” (Mazrui 1983: 285). Mazrui’s argument here is 
that African traditional values were not commensurate with the values of 
socialism which are mostly based on command, efficiency and rationality. In 
his other book, The Africans, Mazrui argued that the whole post-colonial 
African nationalist argument of African socialism was unintelligible when 
seen in comparison with post-colonial Africa’s material conditions. He 
writes,  
But while the resources of Africa were indeed being incorporated into world 
capitalism, the people of Africa were not being transformed into effective 
capitalists. Africans were, on the whole, objects in a game of capitalism rather 
than subjects. They were basically pawns in a bourgeois chess game. It is in 
this sense that Africa’s central economic problem in the post-colonial era is 
not too much capitalism but too little. …Effective capitalism has yet not arrive. 
If the genius of capitalism is production, the genius of socialism is 
distribution. And yet one cannot distribute poverty or socialise the means of 
non-production. Africa will need to develop a productive capacity before it can 
meaningfully implement a programme of distribution. At least to some extent 
Africa has to become capitalist before it can genuinely become socialist 
(Mazrui 1986: 233). 
In other words, it was unintelligible for post-colonial Africa to vouchsafe for 
socialism whilst economic productivity was poor. African nationalists were 
supposed to intensify capitalist production before they even think of 
socialistic policies of wealth redistribution. It was a matter of logic for 
Mazrui when he said that redistribution presupposes the existence of 
something to redistribute. Thus Mazrui concluded that what was required in 
post-colonial Africa was a development of a strong capitalistic base before 
one can even contemplate of socialism implementing socialism. Since the 
thrust of socialism was main orientated towards equitable distribution of 
wealth, it is obviously unintelligible for one to contemplate or even 
implement policies of distribution in the absence of that wealth which is 
supposed to be distributed. The African socialism experiment had a rather 
devastating effect to both the private and public sector. The private sector 
was subjected to lots of legislative restrictions which were inherently 
inhibitive towards individual entrepreneurial creativity. On the other hand, 
the public sector became the main employer for the majority of the 
89 
 
population even though it was not making profits. This inevitably led to 
economic stagnation and ultimate decay. Many developmental theorists have 
come to realisation that after decades of economic stagnation and decay in 
post-colonial Africa, what was needed was to promote a capitalistic spirit of 
entrepreneurship. As these developmental economists put it,  
The key to the solution of the current African malaise is a release of the energies 
of the many million African producers, both men and women. The 
encouragement of African entrepreneurship is essential. Where indigenous 
entrepreneurship flourishes and markets develop, it will also become easier to 
attract foreign capital. Thus there is a synergy between indigenous and 
international business (Cited in Sklar 1988: 13).  
Developmental economists are overwhelmingly of the view that the African 
socialism experiment inhibited the spirit of entrepreneurship among 
Africans because people were not given room to take up business initiatives. 
As a result those post-colonial African countries that implemented policies 
of African socialism experienced exponential economic deterioration. On the 
final analysis the solution that was given by multilateral lending institutions 
such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank were 
based on the economic principles of neo-liberal capitalism. The 
implementation of neo-liberal capitalist policies was thus prescribed to most 
of the post-colonial African states in a programme that came to be popularly 
known as Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP). Acceptance of 
this programme became the precondition for borrowing funds from the 
World Bank and the IMF as to assist most of the African states who were in 
economic distress. The following were some of the recommendations that 
were integral to ESAP as a fully-fledged neo-liberal capitalist solution in the 
aftermath of the failure of African socialism experiment: 
-elimination of price controls in conjunction with measures to increase 
competition and avoid monopolies and cartels, whether by parastatals or by 
private business; 
-gradual reduction of exchange controls balanced by reduced protectionism in 
the industrial countries; 
-elimination of counter-productive red tape in regulatory systems devised by 
governments for business enterprise; 
-reform of the parastatal sectors, including privatisation as a tool and not as 
an end in itself; 
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-credit facilities and technical assistance for small businesses and farming; 
-product specialisation among countries and other devices to enhance the 
viability of regional markets (Cited in Sklar 1988: 13). 
In the light of the above World Bank and IMF solution, government was 
supposed not to interfere in the functioning of the economy and promote 
free market policies, privatisation of parastatals. ESAP policies were also 
called policies that were aimed at promoting economic recovery. This 
economic recovery was also understood as aimed at arousing the spirit of 
capitalism in post-colonial Africa. Sklar described the ESAP policies as post-
colonial African embrace of the spirit of capitalism. Thus he writes, “Today, 
the spirit of capitalism in Africa is broad, and away from the shadow of 
desiccating doubt. It is manifest in the privatisation policies of many 
governments, the virtual abandonment of socialistic economic strategies by 
once-doctrinaire regimes (e.g. Benin, Congo, Angola, and Mazambique” (Sklar 
1988: 14). The African socialism experiment was going against the popular 
working of capitalism as discussed in the previous section. The IMF and 
World Bank ESAP policies were aimed at injecting the spirit of capitalism as a 
panacea to post-colonial Africa’s economic malaise. But what is the spirit of 
capitalism?   
As we have seen in chapter 2, the concept of the spirit of capitalism was 
coined by a Germany sociologist Max Weber who alleged that the rise of 
modern capitalism in Europe and North America was the result of the 
religious teachings of reformed Protestantism which emphasised modern 
capitalist qualities which were about thrift, hard work and being frugal. For 
Weber it was some of these teachings of reformed Protestantism in Europe 
and North America which became stimulant to the spirit of modern 
capitalism. Such an ethic was conducive to the rise of modern capitalism 
because it emphasised hard work and saving money instead of sharing one’s 
economic fortunes with others. Thus the thrust of spirit of capitalism was to 
make money and to save it. Each individual was accountable for his or her 
actions in terms of what s/he does with her wealth. The Protestant ethic was 
also based on individualism. As we have seen previously, some scholars have 
alleged that the problem behind Africa’s failure to appropriate the spirit of 
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capitalism should be traced to the history of this economic system in Africa 
– that capitalism was introduced to Africa through and expropriation of 
resources from the colonised Africans without necessarily being 
accompanied by hard acquisition work.  
This observation was made by Mazrui as follows, “Capitalism arrived in 
Africa with the imperative of acquisition without the discipline of work and 
frugality. The white man himself in Africa set a dangerous example. He never 
washed his own clothes, or cooked his own food, or polished his own shoes, 
or made his own bed, or cleaned his own room, or even poured his own gin 
and tonic” (Mazrui 1990: 493). What is implied in the above observation is 
that capitalism was mediated to Africa without the Protestant ethic. 
Colonialism was more about plundering which Max Weber characterised as 
booty capitalism or imperialist capitalism. According to Weber, “In general 
and at all times, imperialist capitalism, especially colonial booty capitalism 
based on direct force and compulsory labour, has offered by far the greatest 
opportunities for profit. They have been greater by far than those normally 
open to industrial enterprises which worked for exports and which oriented 
themselves to peaceful trade with members of other polities” (Weber 2009: 
168). In other words, the type of capitalism that was transmitted to Africa 
through colonialism was remarkably different from the capitalism that 
existed in Europe where the Protestant ethic provided the moral foundation 
of modern capitalism. In the colonised African context, capitalism was thus 
identified with the plundering of resources through the use of force. Murove 
observed that, 
The African experience of colonial capitalism was based on an economic 
system that was mainly acquisitive with unprecedented expropriation of land 
and minerals from indigenous African peoples. Economically, colonialism was 
an era of the unleashing of greed upon the defenceless colonised indigenous 
people. Under colonialism, African minerals, fertile lands, sacred sites and 
wild life sanctuaries were ruthlessly expropriated from the indigenous African 
population to the benefit of individual colonialists without any compensation. 
Most of those colonial acquisitions were legitimised in some law which made it 
difficult for indigenous Africans to claim back that which was expropriated 
from them (Murove 2018: 14-15), 
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In the light of the above observation the argument that is being proffered is 
that capitalism arrived in Africa without any amoral foundation, rather it 
became the driving motive for colonial expeditions. As we have seen in the 
preceding discussion, most of the African nationalists were against 
capitalism on the grounds that it was the handmaid of colonialism. In as 
much as colonialism was rejected as an oppressive foreign political system 
that was forcibly imposed upon the majority of indigenous African people 
by violence, the same outlook towards capitalism was also expressed by 
many African nationalists. As we shall see in the following chapter, the 
contemporary discourse of economic policies of indigenisation seem to 
derive their inspiration from the desire by post-colonial African governments 
to make capitalism indigenous to the African post-colonial African context. 
Mazrui is more nuanced on the failure for the appropriation of modern 
capitalism in the post-colonial African context when he said,  
The greatest mockery about Western imperialism does not lie in its promotion of 
capitalism in Africa, it lies in its failure to do so. …the West destroyed traditional 
African economies without really creating capitalist foundations to replace them. 
In this sense, the problem of dependency in Africa is about who controls 
capitalism within Africa, rather than about the merits of capitalism as such 
(Mazrui 1986: 215).  
In such observations one can easily deduce that capitalism was not 
appropriated in post-colonial Africa because of Western imperialism or 
colonialism which created an economic situation of dependency instead of 
entrepreneurship among Africans. The way how capitalism was transmitted 
to Africa through imperialism was dovetailed by the distortion of modern 
capitalist values. This point comes out more strongly when he posed the 
following question, “In what sense did Western imperialism fail to create 
African capitalism?” Mazrui went on to say that “the answer lies in the 
phenomenon of distorted capitalist transmission”.  In this distortion, 
“Western imperialism transmitted capitalist greed to Africa – but without 
capitalist discipline. It transmitted the profit motive – but not 
entrepreneurial persistence and risk-taking. Western materialism was 
transferred to Africa, but not Western rationalism” (Mazrui 1986: 215). 
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Because of imperialism, the transmission of capitalism to Africa was about 
greed which was not accompanied by some of the modern capitalist values 
such as thrift and frugality which were described by Weber as pivotal to the 
ascendency of modern capitalism in Western societies. Moreover, Western 
materialism was readily accepted in post-colonial Africa without being 
accompanied by Western rationalism – this is the idea that an economic 
action as only justifiable on the basis of utility maximisation or the 
individual concerned. But some scholars such as Sklar would argue that 
Africa’s economic development did not lie in the binary debate of capitalism 
versus socialism. As he puts it, “In sum, socialism needs capital and lacks a 
theory of incentive; capitalism needs the state and lacks a theory of social 
responsibility. The African economies need private capital, purposeful state 
participation, powerful incentives, and public responsibility for the general 
standard of living. These common requirements for social progress can only 
be met by judicious mixtures of capitalism and socialism” (Sklar 1988: 18).  
In other words, both socialism and capitalism have their own advantages and 
disadvantages. For this reason, Sklar is advocating a mixture of both 
economic systems. But as we have seen previously, within an African context 
that is characterised by extreme poverty as a result of economic 
underdevelopment some scholars such as Mazrui have argued that what is 
needed in Africa is the real spirit of capitalism instead of socialism. 
However, there are some scholars who have argued that despite the post-
colonial African socialism experiment, during the colonial era, the spirit of 
capitalism was appropriated through the introduction of the Christian and 
Islamic religions. The main argument which is put forward by these scholars 
as we shall see in the following section is that these two foreign religions 
were endowed with some teachings that inherently favoured an 
individualistic outlook towards life. This individualistic outlook towards life 
was thus regarded as indispensable for the ascendency of the spirit of 
entrepreneurship among Africans during the colonial era.   
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4.4 Christian and Islamic Values and the Appropriation of Modern 
Capitalism in Africa   
As shown in the preceding discussion, Max Weber advanced a sociological 
theory which focussed on the influence of the Christian religion towards the 
rise of modern capitalism in Western societies. Weber studied the influence 
of religion in various spheres of human existence such as economic, 
political, aesthetic, erotic, intellectual life and theodicy. For example, in his 
study of some of the Protestant sects in the United States he made the 
following observation, “Admission to the congregation is recognised as an 
absolute guarantee of the moral qualities of a gentleman, especially of those 
qualities required in business matters. Baptism secures to the individual the 
deposits of the whole religion and unlimited credit without any competition. 
He is a ‘made man’. …In general, only those men and success in business 
who belonged to Methodist or Baptist or other sects or sectlike conventicles”. 
Weber went on to say that, “When a sect member moved to a different place, 
or if he was a traveling salesman, he carried the certificate of his 
congregation with him; and thereby he found not only easy contact with sect 
members but, above all, he found credit everywhere. If he got into economic 
straits through no fault of his own, the sect arranged his affairs, gave 
guarantees to the creditors, and helped him in every way, often according to 
the the Biblical principle…” (Weber 2009: 305). In other words, conversion to 
a religion enabled the individual to feel that s/he is chosen as a special 
person among the rest of other individuals in society.  For Weber, by virtue 
of conversion to a religion, the individual was accorded some economic 
advantage such as ease access to credit which s/he could otherwise not have 
had s/he not been a Christian. In this way, belonging to a religious sect was 
understood as synonymous with being morally trustworthy in one’s business 
dealings. Hence, according to Weber, “It is crucial that sect membership 
meant a certificate of moral qualification and especially of business morals 
for the individual. This stands in contrast to membership in a ‘church’ into 
which one is ‘born’ and which lets grace shine over the righteous and the 
unrighteous alike. Indeed, a church is a corporation which organises grace 
and administers religious gifts of grace, like an endowed foundation” (Weber 
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2009: 306). Thus for Weber, religious sects were more convenient for the 
shaping of an individual’s capitalistic character as compared to the 
traditional churches such as the Catholic Church, Anglican Church and the 
Lutheran.  
Weber’s primary interest as insinuated previously was to investigate how 
religion influenced the rise of modern capitalism. The type of religion which 
he found to have the causal influence in the rise of modern capitalism was 
reformed Protestantism or the Puritans whose religious teaching was based 
on the belief that individuals were capable of achieving their own destinies 
without external interference. This implied that religion was a matter of 
individual affair qua individual. According to George Ritzer, Weber’s 
understanding of the Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism was based 
on the idea that “it is people’s duty to ceaselessly increase their wealth”. 
Hence, “This takes the spirit of capitalism out of the realm of individual 
ambition and into the category of ethical imperative” (Ritzer 1996: 148). The 
ethical imperative became the justification of thrift and frugality in the 
making of money which was seen as integral to the individual’s divine 
calling. Some post-colonial African scholars have argued that whilst the 
spirit of capitalism had existed in Africa south of the Sahara, of great 
significance is the role that was played by Christian missionaries in instilling 
the spirit of modern capitalism among Africans. 
4.4.1 The Christian Religion and the Spirit of Capitalism in Africa 
John Iliffe argued that the spirit of capitalism was already in existence in 
pre-colonial Africa. He observed that by 1848 in a port in eastern Nigeria a 
Presbyterian missionary by the name of Hope Masterton Waddell preached 
the gospel of Christianity and capitalism to the eastern Nigerian people of 
Old Calabar and only to discover that the people of Calabar already practised 
the spirit of capitalism: As Waddell put it,  
I preached the way of wealth from the word of God, industry, honesty, economy, 
temperance, knowledge, and the blessing of God; warning against idleness, sloth, 
gluttony, drunkenness, ignorance, waste, and bad company, as the sure way to 
poverty and ruin. Seeing the company did not look pleased, I asked the king what 
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ailed them. He said, that they knew all that themselves already (Cited in Iliffe 
1983; 44).  
The practice of being diligent in the pursuit of wealth was something that 
existed in pre-colonial African societies. The accumulation of wealth was 
also related to competition for social prestige in these pre-colonial African 
societies. Thus all those vices that were deemed incompatible with the single 
minded pursuit of material possessions were to be avoided. In the southern 
part of Zaire, pre-colonial historians recorded that the Kuba people are said 
to have taught their young men who were going through initiation that 
laziness was an evil which was synonymous with witchcraft (Iliffe 1983: 44-
45). In other words, such observations tend to undermine the idea that the 
Protestant ethic provided the causal rationale for the rise of modern 
capitalism. But pre-colonial African economic practices cannot be compared 
to modern capitalistic practices. For this reason, Iliffe went on to investigate 
the contribution of Christianity to pre-colonial African economic transition 
to modern capitalism.  
In the investigation of the contribution of Christianity to pre-colonial African 
economic transition to modern capitalism Iliffe observed that in Zambia 
there emerged successful farmers and shopkeepers who were colloquially 
known as bawina – the winners. Most of these bawina were predominantly 
Jehova’s Witnesses’ converts from the Lala people. Thus he writes, 
…membership [to Jehova’s Witnesses] encouraged commercial success in three 
less direct ways. First, certain of the Witnesses’ specific teachings aided a 
businessman: the importance of literacy (in order to read the scriptures), the 
careful use of time, the notion that to acquire skills was to have them ready for 
the New Kingdom. Second, to be a Witness was to belong to a solidary 
community whose mutual trust gave its members an entrepreneurial advantage. 
And finally, since the Lala were a matrilineal people but the teachings of the 
Witnesses favoured patriliny, to become a Witness provided an ideological 
justification for cutting unwanted ties with matrilineal kin, who might otherwise 
eat up the profits of the enterprise, and for replacing their often inefficient 
assistance with hired labourers paid in cash. Among the Lala, then, it was not 
simply that Jehova’s Witnesses became capitalists, but that aspiring capitalists 
became Witnesses (Iliffe 1983: 45-46).    
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In the light of the above quotation, it is clear that the Christian religion in 
the form of the Jehova’s witnesses’ sect enabled the emergence of the spirit 
of capitalism among the Lala people in Zambia in three ways that departed 
from the traditional Lala ways of life. The Christian religious ways that were 
introduced to the Lala people was literacy, solidarity among Jehova’s 
witnesses and a radical break with the bonds of matrilineal traditional 
practices that were deemed prohibitive to individual entrepreneurial efforts. 
Thus those who wanted to become capitalists among the Lala had to become 
Jehohava’s Witnesses first. This is typically an echo of the Weberian theory 
that the Protestant ethic as espoused by the Puritans aided the rise of the 
spirit of modern capitalism in the West and North America. Iliffe’s advocacy 
of the Weberian Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism in post-colonial 
Africa is more nuanced when he further affirmed that, 
Such specific, identifiable links between Christianity and capitalism have been 
common in Africa. The traders of Lagos who established plantations on the 
mainland in the late nineteenth century, for example, were mostly zealous 
members of independent churches and created a symbiotic relationship 
between their and their plantations. Migrant labourers working on the 
plantations were taught independent Christianity. On returning home they 
sometimes founded daughter congregations and invited their employer-pastor 
to visit them. …Christianity, then, could facilitate entrance into the role of 
capitalist. Could it also facilitate entrance into the role of worker, of 
anonymous member in large-scale capitalist society? (Iliffe 1983: 46). 
Thus according to Iliffe, Christianity facilitated the appropriation of 
capitalism among Africans in the sense that it offered Africans with a radical 
break from the clutches of African traditional society and its inhibitive 
mores towards the ethic of entrepreneurship. Whilst Weber had attributed 
the Protestant ethic and the rise of modern capitalism to the Puritans, for 
Iliffe it was Christianity in general that acted as a stimulant to the 
appropriation of the spirit of modern capitalism in colonial Africa. Iliffe 
went on to say that in Ivory Coast Albert Atcho, an Ivorian and an 
entrepreneur preached a peculiar type of Christianity which helped towards 
appropriation of the Spirit of capitalism among the Ivorians because the 
emphasis of his message was on enjoying life to the fullest within the 
present. The following are some of the extracts from Atcho’s preaching: 
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“What is the happiness that you desire to have? First, children, to be well 
paid in your job, to find a place of employment rapidly, to succeed in 
planting, and to have a better life” (Cited in Iliffe 1983: 47). It is evidently 
clear that such type of preaching was wholly materialistic in the sense that it 
instilled the idea that the individual’s happiness relied in the material things 
s/he accumulates. For Atcho, the ideal human being to be emulated by his 
followers was supposed to be a European. As he puts it,  
If it were possible to see God, if there were someone whom one could see, it 
would not a black man whom one would see but a white. Being white Himself, He 
created like Him the one who directly resembled Him. He confided to him all the 
notions, all the facilities and the technical abilities. That is why the whites are in 
advance of us. But in drawing nearer to God again our-selves, we shall become 
like our elder brothers with the white men (Cited in Iliffe 1983: 47).  
In other words, for Atcho the white man was an ideal person for a black 
person to emulate because of his technical achievements. Since the white 
man was made in the image of God it was only logical that the black man 
should imitate the white man in all that he does. Believing in God was a 
prerequisite towards coming nearer to the white man.However, Iliffe went on 
to say that, at Bregbo where Atcho undertook his ministry, those who came 
to him for confession expressed tensions in their lives. He writes, 
 More important, the confessions showed that many maladies were due to 
tensions between old kinship ties and the individualism demanded by the new 
Ivorian society. …Atcho healed individuals; he did not stress the restoration of 
harmony to groups. He taught his patients not to believe that they suffered 
misfortune because they had been bewitched – the persecutive notion normal 
in small-scale agricultural societies. But he did not teach them to ascribe their 
misfortunes to their own guilt and thereby to internalise it and achieve 
individual, personal responsibility. Rather, he offered an escape from the full 
strains of individualisation by assuring his patients that their maladies were 
divine punishments for collaborating with the actions of the devil, and it was 
these actions that were vividly described in the thousands of imaginary 
confessions. In that it is the function of prophetism to ease historical 
transitions, Atcho was the prophet of Ivory Coast’s transition to capitalism. 
And it was entirely in keeping with the association of spiritual force with 
material prosperity that he should have been not an ascetic but a wealthy 
entrepreneur. Connections of this kind between Christianity and capitalism 
are familiar enough within European history and I need not illustrate them 
further (Iliffe 1983: 47-48). 
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What is implied by Iliffe in the above quotation is that Christianity taught a 
message of individualism which was apparently conducive to the 
appropriation of capitalism in the Ivorian society. The Christian religion also 
provided a radical break from African traditional belief systems. One can 
easily deduce the influence of Weber’s Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism in Iliffe’s account of the appropriation of capitalism in Africa. 
Other scholars have maintained that the teachings of the old churches were 
conducive to the appropriation of capitalism in Africa instead of the 
independent churches that were rather rebellious to the colonial 
establishment. Inus Daneel studied the rise of independent churches in 
Zimbabwe after which he deduced, 
On the basis of occupational differences members of the mission churches 
tend to preponderate in the ‘upper class’ in Chingombe. Salaried clergy, 
teachers, clerks and businessmen in the rural centres form the elite of the 
local community. This is the group that builds Western style houses and drive 
cars, which are increasingly becoming symbols of status and wealth as 
opposed to the traditional standard of owning livestock. Independent Church 
members are more numerous in the ‘middle class’ of skilled and semi-skilled 
labourers, who include members of government services such as the police, 
road and rail transport, and tradesmen such as builders, tailors and 
carpenters. …A significant conclusion is that the Independent Churches do not 
appeal only to the economically under-privileged. In other words, any simplistic 
theory that there is a direct correlation between the rapid growth of the 
Independent Churches and the lot of the impoverished sector of rural society 
is plainly untenable. The indications are that where these churches have an 
impact on the ranks of the ‘poor’ and recruit them as members, they 
immediately encourage them to improve their economic positions [his italics] 
(Daneel 1987: 119-120). 
 
Daneel is echoing Weber’s thesis as he ties membership in independent 
churches to entrepreneurship and economic success. However, Daneel’s 
argument is can be refuted on the grounds that some independent churches 
in Africa have been known to be too traditionalistic to the extent that their 
formation has been predominantly motivated by the need to preserve 
African traditional values. For example, a Church called Johanne Apostles of 
Marange in Zimbabwe is notoriously known for downplaying the importance 
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of education and seeking treatment from modern hospitals. Followers of this 
independent church are encouraged to marry at a younger and tender age. 
Business enterprises are usually created with the aim of supporting their 
huge families as polygamous marriages are part and parcel of the tradition 
of this church. Such a church can hardly be said to be in the position to aid 
the appropriation of capitalism. However, apart from the role of the 
Christian religion in aiding the appropriation of modern capitalism in Africa. 
It seems the role of traditional churches is more emphasised when it comes 
to the appropriation of modern capitalism than that of independent 
churches. According to Paul Kennedy, “Church membership provided 
religious justification, spiritual protection and practical assistance for the 
converts in their struggles to disentangle themselves from the demands of 
their matrikin and concentrate instead on building up their business and 
nuclear family interest” (Kennedy 1988: 142). Thus the Christian religion 
contributed to the appropriation of capitalism in Africa as those African 
converts became capitalists by virtue of disentangling themselves from the 
communal demands of African traditionalism. However, some scholars have 
also observed that since Christianity was not the only foreign religion in 
Africa, the Islamic religion played a significant role in the appropriation of 
capitalism in sub-Saharan Africa because its teachings was also based on 
some of the values conducive for the appropriation of modern capitalism.  
 
The Islamic religious teachings the insisted the virtues of sobriety, 
obedience, self-discipline and hard work are thus deemed to have played a 
critical role in the appropriation of capitalism in Africa. These religious 
virtues are understood to have played a critical role for the success of 
capitalistic institutions in colonial Africa. Charles van Onselen in his study of 
forced labour, Chibaro in Southern Africa observed that in the newly 
established mine compounds, mine owners “came to realise that not all 
religious activity was threatening, or incompatible with industrial activity. 
The majority of religious teachings were conservative, and the values of the 
protestant ethic, such as obedience and service, could be put to good use in 
the [mine] compounds” (van Onselen 1976: 185). In such observations it is 
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evidently clear that van Onselen is saying that religious values helped mine 
owners in their inscription of African labour. In this regard, Islam played a 
critical role in instilling discipline and hard work among the African mine 
workers. He writes,  
Mine managers were also willing to acknowledge that sobriety, hard work and 
obedience were not exclusively Christian attributes. For the black followers of 
Islam, who came from Nyasaland, mosques were allowed to be constructed; and 
at both the Cam & Motor and the Globe and Phoenix mines they became part of 
compound life. The teachings of Mohammed were considered to meet so well the 
requirements of industrial life… (van Onselen 1976: 186).  
Here the implication is that the Islamic religion was was found to be more 
conducive to the smooth mining activities of western capitalist settlers. In 
the same vein, John Iliffe also observed that the Giriama of the Kenyan coast 
who became accumulators of wealth “had become Muslims, usually as a 
result of possession by an ‘Islamic spirit’ and at least to the extent of 
observing Ramadan and eschewing alcohol and impure meat”. Iliffe went on 
to say that, “This enabled them to withdraw from much Giriama social life 
and its accompanying drain on their funds, just as Jehovah’s Witnesses 
could withdraw from unwanted matrilineal ties. By the 1960s, moreover, the 
accumulators were beginning to intermarry and thus create the group 
solidarity which was another potential advantage of minority status” (Iliffe 
1983: 48-49). In other words, Islamic religion helped to promote the spirit of 
capitalism among the Giriama people of Kenya in a way that was similar to 
the Christian religion. From the influence of Islam in east Africa Iliffe went 
on to investigate the influence of the Islamic religion in West Africa. AS he 
puts it, 
For that aspect of Islam’s relationship with capitalism we must turn to the long-
standing Islamic culture of West African savanna. There the association of 
business communities with particular Islamic brotherhoods is long established. 
By 1900, for example, all the North African traders in Zinder (in modern Nigeria) 
belonged to the Sanusi brotherhood, which enforced contracts among them and 
provided them with services all the way across the Sahara to Tripoli. During the 
twentieth century somewhat similar patterns appeared among West Africans. 
One such innovation was the growth of the Reformed Tijaniyya, a brotherhood of 
Senegalese origin which was introduced to Kano in northern Nigeria in 1937 and 
was thought thirty years later to have gained the adherence of more than half the 
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city’s men. In Kano the Reformed Tihaniyya performed several functions. It 
reinforced the emirate’s autonomy within the Sokoto Caliphate, whose official 
brotherhood was the rival Qadiriyya. It encouraged a genuine spiritual 
earnestness and popular participation (Iliffe 1983: 49-50). 
It can be deduced from the above quotation that Iliffe is arguing that Islamic 
brotherhoods that were entrenched in capitalist business practices 
facilitated the appropriation of capitalism in West Africa. Through these 
Islamic brotherhoods, those Africans who converted to the Islamic faith were 
able to carry out their entrepreneurial activities. Also, the formation of these 
Islamic brotherhoods presupposed that its members set themselves apart 
from the rest of the traditional community and its traditions and mores. 
Iliffe would thus go on to say that, “Nevertheless, African Islam offers 
almost rich a variety of relationships between religious ideology and 
capitalist action as can be found within Christianity. …There is very little 
indication that indigenous religious institutions aided the emerging 
capitalist” (Iliffe 1983: 51-52). Traditional African society is thus portrayed 
as inherently inhibiting the appropriation of the spirit of capitalism or the 
ascendency of modern capitalism in Africa. Paul Kennedy (1987: 142) echoed 
Iliffe when he alleged that “conversion of some young entrepreneurs to the 
Islamic faith [followed] a long period of psychological tension and physical 
illness induced by the possibility of conflict with the elders whose status and 
power were threatened by the younger men’s activities”. Here again we have 
the motif of a radical break with African traditional society that was 
influenced by the Islamic religion as the enabling factor towards the 
appropriation of the spirit of capitalism. Some Africans who fell ill were 
usually diagnosed as being possessed by Islamic spirits “whose appeasement 
required nothing less than the religious conversion of those unfortunate 
enough to become possessed”. Religious conversion to the Islamic faith 
fostered a new way of moral outlook that would later on become a catalyst 
factor towards the appropriation of the spirit of capitalism. In this vein, 
Kennedy writes, “Once this had occurred, the Islamic ban on the 
consumption of alcohol and certain foods, as well as the need to follow a 
partly separate ritual and social life, all provided the opportunity for 
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entrepreneurs to reduce their level of involvement in traditional society. Yet 
this behaviour no longer incurred community displeasure since it was now 
judged to be religiously determined rather than the result of selfish 
individualism”. Conversion to Islamic faith enabled Africans to undertake 
entrepreneurial activities without fear of reprobation from African 
traditional community as the behaviour of the converts to the Islamic faith 
became religiously justifiable.  
However, whilst the appropriation of modern capitalism is attributed to 
Christianity and the Islamic religion, the above scholars tend to agree on the 
idea that the African traditional religion was incompatible with the spirit of 
modern capitalism. Individual entrepreneurial success in traditional African 
societies has been always attributed to witchcraft or sorcery. The question 
that has been raised in this regard has to do with how Africans understood 
capitalism within their traditional settings. There is a motif among scholars 
which is says capitalistic economic practices that thrived on individualism 
were prone to be seen as manifestations of witchcraft. The medical 
anthropologist, Michael Gelfand observed that among the Shona people of 
Zimbabwe, witches are believed to feed on human flesh. He writes,  
Human flesh is believed to be the most powerful of a witch’s medicines. These 
medicines may be used to cause harm or they may be used for socially 
acceptable purposes, for luck in gambling, for example, or success in business, or 
to obtain good crops; nevertheless, by their nature they are evil, and their use is 
held to convey an unfair advantage over others in the community (Gelfand 1991: 
175).  
The traditional African belief in witchcraft caused them to see successful 
entrepreneurial activities as the results of witchcraft. In the same vein, Iliffe 
observed that, “Many rural Rhodesians were said in the 1960s to believe that 
a successful trader must have buried the heart of a close relative under his 
counter. The Sukuma people of northern Tanzania long ascribed the success 
of pioneer cotton farmers to the fact that they had some zombies work for 
them. It was probably an indication of the different levels of capitalist 
development in the two societies that African witchcraft beliefs had a 
powerful levelling equalilty…” (Iliffe 1983: 54). Because of the values of 
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individualism in capitalism, it became inevitable that capitalistic economic 
activities came to be interpreted as a manifestation of witchcraft.  
Another factor which has been propagated by Western anthropologists as 
mitigating against the appropriation of modern capitalism is that Africans 
were mainly lovers of cattle. These cattle, it is alleged, were seen as a symbol 
of economic status and they were also used in religious rituals. The colonial 
anthropologists L. Marquard and T. G. Standing wrote that,  
Obviously, the first, and often the only, concern of primitive people is to keep 
themselves alive and get enough to eat. …The normal life of the Bantu before 
Europeans came was in keeping cattle, tilling the ground, and hunting game. 
…The ruling passion of most Bantu men’s life was cattle. Cattle were movable 
reservoir of food, though rarely killed except to propitiate the spirits; they were 
the only form of money and fines…and gifts were paid in cattle; they were the 
chief if not the only mark of wealth and prosperity… (Marquard and Standing 
1939: 20).  
The implication of this anthropological observation about traditional African 
societies is that before the advent of colonialism, the African economy 
evolved around cattle breeding. Whilst cattle breeding was the pinnacle of 
African traditional economic outlook, there is strong evidence that prior to 
the advent of colonialism Africans were involved in the mining of copper, 
gold and iron as well as farming of various crops. However, most of the 
economic activities of Africans in traditional societies were mainly based on 
the value of subsistence instead of overaccumulation of wealth as we find in 
modern capitalism. Karl Polanyi, an Austrian economic historian observed 
that the idea of a free the western free market economy was something 
evolved in Western societies and did not have some form of universal origins 
in all human societies. In Western societies capitalism evolved with a 
peculiar understanding of a human being and labour which was not 
universally shared in all societies. He writes, 
To separate labour from other activities of life and to subject it to the laws of 
the market was to annihilate all organic forms of existence and to replace 
them by a different type of organisation, an atomistic and individualistic one. 
…This effect of the establishment of a labour market is conspicuously 
apparent in colonial regions today. The natives are to be forced to make a 
living by selling their labour. To this end their traditional institutions must be 
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destroyed, and prevented from re-forming, since, as a rule, the individual in 
primitive society is not threatened by starvation unless the community as a 
whole is in a like predicament. …There is no starvation in societies living on 
the subsistence margin (Polanyi 1968: 163). 
 
In the light of the above observation, the argument which Polanyi is making 
is that in traditional African societies the economic practice of subsistence 
promoted equality among all members of the community. No one hoarded 
wealth at the expense of other members of the community. Thus the 
problem of hunger and material deprivation did not exist. Polanyi went on to 
allege that, “It is the absence of the threat of individual starvation which 
makes primitive society, in a sense, more human than market economy, and 
at the same time less economic. Ironically, the white man’s initial 
contribution to the black man’s world mainly consisted in introducing him 
to the uses of the scourge of hunger” (Polanyi 1968: 164). In other words, 
capitalism was not a natural state of human beings within African traditional 
societies whose economies were based on subsistence. Within such an 
economic system, the advancement of human wellbeing was considered to 
be more important than individual pursuit of profits through endless 
accumulation of wealth. As we have seen previously in the argument of 
African socialism, the dominant idea was that African traditional societies 
were collectivist or that they practised some form of traditional socialism 
that was based on egalitarian values. Polanyi went on to aver that what was 
happening in African through colonialism was something which happened to 
European societies in the eighteenth century during the evolution of modern 
capitalism in those societies. Thus he writes, “Now, what the white man may 
still occasionally practice in remote regions today, namely, the smashing up 
of social structures in order to extract the element of labour from them, was 
done in the eighteenth century to white populations by white men for similar 
purposes” (Ibid). Here it is important to note that Polanyi is arguing that the 
current modern capitalistic practices were actually engineered at some point 
in time in European history. In other words, modern capitalism was not 
necessarily an economic system that evolved with human nature time 
immemorial, rather it was an economic system that came into being as a 
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result of deliberate human political legislations that were aimed at bringing 
about specific economic outcomes.  
With reference to indigenous African societies, some scholars have argued 
that the modern capitalistic economic system cannot be appropriated 
because of its individualistic and mechanistic presumptions about a human 
person as solely a utility maximizer. These scholars have argued that African 
societies give prime value to prestige – the belief that wealth is there to be 
shared with others in community. For example, Mazrui argued that whilst 
the concept of private property was not foreign to African indigenous 
economic systems prior to the advent of colonialism, private property was 
curtailed by traditional customs (Mazrui 1977: 23). In the same way, the idea 
of private land which can be bought and sold was foreign to African customs 
because land was understood as something that belongs to the community 
as a whole. Whilst modern capitalism operated under the ideal that in his or 
her economic relations the individual is originally self-interested or greed, 
African traditional value systems were based on the idea that the individual 
belongs to the community, and that wealth should be enjoyed in common. 
Jomo Kenyata emphasised the primacy that is given to the prestige motive in 
indigenous African communities when he said, “The selfish or self-regarding 
man has no name of reputation in the Gikuyu community. An individualist is 
looked upon with suspicion and is given a nickname of mwebongia, one who 
works for himself and is likely to end up a wizard” (Kenyata 1953: 119). The 
primacy that is given to the prestige motive is thus enough evidence to the 
argument that indigenous African traditional values were incommensurable 
with capitalistic values. In African traditional culture, as Benezet Bujo aptly 
puts it,  
Avarice was one of the most detestable vices, Hence, the border between this 
avarice and frugality is unclear in Africa, because saving money, for instance, 
could be taken as an excuse for refusing to offer necessary assistance to others. 
This may explain why even today people in Africa do not hesitate to organise big 
feasts with relatives, friends and acquaintances and to spend money lavishly in 
order to keep human contacts as close as possible (Bujo 1998: 163).  
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But the question that arises is: If modern capitalism was built upon vices 
such as avarice, to what extend can such an economic system be 
appropriated in post-colonial Africa where avarice is highly detested? Whilst 
African governments, as we have seen in the preceding section, have 
attempted to devise policies that would eventually lead to the appropriation 
of capitalism, Guy Hunter cautioned that, “[In post-colonial Africa] The moral 
element has been equally strong. It is felt as a revulsion against the 
sufferings and inequalities of growth as it was achieved in the West; a 
revulsion particularly against private enterprise, not only because it had 
been disfigured by greed and exploitation but for its associations in Africa – 
capitalism, imperialism, colonialism” (Hunter 1967: 119). In other words, the 
moral element in African indigenous culture had a retarding effect towards 
the appropriation of modern capitalism in post-colonial Africa as well as the 
inevitable conceptual association of capitalism with colonialism and 
imperialism. 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed some of the critical issues that have been central to 
the discourse of appropriation of capitalism in post-colonial sub-Sahara 
Africa. In this chapter I have argued that what has been found problematic in 
the quest for the appropriation of modern capitalism is that this economic 
system is weaved around an understanding of a person as individualistic and 
selfish who actions are solely motivated by utility maximisation. On the 
basis of this presumption, modern capitalism theory postulates that the 
individual quest for material possessions is insatiable. On the basis of a 
succinct summary of modern capitalistic understanding a human being and 
his or her economic relations, I went on to discuss the problem of 
incommensurability between African traditional values and modern 
capitalism. The argument of the incommensurability between African 
traditional values and modern capitalism gave rise to post-colonial African 
socialism experiment. African nationalists such as Kwame Nkrumah, Julius 
Nyerere, Leopold Senghor, Tom Mboya, Kenneth Kaunda and Canaan Banana, 
just to mention a few argued in their various ways that socialism was 
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indigenous to African values. On the basis of this presumption, the 
economic developmental orientation became that of indigenising socialism 
instead of capitalism. Thus capitalism was to be rejected mainly on the 
grounds that it was based on values of individualism which these African 
nationalists considered to be foreign to African indigenous values.  
It was also argued in this chapter that the African socialism economic 
discourse in postcolonial Africa was not about the appropriation of 
capitalism, but the outright rejection of capitalism as it was deemed to be 
incommensurate with African indigenous values. The African socialism 
argument was not so much about economic development, rather it was 
politically motivated in the sense that the salient aim was to rebel against 
capitalism because of its historical symbiotic relationship with colonialism. 
In support of the above argument, there are other post-colonial African 
scholars who argued that the African socialism experiment ruined the 
economies of all those states in which it was implemented as a national 
developmental economic policy. This chapter also raised the argument of the 
appropriation of capitalism in post-colonial Africa. The argument about the 
appropriation of capitalism in post-colonial Africa was discussed in 
relationship with Weberian theory of the Protestant ethic and its causal 
influence to the rise of modern capitalism in Western societies. Some 
scholars argued that Christianity and Islam facilitated the appropriation of 
capitalism in colonial Africa. These religious are regarded to have promoted 
the capitalistic ethic of individualism by emphasising the idea of individual 
responsibility as well as dissociation of individuals from communal 
obligations – thus focusing solely on their entrepreneurial activities. These 
foreign religions are regarded to have taught Africans capitalistic values 
such as thrift, frugality, discipline and hard work. In this regard, we found 
that these scholars who have adopted the Weberian Protestant ethic theory 
tend to forge some convergence of thought on the idea that African 
traditional or indigenous religion was incompatible with the spirit of modern 
capitalism. 
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Finally, in this chapter there are some anthropologists who have maintained 
that African traditional society cannot be regarded as a suitable foundation 
for the appropriation of capitalism. In support of this argument some 
scholars maintained that capitalistic entrepreneurial practices have often 
been associated with witchcraft in the sense that a successful entrepreneur 
is suspected of practising witchcraft against the community. Another 
argument that was made against the appropriation of the spirit of capitalism 
was that the African economic outlook was rather based on subsistence 
instead of thriving for endless accumulation of wealth as it is the case in 
modern capitalism. It is for this reason, the scholars who proffered this 
argument deduced that the prominence that is given to morality in 
indigenous African cultures had a retarding effect towards the appropriation 
of modern capitalism in post-colonial Africa as well as the conceptual 
association of capitalism with colonialism and imperialism. In Chapter 5 my 
aim is to discuss how the quest for the appropriation of capitalism in post-
colonial Africa has led to the contemporary discourse of economic 
indigenisation or Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) policies.        
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CHAPTER FIVE: ECONOMIC INDIGENISATION/BLACK ECONOMIC 
IMPOWERMENT AND THE APPROPRIATION OF MODERN CAPITALISM IN 
POST-COLONIAL AFRICA 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In the preceding chapters we seen that various ethical issues have been 
raised with regards to the suitability of modern capitalism as a viable 
economic system for post-colonial Africa’s economic developmental 
problems. The indigenisation of capitalism has been regarded by post-
colonial African governments as the ultimate panacea to Africa’s economic 
problems. The term economic indigenisation is sometimes referred to as 
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE). As we have seen in chapter 4, after 
attaining independence from their various colonial powers, many African 
states in sub-Saharan African embarked on various economic reform 
programmes that were mainly aimed at not only giving a radical break from 
modern capitalism as it was introduced to Africa through colonialism, rather 
economic experiments such as African socialism should be seen as earlier 
attempts by African nationalists to appropriate modern capitalism by trying  
to infuse African traditional values in this economic system. 
Indigenisation or Black Economic Empowerment has been adopted by many 
post-colonial African governments as an ethical imperative economic policy 
that is aimed at redressing the economic inequalities that have been 
perpetuated by colonialism and apartheid in the case of South Africa. In 
order to redress the economic inequalities of the past, BEE/indigenisation is 
thus aimed at deliberately creating policies that will enable black people to 
participate in the national economy. Modern capitalism in post-colonial 
Africa is thus regarded as a foreign economic system that was introduced to 
Africa through colonialism. As a foreign economic system, proponents of 
BEE/indigenisation have argued that such an economic system can only be 
appropriated through active participation of the majority of the African 
population in the mainstream of the economy. 
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Another argument which is put forward by proponents of BEE/indigenisation 
in post-colonial Africa is that political power without economic amounts to 
perpetuating the legacy of colonialism or apartheid within the post-colonial 
or post-apartheid political dispensation. The main presumption is that 
political power should be complemented by economic power. Deliberate 
economic empowerment is thus presumed to ultimately lead to the 
appropriation of modern capitalism. Here the idea is not to come up with a 
unique form of African capitalism, but to enable the participation of black 
people through legislation so that they will control the national economy in 
the long-run. 
Apart from the above introduction, this chapter is comprised of five 
sections. The first section will define BEE/indigenisation so as to orientate 
the reader on the meaning of these terms in the scope of this dissertation. In 
the second section I will discuss the relationship between 
indigenisation/BEEE and the legacy of colonialism in post-colonial Africa. 
The third section will provide some analysis of indigenisation/BEE policies 
with specific reference to two countries – South Africa and Zimbabwe. This 
analysis will also make reference to other sub-Saharan African countries 
where indigenisation/BEE policies were implemented. In the fourth section I 
will discuss some of the ethical issues that arise from indigenisation/BEE as 
a policy for economic development aimed at redressing the legacy of 
colonialism and apartheid. Finally, I will conclude this chapter by drawing on 
some points that I deem to be of great significance to the chapter. 
5.2 The meaning of Indigenisation/BEE 
The word indigenisation is a verb which is derived from the noun 
‘indigenous’. The word indigenous is derived from the Latin word, indigema. 
The Shorter English Dictionary defined the word indigenous as 1. “Born or 
produced naturally in a land or region; native to (the soil, religion, etc). 2. 
Native, vernacular” (Onions et al 1973: 1057). Whilst there is no settled 
agreement among scholars on the meaning of indigenous, there is some 
convergence of thought on the understanding of the term indigenous as 
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meaning being born or native to the land. According to Lotte Hughes, 
anthropologists  
…tend to use the term indigenous people to describe a non-dominant group  in a 
particular territory, with a more or less acknowledged claim to be aboriginal – a 
word now used (with an initial capital letter) for the indigenous peoples of 
Australia in particular. But in its broadest sense, aboriginal simply means 
‘original inhabitants’. They are the people who were there first, who may also call 
themselves First Peoples or First Nations (Hughes 2003: 11-12).  
Indigenous people are thus understood to be the original people who 
inhabited a particular area before the arrival of tribes/ethnic groups or 
nations. Indigenous people are the original people who existed in a 
particular area before the advent of any other people from without. 
According to the above definition, nomadic people who usually move from 
place to place in search of greener pastures for their livestock can hardly be 
considered as indigenous people. Since many black people who are currently 
the majority of the population in Southern Africa are historically said to 
have originated from central Africa they do not qualify to be called 
indigenous people in the light of the definition that has been given to us by 
Hughes.   
 
The International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA) has the 
following definition, 
Indigenous peoples are the disadvantaged descendants of those peoples that 
inhabited a territory prior to the formation of a state. The term indigenous 
may be defined as a characteristic relating the identity of a particular people 
to a particular area and distinguishing them culturally from other people or 
peoples. When, for example, immigrants from Europe settled in the Americas 
and Oceania, or when new states were created after colonialism was abolished 
in Africa and Asia, certain peoples became marginalised and discriminated 
against because their language, their religion, their culture and their whole 
way of life were different, and perceived by the dominant society as being 
inferior. Insisting on their right to self-determination is indigenous peoples’ 
way of overcoming these obstacles. Today many indigenous peoples are still 
excluded from society and often even deprived of their rights as equal citizens 
(Cited in Hughes 2003: 13). 
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In the light of the above definition, indigenous people are those people who 
lived a particular territory before the formation of a state. This means that 
such people are the ones who belonged to that particular territory before 
their territory was taken from them through conquest. It is also important to 
note that indigenous people became marginalised or discriminated on the 
basis of religion, culture and their way of life is regarded as inferior by the 
dominant culture. Usually the dominant culture is the culture of the 
conquerors. Indigenous peoples’ way of life and their religious belief 
systems are usually regarded as primitive. The belief that indigenous 
peoples were primitive was dovetailed with the idea that they needed to be 
modernised or taught Western ways of doing things.  The United Nations 
provided the working definition of indigenisation as follows, 
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a 
historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that 
developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors 
of the societies now prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. They form 
at present nondominant sectors of society and are determined to preserve, 
develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and 
their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in 
accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal 
systems (Hughes 2003: 15). 
According to the above definition, indigenous people are regarded as those 
in the minority of society. Though they are in the minority, they do pass on 
their cultural heritage from generation to generation. However, the above 
definition is problematic in the sense that it discounts Bantu speaking 
people as indigenous people because the people who would qualify as 
indigenous are the Koi-San people who are historically considered to have 
inhabited Southern Africa before the invasion of southern Africa by the 
Bantu speaking people. In this regard, the Koi-San regard the Bantu speaking 
people of Southern Africa as immigrants or invaders. Another problematic 
issue that arises in the concept of indigenous is related to other peoples who 
are not African but they were born and raised in Africa and their ancestors 
were all buried in Africa. However, the dominant understanding of 
indigenous people is related to the idea that those who were colonised 
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qualify to be called indigenous people. The idea that black people suffered 
economic deprivation under colonialism and imperialism seems to have 
guided the rationale behind indigenisation as an economic policy. 
However, as a socio-economic policy, indigenisation is aimed at redressing 
the injustices of the past as a result of colonialism and imperialism. Adebayo 
Adedeji (1981: 32) said that, “Throughout the ages and in various countries 
the basic objective of indigenisation has formed the cornerstone of 
economic policy, albeit in varying degrees. …The English mercantile laws, for 
example, were designed to conserve foreign exchange, to monopolise the 
trade of the colonies, to reserve essential raw materials for English 
industries…”. As such, he went on to deduce that, “To merely equate 
indigenisation with Africanization is to trivialise it”.  Thus for Adedeji 
indigenisation has been integral to the evolution of modern capitalism in 
many Western societies. Karl Polanyi argued that the capitalistic creed of 
liberalism was not something ahistorical, rather, in the English society this 
creed could be traced to 1830s. For example, “after the political victory of 
the middle class, in 1832, the Poor Law Amendment Bill was carried in its 
most extreme form and rushed into effect without any period of grace. 
Laissez-faire had been catalysed into a drive of uncompromising ferocity” 
(Polanyi 1967: 137). In other words, the legalisation of Laissez-faire was an 
attempt by the ruling class in the British society to protect their own wealth 
against government policies that were aimed at promoting social welfare.   
In post-colonial Africa indigenisation has been construed in terms of African 
experiences of colonialism and apartheid. In this vein, Munyaradzi Murove 
gave the common arguments that are usually given by proponents of 
indigenisation in post-colonial Africa as follows, 
(1)The African economy under colonialism and apartheid was based on giving 
business opportunities to whites as opposed to black people, hence to redress 
this colonial economic legacy, it is imperative that the post-colonial African 
government should give preference to black people in all sectors of the 
economy. (2) Since capitalism has been the handmaid of colonialism and 
apartheid, the continuous existence of this economic system under the hands 
of those who were the beneficiaries of colonialism and apartheid can only 
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perpetuate neo-colonialism in post-colonial or post-apartheid South Africa. (3) 
Real political power is in the hands of those who own and control the 
economy. It follows that political power will remain inadequate without 
economic power by those who were previously disadvantaged to own and 
control all the sectors of the economy. For that to happen, it is indispensable 
that government legislative authorities should enact laws that promote 
BEE/Indigenisation/Africanisation in the modus operandi of companies and in 
the issuing of tenders. In so doing, economic power is being transferred to 
those who were previously disadvantaged. (4) Capitalism in Africa has helped 
to promote the westernisation of Africans and operated in ways that only 
helped to serve western economic needs. To reverse such a scenario, post-
colonial Africa needed to domesticate capitalism, and the most effective way 
towards the domestication of capitalism was for black Africans to wrest 
control of this economic system such that African values, modes of 
production and consumption should become prominent in this economic 
system. Hence the post-apartheid economic policy of BEE/Indigenisation is 
regarded as the most effective economic policy towards the domestication of 
capitalism (Murove 2010: 49-50). 
According to Murove, the above four points are a summation of the rationale 
behind indigenisation as a socio-economic policy. As an economic policy, 
indigenisation is aimed at transferring economic power into the hands of 
those who were historically disadvantaged because of colonialism and 
apartheid in the case of South Africa. Indigenisation is about controlling or 
owning an economic system which was previously under foreign control or 
domination. The primary aim for economic indigenisation is to ultimately 
appropriate or domesticate capitalism. If capitalism remains in the hands of 
the yester colonisers and oppressors, the majority of the previously 
oppressed will remain economically destitute. Thus government policies are 
aimed at actively enforcing economic indigenisation.   
The government of Zimbabwe promulgated what it called Indigenisation and 
Economic Empowerment Act (Part I, b) in which it says, “indigenisation’ 
means a deliberate involvement of indigenous Zimbabweans in the economic 
activities of the country, to which hitherto they had no access, so as to 
ensure the equitable ownership of the nation’s resources”. The Act went on 
to say, “indigenous Zimbabwean means any person who, before the 18th 
April, 1980, was disadvantaged by unfair discrimination on the grounds of 
his or her race, and any descendent of such person, and includes any 
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company, association, syndicate or partnership of which indigenous 
Zimbabweans form the majority of the members or hold the controlling 
interest…”. The above definition means active participation of indigenous 
Zimbabweans in the economy of the country to which they were previously 
deprived from participating through colonialism. Indigenous Zimbabwean is 
defined as a person who experienced discrimination on the grounds of race. 
Within such a definition, it is clear that indigenisation is envisaged as a 
policy that is aimed at undoing the economic injustices of the past by 
empowering indigenous Zimbabweans. To achieve the objective of 
indigenisation the Act goes on to stipulate that, 
(i) The Government shall, through this 
Act or regulations or other measures under this Act or any other law, 
endeavour to secure that – (a) at least fifty-one per centum of the shares of 
every public company and any other business shall be owned by indigenous 
Zimbabweans. (b) no – (i) merger or restructuring of the shareholding of two 
or more related or associated businesses or (ii) acquisition by a person of a 
controlling interest in a business; that requires to be notified to the 
Competition Commission in terms of Part IVA of the Competition Act [Chapter 
14: 28] shall be approved unless – (iii) fifty-one per centum ( or such lesser 
share as may be temporarily prescribed for the purposes of subsection (5) in 
the merged or restructured business is held by indigenous Zimbabweans ; and 
the indigenous Zimbabweans referred to in subparagraph (iii) are                              
equitably represented in the governing body of the merged or                                
restructured entity… (Part II).  
(a) no unbundling of a business or 
demerger of two or more businesses shall, if the value of any business 
resulting from the unbundling or demerger is at or above a prescribed 
threshold, be approved unless –fifty-one per centum…is held by indigenous 
Zimbabweans. 
(b) no projected or proposed investment 
in a prescribed sector of the economy available for investment by domestic or 
foreign investors for which an investment licence is required in terms of the 
Zimbabwe Investment Authority Act [Chapter 14: 30] shall be approved unless 
a controlling interest in the investment…is reserved for indigenous 
Zimbabweans. 
In the light of the Zimbabwean indigenisation act as stated above, there is a 
strong belief that indigenous Zimbabweans should wrest control of the 
economy to the without greater participation of foreigners. Thus 
indigenisation means indigenous ownership of the economy by those who 
have been excluded from ownership as a result of race.  
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The government of South Africa does not talk much about indigenisation, 
rather it calls the same socio-economic policy as Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE) which was defined by the BEE Commission as follows,  
It is an integrated and coherent socio-economic process. It is located within 
the context of the country’s national transformation programme, namely the 
RDP [Reconstruction and Development Programme]. It is aimed at redressing 
the imbalances of the past by seeking to substantially and equitably transfer 
and confer the ownership, management and control of South Africa’s financial 
and economic resources to the majority of the citizens. It seeks to ensure 
broader and meaningful participation in the economy by black people to 
achieve sustainable development and prosperity (BEE Com 2001: 2). 
In other words, BEE is postulated as primarily integral to the overall policy of 
the Structural Adjustment Programme (RDP) in which the primary policy 
objective is to redress the inequalities of the past. BEE was thus envisaged as 
a policy that would promote the broader participation of black people in the 
economy so that sustainable development and prosperity could be achieved 
in the long run. The thrust of BEE socio-economic policy is to enable greater 
participation of black people in the mainstream of the South African 
national economy as managers and owners of companies which were 
previously dominated and controlled by white people. One finds the BEE 
Commission stating it categorically that,  
In this report, the BEECom presents a case for South Africa to break the cycle 
of underdevelopment and continued marginalisation of the majority of its 
people from the mainstream economy and catapult the country onto a course 
of sustained rates of economic growth. In making this case, the BEECom 
believes that the legacies of colonial and apartheid oppression and deliberate 
disempowerment provide a sufficient moral and political basis to justify an 
Integrated National BEE Strategy. …Colonial and Apartheid policies lead to 
significant structural distortions in the economy. These distortions eventually 
resulted in a crisis in the Apartheid economy, the consequences of which are 
still with us today (BEECom. 2001: 3).  
The implication of the above quotation is that BEE was about the promotion 
of economic development by enabling greater participation of the majority 
of the people who were previously marginalised from the mainstream of the 
economy. The greater economic participation of the majority who were 
previously marginalised is also anticipated to stimulate economic growth. In 
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this regard, the presumption is that BEE is a socio-economic policy that is 
going to empower people. The ability of this socio-economic policy to 
empower people makes it a corrective policy measure against the 
marginalising effects of Colonial and Apartheid socio-economic policies.  
The former post-apartheid minister of finance, Trevor Manuel had this to say 
about BEE “…we have come to use the word ‘empowerment’ in recent years 
as a broader and more satisfactory characterisation of the social policy goal 
we formerly called ‘affirmative action’ and before that ‘indigenisation’ or 
‘Africanisation’. Epowerment is partly about redressing historical 
disadvantage, but it is also about investing in capabilities and opening doors 
of opportunity” (Mail & Guardian 2005: 5). In other words indigenisation, 
BEE or affirmative action are words that mean the same thing – 
transformation of the economy so that it becomes more inclusive by 
redressing the economic wrongs that were inflicted upon the majority of the 
African indigenous population by a white minority. 
The South African Government discusses of BEE in terms of Transformation. 
Chapter 13, Section 217 of South African Constitution is about Procurement 
and its spirit is that of effecting BEE. This section states that, 
(1) When an organ of state in the national, 
provincial or local sphere of government, or any other institution identified 
in national legislation, contracts for goods or services, it must do so in 
accordance with a system which is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive 
and cost-effective. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not prevent the 
organs of state or institutions referred to in that subsection from 
implementing a procurement policy providing for –  
(a) Categories of preference in the 
allocation of contracts; and  
(b) the protection or advancement of 
persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. 
(3) National legislation must prescribe a 
framework within which the policy referred to in subsection (2) may be 
implemented (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, Act 108 
of 1996). 
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In this Section 217, it is clear that the post-apartheid South African state is 
expected to procure in a way that favours those who were previously 
disadvantaged by the apartheid government. Section 217 of the Constitution 
of South Africa is thus echoed by The BEE Commission’s Report of 2000 
when it defined BEE as “an integrated and coherent socio-economic process”.   
Indigenization or BEE is partly related to the idea of promoting economic 
nationalism. The idea of creating such socio-economic policies arose from 
the need to domesticate capitalilsm or to make capitalism relevant to post-
colonial African societies. Economic nationalism is related to the 
industrialisation of African societies during colonialism. As a result of 
colonialism, Africans found themselves being part and parcel of the 
industrialised colonial society and at the same time being economically 
excluded. Thomas Eriksen made an interesting observation when he said, 
In this historical context, a need arises for a new kind of ideology capable of 
creating cohesion and loyalty among individuals participating in social 
systems on a huge scale. Nationalism was able to satisfy these requirements. It 
postulated the existence of an imagined community based on shared culture 
and embedded in the state, where people’s loyalty and attachment should be 
directed towards the state and the legislative system rather than towards 
members of their kin group or village. In this way, nationalist ideology is 
functional for the state (Eriksen 2002: 103).  
The socio-economic policy of indigenisation was intended to give a local 
flavour to an economic system that has been dominated by the West for a 
long period of time. As we have seen in chapter 4, the ideology of African 
socialism was appealed to by African nationalists on the grounds that 
African traditional societies were collectivists therefore capitalism and its 
individualistic values was not a suitable economic ideology for post-colonial 
African societies. In indigenisation or BEE socio-economic policy we see 
again another attempt at fostering economic nationalism through the 
deliberate promotion of ownership by indigenous people with the aim of 
giving capitalism and some indigenous semblance.  In a world that is 
dominated by the Western driven capitalism, “the strategy of indigenisation 
would help Third World countries to retain some sense of economic 
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autonomy” (Murove 2008: 139). In this regard, indigenisation is a strategy 
that is used by African nationalists as a fight against the modern capitalistic 
world economic hegemony. Indigenisation can thus be seen as a way 
whereby African countries are asserting their identities within the economic 
sphere. Ali Mazrui characterised indigenisation as a quest for the 
domestication of capitalism. He writes, 
While indigenisation involves greater utilisation of what is distinctively native, 
domestication is an effort to make what is foreign more relevant to local 
conditions and local needs. For example, there may be certain forms of 
technology that are distinctively imported. The question which would arise 
would be to make that technology more appropriate to the culture and 
material conditions of a given society (Mazrui 1990: 245). 
Thus the strategy of indigenisation is supposedly aimed at relativising 
capitalism so that it can be domesticated to the local African cultural 
conditions. Whilst there is a belief that modern capitalism operates under 
universal rules, the domestication of this economic system will make it 
relevant to the local culture. Instead of seeing modern capitalism from a 
monistic perspective, the indigenisation of this economic system aims at 
relativises it to a particular culture. Some anthropologists such as John 
Camaroff and Jean Camaroff have referred to indigenisation as an attempt to 
commodify culture which they describe as the commercialisation of ethnicity 
or identity. Thus they write, 
The identity industry is a prime case in point. Those who seek to brand their 
otherness, to profit from what makes them different, find themselves having 
to do so in the universally recognisable terms in which difference is 
represented, merchandised, rendered negotiable by means of the abstract 
instruments of the market: money, the commodity, commensuration, the 
calculus of supply and demand, price branding. And advertising. Ethnicity, Inc. 
is also shaped by the centrality of mass mediation to the age of planetary 
consumerism, the effect of which is that the counterpoint between the 
singular and the generic is now enacted…Ethno-commerce feeds an ever more 
ubiquitous mode of production and reproduction, one born of a time in which, 
as we have noted the sale of culture has replaced the sale of labor in many 
places (Camaroff and Camaroff 2009: 24). 
In this regard, indigenisation understood as the commodification of ethnicity 
by emphasising the distinctiveness of one’s own culture as a way of selling 
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products. According to the above quotation, the emphasis which is placed on 
indenisation is similar to the selling of culture. But the problem inherent in 
this kind of thinking is that it portrays modern capitalism as an economic 
system that exists independent of cultural context. As we have seen in the 
previous chapters, modern capitalism arose from Western culture and its 
worldview as well as its understanding of an individual as an atomic unit 
within society. However, as stated previously, the main thrust of 
indigenisation is to reverse the injustices that have been committed through 
colonialism and apartheid. It mainly for this reason that indigenisation is 
understood as affirmative action. Indigenisation is not about the promotion 
of ethnicity, rather its an expression of economic nationalism. As Murove 
puts it, “The economic modus operandi of colonial economic practices could 
not be severed from the idea of legalised robbery on the grounds that 
African resources were controlled by their respective colonial powers – be 
they French, British or Portuguese” (Murove 2008: 52). Without the 
indigenous control of the economy, political power will be useless since real 
power lies in the economy and those who control the national economy. 
   
5.3 Indigenisation/BEE and the Legacy of Colonialism 
In the light of the above conceptual definition of indigenisation, it is 
evidently clear that one can hardly discuss indigenisation of the economy 
without referring to economic impact of capitalism under colonialism. What 
prompted imperial or colonial expeditions was the search for resources for 
the newly opened industries in the West. Colonialism was thus regarded as 
the handmaid of capitalism. As we have seen in chapter 4, African 
nationalists argued for what they called African socialism partly on the 
grounds that under colonialism, capitalism was mainly about the 
expropriation of the resources of the colonised Africans. Capitalistic modes 
of production were conflated with civilisation in such a way that civilisation 
became synonymous with Europeanisation of Africa. Vuyo Jack and Kyle 
Harris provided us with a comprehensive analysis that justifies the necessity 
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of BEE whereby the state it from the outset that an historical account is 
indispensable for understanding BEE. As they put it, 
During the apartheid era, which came to an end in 1994, social engineering 
resulted in a gross imbalance in socio-economic status between Black and 
white. The exclusively white government engineered laws first through 
colonialism, and subsequently apartheid, to monopolise the economic 
resources of the country. Not only were Black people specifically excluded 
from economic participation, but they were also denied the right to economic 
and intellectual growth through various destabilisation mechanisms (Jack and 
Harris 2007: 5). 
In the light of the above observation, BEE was a socio-economic policy that 
was necessitated by the historical epoch of colonialism and then later on by 
apartheid in South Africa. Both these two epochs in the history of South 
resulted in a systematic exclusion of black people from ownership of 
business and land. Economic inequalities between whites and blacks became 
statutory. Through these historical privileges, economic interests of the 
white population was often at variance with the political interests of the 
colonial government. Apartheid policies were not only instruments for the 
maintenance of political power in white hands, rather these policies were 
crafted with the aim of maximising the exclusion of black people from 
participating in the economy. As Jack and Harris put it, 
Through legislation, colonialism limited land and business ownership by 
Africans. In order to retain cheap labour for the mines, at the time owned by 
key white political figures, colonial policy discouraged Black commercial 
agriculture. In 1913 the Land Act prevented Africans from owning land 
outside their designated areas. Forced communal ownership of agricultural 
land in these areas further destabilised Black commerce. In 1923, the colonial 
government introduced the Native Act, which restricted Africans, or effectively 
migrant labour, to designated ‘location’. While legal requirements did not limit 
Black commercial activities to these locations, government tacitly encouraged 
local councils to do so. Where white traders operated on the fringes of such 
locations, local councils would discourage Black competition from operating in 
the designated areas (Jack and Kyle 2007: 5).  
In other words, an historical colonial economic exclusion of blacks from 
participating meaningfully in the economy of their country created a 
situation whereby black people remained economically disadvantaged. Sol 
Plaatje who wrote on the effects of The Native Land Act in his book, Native 
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Life in South Africa, provides the reader with gruesome picture of this 
colonial Act of the British imperial government in South Africa resulted in 
the majority of black South Africans losing their land and livestock in a 
country of their birth. A part of this act reads as follows, “A native shall not 
enter into any agreement or transaction for the purchase, hire, or other 
acquisition from a person other than a native, of any such land or nay of any 
right thereto, interest therein, or servitude thereto” (Plaatje 2007: 64). Whilst 
the land which was previously owned by Black people was taken away from 
them through colonial legislations, one can easily see from the above 
quotation that blacks were not allowed to buy or own land. Without 
ownership of land, blacks were thus deprived of the ownership of minerals 
that were found in the land. Such economic deprivation implied that black 
people could only make a living as labourers in white owned farms or as 
migrant mine workers. Pass laws that were promulgated later on in South 
Africa by colonial administration were aimed at depriving black people, 
Indians and Coloured people any meaningful participation in the economy. 
For example, in the Kimberly Dimond Field the British colonial 
Administrators came up with Proclamation 14 of August 1872 which  
…laid down a new regime of labour contracts, linking it to a system of pass laws 
that became the main device for controlling black labour throughout southern 
Africa for decades to come. On arrival in Kimberly, black migrants – ‘servants’ – 
were required to register at a depot and obtain a daily pass until they had 
secured employment. …Once employed, the servant was required to carry a pass 
signed by his master (Meredith 2007:45).  
Thus through such colonial legislations, black people were reduced to 
labourers who were subjected to continuous inhumane treatment at the 
hands of their colonial masters. 
In the history of South Africa, apartheid was not so much about who 
controlled South Africa politically, rather it was about capitalism. Merle 
Lipton provided us with the characteristics of apartheid which was officially 
known by the then ruling Nationalist party as the policy of ‘separate 
development’ as follows, 
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(a) The hierarchy ordering of the 
economic, political and social structures on the basis of race, identified by 
physical characteristics such as skin colour. Whites (roughly 18 per cent of 
the population…) comprised a ruling oligarchy and privileged elite; 
coloureds and Indians (12 percent) and Africans (70 per cent) were second 
and third class citizens respectively – indeed, Africans were even identified 
by the government as non-citizens. 
(b) Discrimination against Africans, and to 
a lesser extent coloureds and Indians, who were excluded from many of the 
civil, political and economic rights enjoyed by whites, such the vote, 
freedom of movement, and the right to do certain jobs or own property in 
much of the country. 
(c) Segregation of the races in many 
spheres of life: they lived in separate areas, went to separate schools and 
universities, used separate buses and trains; there was little social mixing; 
sexual relations and inter-marriage across the colour lines were illegal. 
(d) The legalization and institutionalization 
of this hierarchical, discriminatory and segregated system, which was 
enshrined in law and enforced by the government (Lipton 1986: 14-15). 
Thus apartheid was about a systematic economic deprivation of the majority 
of the citizens in favour of the minority white population. Africans were 
rather enslaved in such a way that their economic subsistence survival 
depended on working for the economically privileged white people. For 
example, Lipton observed that, “The 1922 Stallard Commission laid down 
the principle that an African should only be in the towns to ‘minister to the 
needs of the white man and should depart therefrom when he ceases to 
minister’” (Lipton 1986: 18). In other words, the African was only important 
as a source of labour to a Whiteman. Whilst racially discriminatory Acts had 
existed under British colonialism in South Africa, the rise of apartheid in 
1948 when the National Party came into power came up with a systematic 
categorisation of those Acts of discrimination into an official policy called 
apartheid. Thus in the process the whole country was subjected to Acts that 
privileged white people economically at the expense of other races. For 
example, Jack and Harris observed that, “In 1950 the Group Areas Act 
prohibited African, Coloured and Indian people from operating a business 
outside their designated area. Furthermore, although government never 
passed legislation to this effect, Africans were forcibly persuaded to stop 
trading in locations that existed on the outskirts of white towns and cities. 
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To protect white business interests, Black people wishing to continue trading 
had to return to their homelands to do business there” (Jack and Harris 
2007: 5-6). Thus through legislation, apartheid became a political policy 
instrument that was crafted to deprive black people equal opportunities. It 
was not only blacks who were segregated against, as Lipton observes, “The 
1950 Group Areas Act further restricted the residential and trading rights of 
all blacks, including, for the first time, the coloureds in the Cape. By 1980, 
115,000 coloured and Indian families, involving over a quarter of all 
coloureds and Indians, had been forced to move, often losing their homes 
and businesses at derisory rates of compensation” (Lipton 1986: 23-24). In 
the light of these historical injustices, some scholars such as Daron 
Acemoglu, Stephen Gelb and James Robinson have advanced an insight to 
the effect that,  
In essence, BEE is about attempting to create a degree of economic equality 
which would not itself be a natural market outcome of the changed political 
environment. Such a policy has been a commitment of the ANC at least since 
the formulation of the Freedom Charter in 1955 which stated ‘The national 
wealth of our country, the heritage of South Africans, shall be restored to the 
people; The mineral wealth beneath the soil, the Banks and monopoly industry 
shall be transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole; All other 
industry and trade shall be controlled to assist the wellbeing of the people’[my 
italics] (Acemoglu, Gelb and Robinson 2007: 4). 
In other words, through BEE the post-apartheid ANC government was 
fulfilling the promises it made in the Freedom Charter in 1955 – that the 
wealth should be returned to the original people from whom it was 
unjustifiably taken through oppressive Colonial and Apartheid policies. 
When read in the spirit of the Freedom Charter, it is plausible to see BEE as 
part of economic nationalism. If BEE is part of economic nationalism, to what 
extend can such a policy promote the appropriation of modern capitalism? 
To answer such a question we have to recall that Apartheid and Colonialism 
distorted the mediation of capitalism in many ways which we discussed 
previously. This observation was also made by Acemoglu, Gelb and Robinson 
in their argument for the justification of BEE when they said, 
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For over a century, South African society was based on an economic and 
political model where whites structured institutions in order to repress blacks 
and extract resources from them. In the process, they created probably the 
most unequal society in the world. The extraction of rents from black people 
created a massive misallocation of resources. These were not just human, but 
also physical. Blacks had no access to land or capital and the Colour Bar 
blocked them from upward social mobility and removed the incentives to 
invest in human capital. Bantu education removed their ability to accumulate 
human capital. …Basic economic theory suggests that there are potentially 
huge productivity benefits to be had from overcoming this misallocation of 
human and physical resources. This is because Apartheid left a mismatch 
between the distribution of ownership of assets and the abilities of those that 
can use them. During Apartheid, this miss-match was deliberately created in 
order to distort market prices and create rents for whites (Acemoglu, Gelb and 
Robinson 2007: 11). 
Apartheid was not concerned with the rules of a free capitalistic economy 
governed by individual freedom to pursue their economic preferences. The 
apartheid economy was fully controlled in a way that furthered the political 
objectives of the apartheid state. It was no longer the free market that 
determined the allocation of resources, but Apartheid policies that in most 
cases promoted the misallocation of resources through the systematic 
entrenchment of racial segregation policies. The apartheid political system 
was not primarily concerned with the promotion of a modern capitalistic 
free market economy, rather it actually violated all the rules of this 
economic system. Human, financial and natural resources were allocated 
purely on the basis of boosting the apartheid political system. The most 
economically debilitating aspect of the apartheid system as that it virtually 
made black people objects of exclusion and exploitation. The issue of 
coming up with an appropriate policy or policies that can redress the 
economic ills that were inherited from Apartheid remains a daunting socio-
economic policy task.   
Acemoglu, Gelb and Robinson (2007: 13-15) came up with three potential 
policy responses for post-apartheid South Africa. The first policy response 
“would be to directly use income redistribution via the fiscal system to relax 
the wealth constraints facing blacks so that they could accumulate and 
acquire assets themselves”. But according to these authors, such a policy will 
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be faced with problems such as “dead weight losses”, “a redistribution of 
income may not lead to the upward social mobility of blacks” and such a 
“policy may take a long time to work and political stability may require a 
much more rapid solution to the problem”. The second response would be to 
“directly redistribute the assets themselves”. Such a policy shares the same 
problems with the above. Of great great significance is that it “can imply 
large losses and reduced investment due to expectations that property rights 
will be insecure in the future”. The third response would be “to remove 
inequalities and improve social mobility and would be affirmative action”. 
This policy response gives one the room to argue “on both positive and 
normative grounds that asset redistribution and affirmative action are 
socially efficient policies”. In all these policy responses, we can deduce that 
the main thrust is to correct those policies of Apartheid that were 
deliberately created with the aim of disenfranchising the majority of black 
people. For this reason, Acemoglu, Gelb and Robinson argued that, “In saying 
that resources are misallocated, or the inequality in South Africa needs to be 
removed because it is a threat to political stability, or that asset 
redistribution and affirmative action may be socially desirable policies, we 
are arguing in terms of social welfare”. Here the rationale is that in a political 
context where historical injustices that entrenched racial inequalities, the 
plausible policy approach would be the adoption of socio-economic policies 
that would be a corrective measure which ultimately results in the 
promotion of social welfare. Such a socio-economic policy measure might 
not necessarily aim at the appropriation of modern capitalism, but to serve 
as some form of reparation or restitution for the economic injustices that 
were committed against black people during the Colonial and Apartheid 
eras. 
In the case of the then Rhodesia, colonialism was mainly about depriving the 
indigenous African people any form of meaningful participation in the 
economy of their country of birth. When the indigenous peoples of 
Zimbabwe were subjected to colonial rule, they were forcibly confined to 
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arid and infertile areas known as Native Reserves as all the fertile lands and 
minerals were taken by the colonial settlers. As Murove rightfully puts it,  
Under colonialism, African minerals, fertile lands, sacred sites and wild life 
sanctuaries were ruthlessly expropriated from the indigenous African population 
to the benefit of individual colonialists without any compensation. Most of those 
colonial acquisitions were legitimised into some law which later on made it 
difficult for indigenous Africans to claim back that which was expropriated from 
them (Murove 2018: 15).  
In this way of thinking, we can deduce that colonialism was all about 
acquisition of land and minerals which were previously under the ownership 
of African indigenous communities. The primary motive behind all the 
colonial expeditions was not to civilise and preach the gospel to the so-called 
heathens Africans. Martin Meredith observed that under colonialism, 
“Legislation was introduced to ensure that African development never posed 
a serious threat to white interests. Land, jobs and wages were apportioned 
by race. Within ten years from 1890 nearly 16 million acres were handed out 
to white farmers regardless of whether Africans were occupying the land or 
not” (Meredith 1979: 21). Thus colonialism was about dispossession of land 
and minerals from the indigenous African population. The struggle against 
colonialism and apartheid can be understood as a struggle for restitution, or 
correcting the economic injustices of the past.  Thus one finds Mazrui saying 
that, “the consequences of both enslavement and colonisation are not merely 
themes for plenary lectures at African Studies conventions because these 
consequences also include the malfunctioning of colonial economies in 
Africa and the distortion of socio-economic relations in the African 
Diaspora…” (Mazrui 2002: 61-62). In this type of thinking, the epoch of slave 
trade from Africa to the transatlantic was similar to the epoch of 
colonialism. While slave trade was about enslavement of Africans in the 
building of the economies in the Americas, colonialism involved the looting 
of African natural resources for the building of the economies of colonial 
powers.  
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At the end of the cold war, the issue of reparations and empowerment of 
Africans over their own resources has gained a lot of momentum amidst the 
global marginalisation of the post-colonial state. As Mazrui puts it,  
But it is not merely the empowerment of the African people over the African 
state which is at stake in the politics of reparations. It is also the 
empowerment of the new African state in the wider global system. How is this 
kind of global empowerment to proceed? In fact one of the ironies of the 
1990s is that the African people in countries like Zaire, Zambia and Nigeria 
have been trying to assert greater control over their governments at precisely 
the time when African governments have been losing influence on world 
events. The African public is beginning to get empowered – but precisely the 
time when the African state is more deeply enfeebled. The momentous 
changes which have occurred in the wake of the end of the Cold War have, on 
the whole, marginalised Africa further (Mazrui 2002: 66-67). 
In the light of the above observation it is clear that the issue of black 
empowerment has some global implications in the post-Cold War era. 
Related to this observation is the reality that African post-colonial 
governments are increasingly facing enormous challenges that are 
emanating from being marginalised on the global political arena. In this 
post-Cold War era, Mazrui went on to argue that, “Former communist 
enemies in Europe have become more important to the United States than 
former friends in Africa. With the disappearance of socialist allies, Africa’s 
influence in the United Nations has declined sharply, and Africa’s share of 
world trade, global investment, and foreign aid continues to shrink” (Mazrui 
2002: 67). This argument implies that Africa’s global position has become 
too remote for reparations for the wrongs that were done to her during 
colonialism and transatlantic slavery trade. Prior to post-Cold War era, Africa 
had some influence on global politics on the grounds that the then 
competing global super powers were involved in a cut-throat competition for 
allies. Thus the economic needs of African states were prioritised by the two 
powers (USA and USSR) and their Eastern and Western allies. This global 
political change has led African scholars and nationalists to rethink the place 
of post- colonial Africa in the world economic and political arena.  
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In the aftermath of the post-Cold War, the leaders of global capitalism who 
are in this case the USA and her Western allies have maintained that what 
was needed in post-colonial Africa was the implementation of good liberal 
capitalistic policies that would translate into economic growth and 
development. But as we have seen previously, most of the IMF and World 
Bank prescribed policies to Africa have actually created a chronic state of 
post-colonial African economic dependency on their yester colonisers. 
BEE/Indigenisation has been envisaged as a plausible economic policy that 
would help post-colonial countries to exercise some economic independence. 
Dependency theorists such as Chinweizu argued that,  
Despite an almost complete success at political decolonisation, Africa failed at 
economic development and economic decolonisation, and consequently failed 
at that modernisation upon which it counted for world respect. …Not only had 
Africa failed to create a robust modernity; worse still, it had lost even its 
traditional ability to feed itself. By 1984, it was the only continent that was 
unable to feed itself. …As African leaders clamoured for relief aid, and as 
millions starved and died, Africa became an object of world charity, pity and 
thinly disguised contempt. After a quarter of a century of effort, Africa had 
neither attained modernity nor gained the respect of the world (Chinweizu 
1999: 778-789). 
In such a sceptical outlook towards Africa’s ability to effect economic 
development, the problem of Africa’s economic underdevelopment are put 
entirely on her own shoulders as her own doing. In a nutshell, Africa is 
accused of being responsible for its own economic woes. Africa has been 
failed by its own African leaders – hence it was unrealistic to lay African 
economic problems on colonialism. For Chinweizu, Africa’s governing class 
was mainly responsible for the continent’s economic developmental 
problems because its consumption habits whilst they were “on the whole, 
inexperienced in production, averse to its rigours and risks, and even 
superciliously hostile to material production. …on the other hand, they had 
enormous appetite for material consumption” (Chinweizu 1999: 789-790). 
The African ruling class was more interested in consumption, a habit that 
did not take into account the primacy of production. This negative attitude 
towards production by the post-colonial African ruling class has been chiefly 
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responsible for the vicious circle of dependency in post-colonial Africa. He 
writes, “Their mandarin disinclination to production, their commitment to 
distributive welfarism, and their cargo-cult view of development as the 
satisfying of growing appetites by growing imports constituted the main 
strands of a dependency mentality which prevented Africa from achieving 
the development it professed to be striving after” (Chinweizu 1999: 792). In 
other words, Africa’s economic underdevelopment was rather a problem of 
the ruling class’s unproductivity and poor economic policies that 
emphasised on distributive welfarism, as we have seen previously with the 
African socialism experiment, and a tendency to import everything. In this 
way, Chinweizu argued that post-colonial Africa has maintained and 
perpetuated an economic culture of dependency. Chinweizu went on to say 
that, “Thus, whereas the structural roots of Africa’s failure to decolonize 
economically or to develop lay in inherited dependency relations, the African 
inability to organise and change those relations by concentrating on the 
enlargement of their productive forces ultimately resulted from the 
dependency mentality with which the African leadership was thoroughly 
suffused” (Ibid).  
In the light of the above quotation, Chinweizu is rather assuming that 
Africans should solve their economic developmental problems by directly 
taking charge of their own economic developmental capabilities within their 
own economies. He regards this as part and parcel of economic 
decolonisation. Failure to decolonise economically gives rise to a situation of 
perpetuating colonially inherited dependency relations. In this type of 
reasoning, one can also infer that BEE/Indigenisation can be regarded as part 
and parcel of the post-colonial drive towards economic decolonisation. 
Economic decolonisation or indigenisation has the control of the national 
economy as its primary objective. This objective is well stated by Adebayo 
Adedeji as follows, 
Unlike nationalization, indigenization in fact encourages, develops and 
strengthens indigenous private enterprise at the expense of expatriate-
controlled enterprise. Four types of indigenization can be identified. First, 
there is the indigenization of ownership, which aims at giving the indigenes of 
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a country, either individually or collectively, ownership stake in the economic 
establishments in their country. Such indigenization of ownership can be 
accomplished through either public or private ownership or through a 
combination of both. There is, second, the indigenization of control, whose 
objective is to enable the indigenes of a country to exercise control – through 
the boards of directors – on the policies of the enterprises. While it is possible 
to have ownership indigenization without control indigenization, the reverse 
arrangement, namely control indigenization without ownership indigenization, 
can best be weak or fragile. Third, there is manpower indigenization, 
otherwise known as Africanization. …The private sector, however, has also 
aimed at developing indigenous competence in modern industrial and 
commercial operations. Finally, there is the indigenisation of technology. This 
is in three phases, the first being the acquisition of technology from highly 
industrialized countries so s to enable developing countries to overstep many 
stages of development. The second stage is one of adaptive technology, a 
process of selection and adaption in order to match imported techniques to 
African conditions. But both phases have a tendency to deepen the 
dependence of underdeveloped countries on industrialized countries, in 
tangible and intangible ways (Adedeji 1981: 31). 
In the light of the above quotation, it can be deduced that Adedeji is 
interpreting the four types of indiginisation as primarily aimed at 
overcoming economic dependency through ownership of the means of 
economic production, control as directors of companies, developing civil 
services competence in national industries and finally making sure that 
technology is adapted to the local context. On the final analysis one can also 
say that the aim of indigenisation is to domesticate capitalism in such a way 
that strategically severs it from external control. The external control of 
African economies is a practice that was originally created by colonialism 
and imperialism. As we have seen in the previous discussion, the drive 
towards indingenisation has been motivated by the belief that since modern 
capitalism had some connections with colonialism and imperialism, political 
independence without economic independence will cause post-colonial 
Africa to remain in a perennial state of dependency on the yester colonial 
masters. In this regard, advocates of indigenisation as we have seen in the 
Zimbabwean Indigenisation Act would maintain that such a policy was aimed 
at effecting total decolonisation of the Zimbabwean economy. This 
understanding of indigenisation is well stated by Adedeji when he said, “To 
merely equate indigenization with Africanization is to trivialize it. The 
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primary purpose of indigenisation is economic decolonization, the reduction 
of economic dependence and the achievement of an increasing measure of 
self-reliance through internally located and self-sustaining growth” (Adedeji 
1981: 32). Here again, the emphasis is put on indigenisation as a socio-
economic policy technique aimed at contextualizing modern capitalistic 
modes of production or the appropriation of capitalism in post-colonial 
Africa.  
In BEE/indigenisation policies and discourses there is a strong presumption 
that capitalistic economic development will only come about as a result of a 
creation of African indigenous capitalists. Some scholars see the 
participation of indigenous capitalists has a practice that is found in many 
countries all over the world. Thus one finds Colin Leys asserting that,  
So for capitalist development to occur, there must also be local, domestic, 
internal, ‘national’ (and, perhaps, ‘indigenous’) capitalists; and these vary 
greatly in their individual and collective capacities – the scale of the capital 
they dispose of, the technical and organisational skills they command, the 
social cohesiveness they exhibit, the political power they wield, the ideological 
influence they enjoy, and so on. In the absence of any practicable alternative 
to capitalist development, therefore, it becomes very important to understand 
what determines the relative strengths and weaknesses of each 
underdeveloped country’s internal or domestic capitalist class (Leys 1994: 11). 
In the light of the above quotation, the existence of indigenous capitalists is 
an indispensable requirement for capitalist development within a given post-
colonial African country. On the final analysis we can also say that the 
performance of indigenous capitalists becomes a determining factor to the 
appropriation of modern capitalistic modes of development in post-Colonial 
Africa. However, in this way of thinking one can also argue that the 
BEE/Indigenisation socio-economic policy is partly aimed at creating a class 
of African capitalists, an idea which resonates very well with the modern 
theory of economic development. As Leys puts it, “The general theme of 
modernisation literature was that [African] business elites were essential to 
development and that factors characteristic of traditional society, especially 
‘traditional values’, inhibited the emergence of such elites (Leys 1994: 16). As 
we have seen in Chapter, 4 the above argument was integral some scholars 
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who argued that African traditional values were inhibitive to the 
appropriation of the spirit of capitalism in post-colonial Africa. The thesis 
which is being advanced by Leys is that indigenous capitalism or the 
existence of indigenous capitalists can lead to successful capitalist 
development. Thus he writes, 
Indigenous African capitalism, which had existed here and there before 
colonialism, was overwhelmed by competition from advanced capital in the 
metropoles, backed up by colonial rule. Indigenous capitalism reemerged under 
colonialism, in agriculture (primarily through a gradual process of differentiation 
among smallholders engaged in export commodity production), in trade, and 
finally in industry (Leys 1994: 22). 
The insights of Leys as stated above have been echoed by the historian John 
Iliffe in his account of the contribution of Christianity in Africa towards the 
emergence of capitalism. Leys’ main insight here is that a class of indigenous 
capitalists is indispensable to post-colonial Africa’s economic development. 
In other words the salient presumption is that if post-colonial Africa has to 
realise capitalist development, then the existence of a class of African 
indigenous capitalists is a pre-requisite to any authentic appropriation of 
modern capitalism.  
Whilst Leys does not explicitly discuss about BEE, we can easily infer from 
this type of thinking that this type of thinking as part of the rationale which 
we have seen in the preceding sections of this chapter as part and parcel of 
the rational justification for BEE/indigenisation. Thus one finds this same 
type of argument being proffered by John Rapley (1994: 39-45) in his study 
called, “The Ivoirien Bourgeoisie” which he said was a class of indigenous 
capitalists in Ivory Coast which has become so powerful economically such 
that it is currently controlling the state in post-colonial Ivory Coast. The 
reason which is given by Rapley as to why the Ivoirien bourgeoisie has 
become so powerful is because of its ability to adapt itself to the indigenous 
economic conditions of the Ivoirien society. As he puts it, “[T]he Ivoirien 
bourgeoisie seems to have been quite effective at assimilating and adapting 
imported technology to local conditions”. Whilst foreign owned companies 
“tend to import technology and production processes unaltered”, one finds 
135 
 
that “Ivoirien capitalists, on the other hand, arguably have a long history of 
adjusting technology and production processes to local conditions, dating 
back to the early plantations when they used smaller plots than the 
European settlers [who] scattered them throughout the forest as opposed to 
concentrating them on one plantation…”. In other words, the ability of 
indigenous Ivoirien capitalists to adapt the imported technology and 
production processes to the local condition gives them an economic 
advantage over foreign capitalists in the Ivory Coast. It their ability to adapt 
to the contextual economic realities of the African society which makes 
indigenous Ivoirien capitalists special agents for the appropriation of 
capitalism in Ivory Coast.  
 
However, post-colonial African governments responded differently to the 
whole idea of promoting African indigenous capitalists who would act as 
agents of national economic development. As we have seen previously, some 
post-colonial governments toiled with the idea of promoting African 
socialism instead of promoting the emergence of African capitalists. For 
example, in Tanzania, Nyerere believed that the role of the government was 
to determine the economic ideological direction of African socialism instead 
of promoting African indigenous capitalists as future agents of economic 
development. Thus one finds that Nyerere was wholly hostile to the idea of 
indigenous entrepreneurship in as much as he was hostile to the idea of 
foreign direct investment. He writes,  
…I do not think there is any free state in Africa where there is sufficient local 
capital, or a sufficient number of local entrepreneurs, for locally based 
capitalism to dominate the economy. Private investment in Africa means 
overwhelming foreign private investment. A capitalistic economy means a 
foreign dominated economy. These are the facts of Africa’s situation. The only 
way in which national control of the economy can be achieved is through the 
economic institutions of socialism (Nyerere 1968: 264). 
The idea of indigenous Tanzanian capitalists with a role in the economic 
development Tanzania was just repugnant to Nyerere because indigenous 
Tanzanians were traditionally socialists and modern capitalism was an 
economic system that was wholly dominated by foreigners. On the basis of 
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such reasoning, Nyerere’s main concern was about the national control of 
the economy. This national control of the economy was only feasible 
through ‘institutions of socialism’. From the outset, Nyerere ruled out the 
existence of indigenous Tanzanian capitalists who had a role in post-colonial 
Tanzanian economic development. Nyerere’s ideological outlook was shared 
by many African nationalists during the cold war era. The Soviet Union in 
particular has always encouraged those African countries that it helped 
during the struggle and against colonialism to transcend “the national petite-
bourgeoisie, and embark on a non-capitalist path of development, capable of 
leading to socialism” (Thiam, Mulira and Wondji 1999: 808). In this way of 
thinking, it is apparently clear that a class of indigenous African capitalists 
was regarded as important to the development of the new independent 
African states. According to this type of reasoning, such a class was 
undesirable in a state which had defined its economic developmental vision 
in terms of socialism. The appropriation of capitalism was an antithesis of 
attaining a post-colonial African state that pursues the objectives of 
socialistic economic developmental goals as the primary national objective. 
In the case of Zimbabwe, upon the attainment of independence the focus of 
the new government of the independent Zimbabwe was not about promoting 
socio-economic policies that would create a class of indigenous Zimbabwean 
capitalists who would promote the appropriation of capitalism for the 
development of the country. Some scholars have argued that the government 
of Robert Mugabe was rather hostile towards capitalistic development. In 
this vein, Sheila Nicholas made the following observation, 
In the period immediately following independence, the Mugabe government’s 
emphasis was on controlling the economy and investment so that it could 
engineer a major redistribution of wealth from the rich whites to poor 
Africans, especially in the rural areas, where a political commitment was made 
during the liberation struggle. The Mugabe government also pursued a broader 
policy of increasing the government’s control over the direction of 
development and ownership of the economy. In seeking extensive control of 
the economic processes in Zimbabwe, the government saw itself as the 
primary indigenous ‘entrepreneur’. As a result of these factors, the ZANU-PF 
government, unlike most postcolonial African regimes, did not support the 
African business sector against settler or Asian capital, although the 
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government’s regulation of foreign investment went some way to protecting 
local investment in general. Privileged access to credit, licenses, and markets 
was not granted to African nationals (Nicholas 1994: 102). 
In other words, the Mugabe government of the newly independent Zimbabwe 
was not concerned with promoting the emergence of indigenous 
entrepreneurs or indigenous capitalists who were going to act as agents of 
economic development within a modern capitalistic ideological framework. 
On the contrary, this government maintained the colonial capitalistic status 
quo which it inherited from the Rhodesian colonial settler government. The 
primary focus of the Mugabe’s government was to redistribute wealth from 
urban centres to rural areas. Through the government Small Enterprises 
Development Corporation (SEDCO), the government of Zimbabwe committed 
itself to promoting small businesses by giving them loans. As Nicholas 
(1994: 102-103) puts it, “the main thrust of SEDCO’s policy was to promote 
the development of commercial and industrial enterprises in the rural areas 
to help redistribute wealth away from the urban centres. There was also a 
mandate to promote cooperative ownership of these enterprises, as opposed 
to individual ownership”. The socialistic orientation of the Zimbabwean 
government in the early 1980s did not make things ease for the emergence 
of a class of indigenous capitalists because this government’s focus was 
more on promoting socialist policies which were deemed suitable for “state 
ownership” instead of “private ownership”. 
The idea of promulgating policies that were to promote the emergence of a 
class of indigenous capitalists was not appealing to the new Zimbabwean 
government. The new government of Zimbabwe is alleged to have had a good 
relationship with some multinational companies and the settler bourgeoisie. 
According to Nicholas, “Thus, in the first ten years of independence, the 
indigenous bourgeoisie, while not hindered, was not encouraged. Any 
development it achieved was accomplished in spite of its weak and 
peripheral position vis-à-vis the government and the settler bourgeoisie” 
(Nicholas 1994: 103). In other words, ten years after the attainment of 
independence, the government of Zimbabwe’s main focus was not in the 
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indigenisation or the creation of indigenous capitalists, rather its focus was 
more on welfarism, with specific focus on developing rural areas.  
Nicholas’ argument that the early 1980s government of Zimbabwe should 
have assisted in the ascendancy of a class of indigenous bourgeoisie is based 
on the salient presumption that such a class was indispensable for the 
appropriation of capitalism and the economic development of the country. 
However, the weakness inherent in such an argument is that there is no 
empirical evidence to support the claim that government assistance towards 
the ascendency of a class of indigenous bourgeoisie can give rise to the 
appropriation of capitalism and economic development. As we have seen 
previously, even though the Zimbabwean government has promulgated 
“Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act” in 2007, there is no 
evidence that this Act has resulted in the creation of a class of indigenous 
bourgeoisie who have contributed positively to the appropriation of 
capitalism and national economic development. 
Some scholars have argued that the 2007 Zimbabwean Indigenisation and 
Empowerment Act in Zimbabwe has contributed to some of the 
contemporary economic underdevelopment problems in Zimbabwe. For 
example, the idea that fifty one per centum of a foreign company or any 
business enterprise that is contacted in Zimbabwe should be owned by 
indigenous Zimbabweans was critiqued by scholars and policy makers as 
anti-spirit of capitalism, and that it actually bared any form of foreign 
investment into the country. This Indigenisation Act was a disincentive to 
foreign investment because no business person can invest into a country in 
which s/he is required to relinquish fifty one per centum to someone else 
who does not own that fifty one per centum. Since the promulgation of this 
indigenisation policy, there is no foreign owned business or enterprise which 
has ceded fifty one per centum to indigenous Zimbabweans. A Zimbabwean 
newspaper, The Zimbabwe Indipendent said that the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development World Investment Report 2015 
showed that Zimbabwe received a meagre share of Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) in the SADC region. “Zimbabwe’s 2014 FDI inflows of US$545 million 
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paled in comparison to neighbouring countries in the Sadc region such as 
Mozambique, which received US$4,9 billion, almost nine times more, South 
Africa (US$5,7 billion) and Zambia (US$2,4 billion). Zimbabwean chairperson 
Oswell Binha noted that the indigenisation policy remains “a millstone 
around the neck of the economy” (Kuwaza 2016). In the light of the above 
observation from the popular media, it appears that the Zimbabwean 
Indigenisation Act was economically not benefiting the majority of 
indigenous Zimbabweans because in the absence of FDI the economy will 
remain stagnant without any economic growth and job creation. 
Some scholars have argued that the Indigenisation and Economic 
Empowerment Act was economically unintelligible and unconstitutional. 
John Robertson observed that,  
Evidence that the [Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act] law is 
unworkable has accumulated fairly quickly and most of it can be placed into 
two separate folders: the evidence that almost everybody realises it will do 
nothing whatever to empower the population at large, and the evidence that 
the demands of the legislation are in conflict with many other established and 
much more important laws. In particular, it is in conflict with Companies Act, 
with the Constitutional rights of citizens and with the obligations of the State 
to foreign investors, especially those from countries with which Zimbabwe has 
signed a Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement. Parts of 
the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act are even in conflict with 
other parts of the same Act, and also with clauses in the Statutory Instruments 
that are supposed to give effect to the Act. However, a third folder has been 
filling up with a different kind of evidence. …this evidence suggests that from 
the start, the whole purpose of the legislation has been slow, if not prevent the 
recovery of the Zimbabwe economy (Robertson 2012).  
What is implied in the above quotation is that the Zimbabwean 
indigenisation policy was a piece of legislation which has prevented 
Zimbabwe from economic recovery after many years of economic stagnation 
or underdevelopment. The Zimbabwe indigenisation law did not empower 
the majority of the Zimbabwe population. According to Robertson, the 
indigenisation law violated constitutional rights of citizens (to enter into 
business relations with whomever they choose and to freely enter into 
business partnership of their own choice) and also other investment bilateral 
laws which Zimbabwe is a signatory to. In a nutshell, the gist of Robertson’s 
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argument is that the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act was 
detrimental to economic development in Zimbabwe. In the same vein, Amos 
Munzara (2015: 55) discussed the implications of the Zimbabwe 
Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act with special focus on the 
banking sector in Zimbabwe. He argued that whilst the Zimbabwean 
government’s intention was to increase the participation of indigenous 
people in the banking sector which is deemed strategic to the national 
economy, “there are concerns regarding the high local ownership threshold 
which effectively robs foreign investors of controlling interests in any 
venture established in Zimbabwe”. The negative consequences of 
implementing indigenisation according to Munzara are as follows, 
Loss of Customer Confidence – The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe estimates that 
over US$3 billion is currently circulating outside the banking system. Loss of 
Lines of Credit – Indigenisation of foreign banks would lead to loss of access to 
external lines of credit. Foreign banks are arguably better placed to mobilise 
international financial resources compared to local banks. Lines of credit and 
financial support from donor organisations and International financiers such 
as the IMF and World Bank are usually channelled into recipient countries 
through international banks. … Investment Phobia – The Indigenisation and 
Economic Empowerment Act offers disincentives to foreign financial firms to 
invest in the local banking sector with the unfortunate result that the 
indigenised banks will fail to attract foreign capital. …Investor Flight – The 
implementation of the indigenisation programme may result in capital flight 
as foreign shareholders disinvest their holdings in the indigenised banks. 
…The foreign banks will simply close shop and their workers will be 
retrenched further worsening the unemployment problem in the country. 
…Attracting Sanctions – …there is a danger of needlessly attracting crippling 
sanctions on our financial sector if the indigenisation programme is 
implemented by force. Under sanctions, local banks would not be able to 
import or repatriate cash (Munzara 2015: 55-57). 
 
Munzara’s observations as stated above show that the implementation of 
Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act to the banking sector would 
have catastrophic consequences to the banking sector and the country’s 
economic system as a whole. In other words, regulating ownership in a way 
that favours those Indigenous people who are not majority shareholder 
could only result in the systematic ruining of the banking sector. Such a 
scenario will generate into a national economic meltdown which will have 
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adverse effects in the long run to the majority of the Indigenous 
Zimbabweans which the Act purportedly wanted to empower. However, it is 
no wonder that the post Mugabe Zimbabwean government of Emmerson 
Mnangagwa has amended the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment 
Act with the aim of opening up the economy to foreign investment. 
According to the amendments to the Indigenisation Act. Previous the 
Indigenisation Act stipulated that companies operating in Zimbabwe should 
cede fifty one per centum to indigenous Zimbabweans. However, the 
amendment to this Act which was gazetted on 14 March 2018 brought about 
some significant changes when it amended the old Indigenisation act as 
follows, 
(b)  by the insertion after section 2 of the following section -   
2 A Application of Act 
For the avoidance of doubt it is declared that the Act shall not apply to any 
business in the national economy other than those specified in section 3(1) 
and those in the reserved sector of the economy, and that accordingly any 
person is free to invest in, form, operate, and acquire the ownership or control 
of any business not included in section 3(1) or in the reserved sector of the 
economy. 
(c)   by the repeal of section 3 and the substitution of the following sections –  
3. Objectives and measures in pursuance of indigenisation and economic 
empowerment 
       (1) The State shall, by this Act, or through regulations under this Act or 
any other law, secure that at least fifty-one per centum of the shares or other 
ownership interest of every designated extractive business, that is to say a 
company, entity or business involved in the extraction of – (a) diamonds, or  
(b) platinum shall be owned through an appropriate designated entity (with or 
without the participation of a community share ownership scheme or 
employee share ownership scheme or trust, or both)  
 
In the light of the above amendment of “Indigenisation and Economic 
Empowerment” Act 14/2007, the fifty-one per centum that was reserved for 
indigenous Zimbabweans in all business institutions in the country has now 
been removed in such  a way that any person can invest, acquire business 
and fully own it without any restriction. The fifty-one per centum is reserved 
specifically to designated extractive areas such as diamond and platinum. 
These minerals, according to this amendment, are reserved to designated 
entities such as the Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation, the 
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Zimbabwe Consolidated Diamond Company and the National Indigenisation 
and Economic Empowerment Fund. Celia Becker observed that according to 
the 2018 amendements of Zimbabwe’s indigenisation laws,  
In respect of reserved sectors, only a business owned by a Zimbabwean citizen 
may operate in such sectors. Twelve sectors have been identified as ‘reserved 
sectors’, including passenger transportation, retail and wholesale trade, grain 
milling, tobacco grading and packaging and advertising agencies. Previously, 
these sectors were reserved for ‘indigenous locals’ instead of Zimbabwean 
citizens. Accordingly, under the amended Act, anyone of any race may qualify, 
provided they hold Zimbabwean citizenship” (Becker 2018). 
 These amendments to Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act 
demonstrated a radical change towards indigenisation in the sense that the 
current amendment shows that an indigenous person is any person who has 
a Zimbabwean citizenship. In this regard, the amendment has done away 
with Indigenisation Act which has been perceived by many scholars as 
hostile to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). In this amendment, there is a 
realisation from the new Zimbabwean government that the pursuit of 
indigenisation of the economy was not serving any constructive purpose 
with regards to economic growth and neither was it helping towards the 
appropriation of modern capitalism. The Zimbabwean experience of 
indigenisation led to rapid deterioration in economic growth as well as 
investment flight. 
However, the problems that is related to indigenisation/BEE of the economy 
is post-colonial Africa which are identified in this study with some ethical 
implications are as follows: (i) there is no empirical evidence that 
demonstrates that such a socio-economic policy has led to a successful 
appropriation of modern capitalism that can be proved with national 
economic growth as a result of a particular post-colonial African state’s 
implementation of indigenisation/BEE, (ii) the socio-economic policy of 
indigenisation creates a class of African capitalists who end up emulating 
the predatory economic behaviour of the yester colonial bourgeoisie class 
and (iii) sometimes this socio-economic policy has promoted the practice of 
fronting as those who are excluded from benefiting from the 
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indigenisation/BEE socio-economic policy end up colluding with the 
indigenous beneficiaries of indigenisation/BEE. As we shall see in the 
following chapter, these problems constitute some of the ethical challenges 
that emanate from indigenisation/BEE. 
5.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter I provided a critical analysis of indigenisation/BEE with 
specific reference to post-colonial Africa’s quest for the appropriation of 
modern capitalism. The implementation of indigenisation/BEE was mainly 
motivated by what African politicians regarded as the need to redress the 
economic inequalities that have been perpetuated by colonialism and 
apartheid in the case of South Africa. Proponents of indigenisation have 
argued that capitalism can only be appropriated through the active 
participation of the majority of the African population in the mainstream of 
the economy. It is further argued that political power without economic 
power amounts to the perpetuation of colonialism. The main idea behind 
BEE/indigenisation is not to come up with a new form of economic ideology, 
but to create an environment through legislation that will enable black 
people to have a control of the economy     
 This chapter started by problematizing the concept of indigenisation after 
which it was shown that the word indigenisation is an adjective that is 
derived from the noun – indigenous. The word indigenous means someone 
who is native to the land or who originated from the land. I argued that a 
problematic issue that arises in the concept of indigenous is related to other 
peoples who are not African but are born and raised in Africa and their 
ancestors were born and buried in Africa. Some scholars have argued that in 
different epochs all over the world indigenisation was integral to the 
evolution of modern capitalism. In post-colonial and post-apartheid Africa, is 
used as an economic policy that is aimed at transferring economic power 
from the hands of the white minority into the hands of the majority of black 
people who were previously disadvantaged. Specific countries that were 
discussed in greater detail with regards to economic indigenisation are 
Zimbabwe and South Africa. In its Indigenisation and Economic 
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Empowerment Act, the Zimbabwean government defined Indigenous 
Zimbabwean as referring to someone who was subjected to discrimination 
on the basis of race. The act was intended to make such people the main 
beneficiaries of all the economic activities that take place in Zimbabwe by 
stipulating that fifty-one per centum of the shares of every public company 
and any other business was to be given to indigenous Zimbabweans. The 
South African government refers to indigenisation as Black Economic 
Empowerment – implying all those population groups that were previously 
discriminated against by the apartheid government. The spirit of BEE policy 
is aimed at equitably transferring ownership and management of South 
Africa’s resources to the majority of the South African citizens. In this 
regard, indigenisation is aimed at promoting economic nationalism. 
Indigenisation has been envisaged as a plausible economic policy that can 
help post-colonial African countries to exercise some degree of economic 
independence. A situation of economic independence from yester colonisers 
and imperialists is deemed plausible on the grounds that post-colonial 
Africa must create a class of indigenous capitalists. These indigenous 
capitalists are to adapt the imported technology and production processes 
to the local condition as compared to foreign capitalists. The ability to adapt 
foreign technology to local conditions implies that indigenous capitalists 
enjoy an advantageous comparative position for the appropriation of 
capitalism.  I have shown in this chapter that some scholars have argued that 
indigenisation has not succeeded in bringing about some economic 
independence, rather, this socio-economic policy has created a situation of 
economic dependence and underdevelopment. It was argued in this chapter 
that there is no evidence that indigenisation/BEE has successfully created a 
class of indigenous bourgeoisie who have succeeded in contributing 
positively to the appropriation of capitalism. Indigenisation policies were 
critiqued for being an impediment to the accruing of Foreign Direct 
Investment. The negative economic consequences of economic 
indigenisation outweigh the benefits. For this reason, it was argued that 
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indigenisation/BEE socio-economic policy is mitigating against the 
appropriation of modern capitalism 
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CHAPTER SIX: ETHICAL PROBLEMS ARISING FROM INDIGENISATION/BEE  
 
6.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 5, I have discussed how BEE/indigenisation as a socio-economic 
policy has been conceptualised with specific reference to the appropriation 
of modern capitalism in post-colonial and post-apartheid Africa. The main 
belief among the political advocates of the BEE socio-economic policy is 
based on the idea that indigenous black Africans who were previously 
disadvantaged should be given the opportunity to participate in the 
mainstream of the economy as capitalists. To achieve this economic 
developmental objective, indigenisation or BEE legislations have been 
enacted with the aim of making sure that government institutions and 
companies do ultimately comply with BEE/indigenisation regulations. The 
socio-economic policy of BEE/indigenisation is thus related with the issue 
economic reparation or restitution on the economic wrongs that were 
committed by colonialism and apartheid to the majority of black people who 
were excluded from participating in the mainstream of the economy. 
However, many scholars do acknowledge the imperative of black people 
participating in the mainstream of the national economy as capitalists but 
do question the way how this socio-economic policy has been formulated 
and implemented in post-colonial and post-apartheid Africa. A few of those 
individuals who are politically connected have benefited from 
BEE/indigenisation socio-economic policy at the expense of the majority of 
the citizens who were also previously disadvantaged. Whilst it is claimed 
that the economic policy of BEE/indigenisation was aimed at creating a class 
of African capitalists who would eventually give rise to the appropriation of 
modern capitalism, there is no empirical evidence that this socio-economic 
policy has achieved this objective. Some scholars have argued that 
BEE/indigenisation has had some adverse effects to national economic 
development because the implementation of this socio-economic policy did 
not result in the appropriation of modern capitalism, rather it created a 
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small class of parasitic individuals who thrived on crony capitalism which 
thrived in the awarding of tenders. 
BEE/indigenisation has entrenched a culture of dependency which the 
advocates of this policy had purported to want to overcome. Those who got 
rich from BEE/indigenisation have remained the same beneficiaries of 
government tenders, thus creating a new elite which is always empowered at 
the expense of the majority of the citizens. It is for this reason that some 
scholars have argued that such a policy can hardly be ethically defended. 
Some of the ethical issues that are raised in this chapter are that 
BEE/indigenisation is susceptible to corruption which is usually facilitated 
through preferential procurement of tenders. Another ethical issue that has 
been raised by scholars is that of the susceptibility of BEE/indigenisation 
socio-economic policy to business fronting. 
This chapter has been structured around four sections. The first section 
discusses whether indigenisation/BEE is an appropriate socio-economic 
policy for national economic development. In the second section it is argued 
that BEE/indigenisation is unethical because it benefits small class of 
political elites at the expense of the majority of the citizens. The third 
section discusses some of the unethical practices such as business fronting 
and tenders and corruption that arise from indigenisation/BEE socio-
economic policy. Lastly, the fourth section will argue that indigenisation/BEE 
does not advance the cause of welfarism for the majority of those who were 
previously disadvantaged because the implementation of this policy violates 
the ethical requirements for the promotion of the common good. 
6.2 Indigenisation as a Panacea to Economic Development 
In chapter 4 we have seen that many African nationalists had advocated the 
socio-economic policy of indigenisation in the form of African socialism as a 
way of ensuring that political freedom was authenticated in economic 
freedom through national control of the means of production. In this regard, 
Adebayo Adedeji puts it well when he said, 
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It can at least be claimed that all independent African states are involved in 
indigenisation measures with the aim of achieving ultimate economic 
independence. As a policy, however, one gets the impression that the 
approach to its development and application has been rather ad hoc, piece-
meal and lacking in internal consistency. It has been a product of 
circumstances, and at times mainly of politicians reacting to unfavourable 
economic situations and the demands of small groups of indigenous 
businessmen who felt that the prevailing economic conditions put them in an 
unfair position vis-à-vis their foreign competitors. It was hardly the original 
work of development planners, although their involvement became inevitable 
after political decisions have been made. Just as the articulation of a policy of 
indigenisation came about in a piece-meal fashion, so the measure for its 
realisation was equally ad hoc and unplanned. Writers, in appraising 
indigenisation in retrospect, might tend to see clear interrelationships between 
legislative measures and institutional facilities for fostering indigenisation 
objectives. In practice, administrative measures and institutional 
facilities…were not always established and designed to fulfil indigenisation 
policies (Adedeji 1981: 45).  
What is implied by Adedeji in the above quotation is that the post-colonial 
socio-economic policy of indigenisation was not a planned governmental 
economic intervention aimed at promoting economic development, rather it 
was a policy that was adopted as something fashionable in post-colonial 
Africa. There has not been administrative efforts and institutional measures 
that were put in place to support national policies of indigenisation.  One 
finds that in these post-colonial African states, the approach to 
indigenisation/BEE has taken various forms depending on the inherited 
colonial institutions (Adedeji 1981: 46). A comparative study on how the 
indigenisation policy has been implement in many post-colonial African 
countries shows that this policies has been implemented in a chaotic 
fashion. In his analysis of indigenisation in Kenya, Claude Ake (1981: 200-
202) identified some common factors that are shared by all African 
countries are that the implementation of indigenisation policies have 
contributed to social “inequality and even to class formation”. Secondly, 
these indigenisation policies “do not appear to be making any significant 
contribution to the indigenisation of control and the reduction of economic 
dependence”. These two factors makes the whole socio-economic policy 
drive towards indigenisation highly ethically questionable. As a policy, 
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indigenisation does not promote general social welfare but enrichment of a 
few.  
Indigenisation has not alleviated the post-colonial perennial economic state 
of dependence.  This dependence comes in two forms. Firstly, indigenisation 
creates dependence among on international capitalism, As Ake puts it, “the 
dependence of Africa is the root of the disarticulation of African economics, 
the reduction of African economics to the monocultural export type, the 
relation of unequal exchange between the economies of African and the 
West, and the comprador character of the African bourgeoisie” (Ake 1981: 
34). Sometimes this dependence is reinforced as a result of post-colonial 
African policies of indigenisation’s failure to effect competitiveness through 
productivity and innovation.  
The second type of dependence is that most of the beneficiaries of 
indigenisation/BEE usually rely government tenders where they enjoy 
preferential procurement deals. Sometimes these tenders are gained on the 
basis of one’s proximity to political power. Thus one finds other African 
scholars being very critical towards the practice of promoting indigenisation 
through tenders on the grounds that it has not created genuine capitalists or 
business persons who accumulate their wealth through an ethic of hard 
work and frugality. The beneficiaries of BEE/indigenisation who are in most 
cases the political elite wholly depend on this socio-economic policy for 
accumulating wealth. 
 
6.3 Indigenisation and the Political Elite 
Beneficiaries of BEE tenders have remained the same people and sometimes 
this socio-economic policy makes it difficult for others to participate in this 
system. The socio-economic policy in ethically problematic with regards to 
its inherent tendency to empower the same beneficiaries. Jack and Harris 
raised this ethical problem of beneficiaries remaining the same individuals 
to the exclusion of the majority of the previously disadvantaged black 
people which the policy has originally purported to help. This new BEE elite 
is being empowered at the expense of the majority of the citizens. This 
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raises the question of whether their participation is indispensable to the 
company’s activities or whether it is just political cronyism. As we have seen 
previously, the stated objective of BEE is to enable many of those people who 
were previously disadvantaged to participate in the mainstream of the 
economy. In most cases when politicians decide to go into business they are 
followed by business people who want to use their political connections for 
monetary gains. The more the politician delivers, the more he or she gates 
more BEE deals from companies. It on the basis of this rationale that Jack 
and Harris found a plausible explanation to the question of why BEE 
benefitted the same individuals. As they put it, 
There are concerns around creating the ‘new elite’ who are constantly 
empowered at the expense of the masses. The question is specifically whether 
their involvement in the investment is intrinsic to the operations of the 
company, or whether their involvement is tantamount to capital cronyism. 
This is a valid concern, as the objective is to integrate volumes of people into 
the mainstream economy. It is interesting to note how the trend has evolved. 
When influential politicians change careers from politics to business, a flurry 
of suitors flood them with opportunities for the perceived access to political 
networks. The deliverable in this dance is having access to, and use of, those 
networks to result in tangible business for the suitors. The more influential 
the politician, the greater the attraction the suitors have for him or her. 
Furthermore, the more deals the former politician can conclude, the more 
bankable he or she becomes as a deal-maker and the stakes get higher. …If the 
trend of awarding deals to the same individuals continues, we will have a 
situation of exclusion, no longer on the grounds of race but name (reputation 
or popularity) (Jack and Harris 2007: 60). 
 The above observation shows numerous ethical problems that arise from 
indigenisation/BEE. A socio-economic system that empowers a few 
individuals at the expense of the majority of the citizens can hardly be 
defended. If that is the case, it becomes justifiable for one to conclude that 
the indigenisation/BEE socio-economic policy does not promote the common 
good as claimed in most of the indigenisation/BEE Acts in post-colonial 
Africa. Getting rich through indigenisation/BEE policies through political 
connectivity is tantamount to condoning corruption. Already, this BEE socio-
economic policy shows that is imbued in an intractable vicious situation of 
conflict of interest. A politician who resigns from politics and go on to 
acquire indigenisation/BEE deals as a result of a legislation on BEE which he 
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spearheaded or participated in the passing of such a legislation previously in 
parliament becomes conflicted when he ends up enriching himself through 
BEE deals. To use one’s political networks as a way of enriching oneself 
implies being corrupt. In this instance, one uses an indigenisation/BEE 
legislation to enrich oneself. Thus one finds that those who have managed to 
get rich through BEE deals or tenders are euphemistically referred to as 
‘tenderpreneurs’ – implying that they are not real entrepreneurs or 
capitalists who happened to get rich through hard word. Moeletsi Mbeki is 
hyper critical towards indigenisation/BEE beneficiaries. He writes, 
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) has not, however, proved to be the fatal 
blow to South Africa’s oligarchs that Nelson Mandela and black nationalists of 
his era once envisioned. In fact, it strikes a fatal blow against the emergence of 
black entrepreneurship by creating a small class of unproductive but wealthy 
black crony capitalists made up of ANC politicians, some retired and others 
not, who have become strong allies of the economic oligarchy that is, 
ironically, the caretaker of South Africa’s deindustrialisation (Mbeki 2009: 61). 
For Mbeki BEE is actually a socio-economic policy that is the antithesis of the 
capitalist spirit of entrepreneurship because this policy has managed to 
create a group of indigenous African capitalists who are in actual fact not 
real capitalists in the Weberian sense as we have seen in chapter 4. In the 
light of the above quotation, these BEE beneficiaries are parasitic to a few 
rich individuals who have been in control of the economy since the times of 
apartheid. These oligarchs are said to be the ones who actually initiated BEE 
in South Africa prior to ANC’s assumption of political power. They managed 
to coopt the elite within the ANC with the aim of controlling this elite. As 
Mbeki puts it,  
BEE was, in fact, invented by South Africa’s economic oligarchs, that handful 
of white businessmen and their families who control the commanding heights 
of the country’s economy, that is, mining and its associated chemical and 
engineering industries and finance. The flagship BEE company, New Africa 
Investments Limited (Nail), started operating in 1992, two years before the 
ANC came to power. It was created by the second-largest South African 
insurance company, Sanlam, with the support of the National Party 
government-controlled Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), a state-
owned industrial investment bank created in 1940. The Formation of Nail was 
soon followed by the creation of Real African Investment Limited (Rail), 
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sponsored by mining giant Anglo American Corporation through its financial 
services subsidiary Southern Life. The object of BEE was to co-opt leaders of 
the black resistance movement by literally buying them off with what looked 
like a transfer to them of massive assets at no cost. To the oligarchs, of 
course, these assets were small change (Mbeki 2009: 66-67). 
According to Moeletsi Mbeki, BEE was a brainchild of the white dominated 
South African oligarchy companies. In other words, BEE was a strategy that 
was used by these South African oligarchy companies to silence prominent 
African nationalists by buying them off. If one recalls the Freedom Chapter, 
the South African Black Nationalism was based on the idea of nationalisation 
of mines and the resources of the country for the common good. By buying 
off these prominent nationalists, the South African oligarchs managed to 
steer these nationalists off from implementing the objectives of the Freedom 
Charter. In other words, the primary aim of these apartheid oligarchs was 
not to empower Africans to become genuine entrepreneurial capitalists, but 
to silence them or to buy them off. For Mbeki, BEE has helped the oligarchs 
to find protection from those politicians against the majority of black South 
Africans who are most likely to clamour for reparation as a result of the 
atrocities of apartheid. Thus the protection of the South African oligarchs 
became the thrust of the post-apartheid South African constitution whereby 
“the creation of a category of citizens, apparently 91 per cent of the 
population, [was] to be known as Previously Disadvantaged Individuals 
(PDIs)” (Mbeki 2009: 68). Whilst 91 per cent was categorised as previously 
disadvantaged, Mbeki argued that the way how BEE unfolded by benefiting a 
few has made a mockery of 91 per cent as previously disadvantaged. He 
writes, 
The ingenious legal notion of previously disadvantaged individuals created the 
impression that all black South Africans could or would benefit from BEE. This 
legitimised the co-option payment to the black political elite by dangling 
before the black masses the possibility that one day they, too, would receive 
reparations for the wrongs done to them during the apartheid era. BEE and its 
subsidiaries – affirmative action and affirmative procurement – which started 
off as defensive instruments created by the economic oligarchs to protect 
their assets, have metamorphosed. They have become both the core ideology 
of the black political elite and, simultaneously, the driving material and 
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enrichment agenda which is to be achieved by maximising the proceeds of 
reparations that accrue to the political elite (Mbeki 2009: 68-69). 
Mbeki’s main argument as stated above is that BEE in South Africa is only 
benefiting a few of the political elite through affirmative action and 
affirmative procurement are the subsidiary policies that are used in 
acquiring wealth. Also, it is important to note that for Mbeki the term 
Previously Disadvantaged Individuals (PDIs) is deceptively used because it 
implies that all the majority of black South Africans who were disadvantaged 
by apartheid were the beneficiaries of BEE. The PDIs have, in actual fact 
remained the political elite who are beneficiaries of BEE, not the majority of 
the PDIs. This has been the main argument against BEE/indigenisation in 
many parts of Africa where this socio-economic policy has been 
implemented. These political elites who are apparently the main 
beneficiaries of BEE by virtue of their status as PDIs, have an understanding 
of reparation as to imply a policy opportunity for them to maximise wealth. 
According to Mbeki, the political elite’s understanding of reparation in the 
following logic, 
1. In order for the wrongdoer to be able 
to pay reparations, the wrongdoer has to maintain a privileged position. This 
is the principle of fattening the goose that lays the golden egg. What this 
means is that the corporations that were allegedly responsible for victimizing 
the PDIs must not be transformed beyond putting a few black individuals in 
their upper echelons. 
2. For the victim to continue to draw 
reparations it is critical that he or she remains perceived as a victim and as 
weak. This means that the former freedom fighter must be transformed from 
a hero who liberated South Africa into an underlying. The payment of 
reparations to the black elite thus achieves the opposite of what it is claimed it 
was designed to do, that is, make its members leading players in the economy. 
In reality, it makes members of the black elite perpetual junior support 
players to white controlled corporations. 
3. One of the most destructive 
consequences of the reparations ideology is the black elite’s relationship with, 
and attitude to, the South African state. As the state is said to have been party 
to the disadvantaging of the PDIs it is therefore also perceived to owe them 
something. By way of reparations the state must therefore provide PDIs with 
high-paying jobs.  
4. The ideology of reparations traps 
members of the black elite into seeing themselves as the beneficiaries of the 
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production of other social groups and therefore primarily as consumers. To 
facilitate their role as consumers the black elite sees the state essentially as 
distributive rather than developmental. Most importantly, the black elite don’t 
see themselves as entrepreneurs who can initiate and manage new enterprises. 
…This is the most striking difference between the black elite of South Africa 
and the elites of Asia, where the driving ideology is entrepreneurship (Mbeki 
2009: 69-72). 
 
The above logic which Mbeki sees as prevalent among the political elite in 
post-apartheid South Africa debunks the claims of the advocates of BEE as 
an indispensable socio-economic policy for the economic advancement of 
black people in general. The beneficiaries of BEE are thus more interested in 
maintaining the status of quo of or the privileged economic status of the 
oligarchy because they benefit from these oligarchs. For this political elite to 
continue to benefit from BEE, they have to remain as victims of apartheid 
who are in a perennial state for reparation. The post-colonial or post-
apartheid government is perceived by these political elites as owing them, 
and the government should always acknowledge its debt to these political 
elites by providing them with high paying jobs. As these political elites see 
themselves primarily as by right the sole beneficiaries BEE socio-economic 
policy, they are trapped in a mentality where they cannot imagine 
themselves as entrepreneurs.   
For Mbeki, entrepreneurship is the main casualty of BEE socio-economic 
policies in post-apartheid South Africa. Evidence to the absence of the spirit 
of entrepreneurship in post-apartheid South Africa is the reality of the 
demise of the manufacturing sector of the economy. As he puts it, “In a 
society where entrepreneurship is considered an unnecessary distraction, 
and is even discouraged in favour of consumption funded through state 
redistribution policies, as is the case in South Africa (and indeed, with a few 
exceptions, in all of Africa), it follows that the general well-being and 
advancement of the mass of the population becomes problematic” (Mbeki 
2009: 96). It is in such critiques of BEE/indigenisation that one can easily 
conclude that this socio-economic policy remains a setback towards the 
appropriation of modern capitalism in post-colonial Africa. The spirit of 
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entrepreneurship remains pivotal to capitalistic development and the 
appropriation of capitalism. In his An Introduction to Positive Economics, 
Richard Lipsey says that, “The entrepreneur is the one who takes risks by 
introducing both new ways of making old products and wholly new 
products. Thus he is one who organises the other factors of production and 
directs them along new lines” (Lipsey 1974: 50). Entrepreneurship entails 
active participation in the economy as a producer of new and old products. 
In this way, entrepreneurs are people who take risks in investing in the 
creation of new products with the hope that they will make some financial 
gain for their effort. We can say that entrepreneurs do not rely on 
government legislation that favours them, rather they undertake individual 
initiatives regardless of the fact that they might incur losses in the process 
and end up bankrupt.  
BEE/indigenisation has failed to promote the emergence of African 
entrepreneurs because this socio-economic policy does create a class of 
African bourgeoisie who are on the final analysis not capitalists at all. They 
exist as parasites to the state by virtue of their proximity to political power 
within the ruling party. Popular media euphemistically refers to such people 
as ‘tenderpreneurs’ – implying that they are not real entrepreneurs in the 
traditional sense of the word, but individuals who understand 
entrepreneurship solely in terms of acquiring tenders. South African 
minister Bonginkosi Nzimande observed that, 
Tenderpreneurs, found in both public and private sectors, and often the two 
colluding, are those who corruptly capture government tenders using their 
political positions or connections. In fact ‘tenderpreneurs’ pose the single 
biggest threat to genuine entrepreneurs, as the latter often do not have inside 
information or the necessary political connections to get government or even 
tenders in the private sector. Tenderpreneurship expresses the worst in the 
intersection between holding of political position and business interests 
(Nzimande 2010: 2). 
According Nzimande, tenderpreneurs are a biggest threat to a genuine spirit 
of entrepreneurship in the sense that they use their political connections to 
get tenders in both government and private sector. Tenderpreneurship is a 
practice that also thrives on corruption within the government as business 
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position and business interest are conflated. Thus the practice of tenders 
violates ethical business practises because the element of corruption that 
goes hand in hand with it. The practice of tenders being administered 
through preferential procurement has failed to create capitalists, but 
unscrupulous corrupt individuals. The former ANC Secretary General, Gwede 
Mantashe gave a critique of preferential procurement of tenders when he 
said, “The thing of having a bottle of water that you can get for R7 procured 
by the government for R27 because you want to create a middle class person 
who must have a business is not on…It must stop” (Cited in Jeffrey 2013). 
Those who get their wealth through preferential procurement of tenders can 
hardly qualify to be called genuine entrepreneurs or business people who get 
their wealth through their own individual initiative. As we have seen 
previously, tenderpreneurs are a good example of what entrepreneurship is 
not about. In other words, tenderpreneurs are not real entrepreneurs 
because their entrepreneurship relies on government tenders. Without these 
government tenders they cannot undertake works of entrepreneurship.  
The existence of tenderpreneurs is in itself a classic example of post-colonial 
African governments’ socio-economic development failure. It appears as if 
post-colonial governments have failed to predict the economic consequence 
of the implementation of BEE/indigenisation towards the overall national 
economic development. Ray Matikinye critiqued BEE/indigenisation in 
Zimbabwe on the grounds that it was not a practical socio-economic policy 
that can promote national economic development. Thus he writes, 
On paper an indigenisation programme covering all aspects of black economic 
empowerment (BEE) to create employment and reduce poverty among 
Zimbabwe’s indigenous people looks comprehensive enough to impress. But 
the demands on government for its successful implementation also seem too 
hard an act to follow. Government is yet to fully adopt indigenisation as a 
policy to redress the imbalances of the past. Until recently the programme was 
without a clear policy framework and operational guidelines (Mitikinye 2006).  
 
The implication of the above quotation is that whilst BEE can be theoretically 
impressive with regards to its spirit of welfare, what makes it problematic is 
the issue of practical implementation of this socio-economic policy. Here we 
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have a discrepancy between policy formulation which cannot be 
implemented for its realisation. As it has been the case all over Africa with 
socio-economic policy of BEE/indigenisation, there has been a general lack of 
framework to guide its practical implementation. In the case of Zimbabwe, 
Matikinye went on to argue that BEE/indigenisation did not create 
entrepreneurs, but a class of parasitic individuals who thrived on their 
political connectivity to amass wealth for themselves without regard for 
critical economic issues such as those of national economic development. 
For Matikinye BEE/indigenisation socio-economic policy was doing more 
harm to the economy than good. Those who have gained from indigenisation 
were not genuine business people but individuals who simply thrived on 
crony capitalism and political patronage. It is for this reason that people who 
complained about indigenisation have argued that this socio-economic policy 
has benefited the same individuals. The policy of BEE/indigenisation has 
killed the private sector and a culture of accountability in such a way that 
this policy had done more harm than good to the economy. As Matikinye 
puts it, 
At first attempt at indigenisation succeeded in creating a legion of briefcase 
businessmen and petty traders. It also created a small clique of nouveaux 
riches, largely thriving on crony capitalism and feeding on an intricate 
patronage system. …Major complaints revolve round the repeated appearance 
of the same beneficiaries in different deals and guises. …most of the board 
members in Zimbabwe’s statutory bodies are the same charmed circle. Even 
when legislation regarding BEE comes into force, the Zimbabwean policy 
framework for indigenisation goes out the window. Black empowerment can 
only succeed in an environment of economic growth buttressed by a vibrant 
private sector with full accountability all the way down the line. However, 
policy inconsistencies over the years have led to disinvestment and gradual 
de-industrialisation by major international conglomerates due to the hostile 
economic environment (Matikinye 2006). 
According to Matikenyi, BEE in Zimbabwe did not promote entrepreneurship, 
but rather it undermined the spirit of entrepreneurship by creating a small 
group of people who amassed a lot of wealth and were ostentatious in their 
life styles because of the newly acquired BEE riches. Such people do not have 
any vision about national development besides prodigious spending of the 
newly acquired BEE riches. If spending money is one of the chief 
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characteristic of these BEE beneficiaries, it becomes illogical to expect these 
beneficiaries to contribute to the development of the nation as a result of 
their becoming rich through BEE. In a way, a small clique of nouveaux riches 
are not entrepreneurs because their wealth is derived from crony capitalism 
and a political culture of patronage. Political patronage is a practice whereby 
individuals get BEE riches on the basis of whom they know within the ruling 
party. Such a practice undermines the way how modern capitalism has 
worked throughout the world. Other scholars have argued that post-colonial 
African economic prosperity lies in adopting the ways of the working of 
capitalism. In this vein, one finds Chanda Chisala arguing against 
indigenisation/BEE as follows,  
The only way is to change our environment and this will start by changing our 
attitude to the whole idea of capitalism. Capitalism simply means allowing the 
environment to be as free as possible. We destroy the environment when we start 
intervening in it in order to force our ideas of who should own what: how much 
should what he bought… (Chisala 2007). 
 BEE/indigenisation does not help any country to appropriate the spirit of 
capitalism in the sense that these policies manipulate the capitalistic 
economic environment for reasons that are sometimes anti spirit of 
capitalism because such socio-economic policies have been promulgated 
without proper planning. Sometimes these policies have been amended only 
after irreparable harm has been done to the economy. For example, as we 
have seen previously, the Zimbabwean Indigenisation Act stifled economic 
growth throughout the era of Robert Mugabe’s presidency. This act actually 
scared potential foreign investors away and consequently the Zimbabwean 
economy failed to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) into the country. 
Equally, in the case of South Africa, some scholars such as Acemoglu, Gelb 
and Robinson have advanced three arguments in support of the idea that 
this socio-economic policy needs to be amended. Firstly, BEE has not 
resulted in economic growth, secondly, that this socio-economic policy 
should de-emphasise ownership and increase productivity, and thirdly, this 
socio-economic policy is too open ended and no evaluation is given to any 
outcomes because government has not given any terminal date (Acemoglu, 
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Gelb and Robinson 2007: 2). All the above arguments that are being raised 
by these authors do show that the South African government did not give 
enough attention to proper planning prior to the implementation of the 
BEE/indigenisation socio-economic policy. 
The argument about lack of planning in the implementation of 
BEE/indigenisation socio-economic policy was also echoed by Jack and 
Harris when they argued that there is no time limit to individual 
participation in BEE as a beneficiary. As they put it,  
A few people have already progressed beyond being a BEE beneficiary, the most 
notable of which is Mzi Khumalo, one of South Africa’s best-known businessmen. 
He notified the public that he was no longer available for BEE deals. Apart from 
Mzi’s personal reasons for removing himself from the BEE people, his graduation 
makes room for new candidates (Jack and Harris 2007: 59).  
What is implied by Jack and Harris is that there is no sunset clause on when 
individuals who have been beneficiaries of BEE policy should stop 
participating as BEE beneficiaries. It depends on the individual beneficiary 
when to stop participating as a BEE beneficiary. The way how BEE policy has 
been formulated leaves the door open for the individual to remain a BEE 
beneficiary as long as he or she wants to. Since there is no sunset clause on 
when individuals should stop being beneficiaries, it all depends entirely on 
the individual beneficiary’s discretion. For this reason, Jack and Harris went 
on to say, “The principle of graduation is simple – if no one graduates, the 
school will soon become too full and all the students will suffer. It should be 
interesting to see how many people follow the example of Mzi Khumalo. The 
graduation from BEE will most commonly be based on wealth levels, which 
government cannot set. Individuals must determine their own graduation 
level” (Jack and Harris 2007: 60).  What is implied is that there relates to the  
inherent problem of determining what is enough from the wealth 
accumulated through BEE deals is. Without government policy, on the final 
analysis it all depends on individual BEE beneficiary to determine on his own 
whether s/he has accumulated enough wealth from BEE deals to his or her 
own satisfaction. According to Murove, the problem inherent in giving one 
person (Mzi Khumalo) as an example of a graduate of BEE overlooks the fact 
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that, “graduation by essence is marked by a completion of a certain set of 
requirements that are known and accepted by everyone”. Contrary to this 
popular understanding of graduation, Jack and Harris postulated that, 
“graduation is by self-determination informed by self-satisfaction of 
accumulation of limitless wealth” (Murove 2010: 61). Here again, the problem 
which confronts us has to do with having common understanding on the 
amount of wealth which should determine that the individual has graduated 
from BEE.  
Another problem with BEE is that it is difficult to quantify the effect of BEE 
socio-economic policy to national economic wellbeing. Anthea Jeffery argued 
that BEE was not good for the overall functioning of the economy. Thus she 
argues, 
In the mining sector, vague BEE rules and their often arbitrary interpretation 
by bureaucrats have cast doubt over the certainty of mining titles and deterred 
investment, growth and jobs in a sector vital to the success of the economy. 
…In addition, a vast amount of scarce capital has now been spent on BEE 
deals. The value of these transactions is hard to quantify, because those 
involving private companies are not made public. However, figures in the 
public domain put the value of such deals between R550 billion and R600 
billion in the decade from 1998 to 2008 alone. This investment has primarily 
been non-productive and its benefits have gone largely to a small group 
(Jeffery 2013). 
According to Jeffery, the indigenisation drive in the mining sector in 
contemporary South Africa has been pursued in a way that has compromised 
productivity in the mines. Whilst other countries in the world are 
experiencing economic boom in the mining sector, a lot of money which 
otherwise would have been used for the recapitalisation of the mining sector 
has been diverted to BEE deals. The investment in these deals did not show 
any productivity and the money was spend on a small group who are the 
beneficiaries of BEE. In such a critique one is left wondering as to what is the 
rationale of disrupting a nationally lucrative sector within the economy 
inorder to benefit a few BEE elite. BEE is also regarded by Jeffery has 
responsible for a low percentage of economic growth. As he puts it,  
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What the poor need most of all are jobs, backed by good schooling, and the 
growth rate needs to reach 7% a year to bring increasing prosperity to all. 
…But BEE, and other forms of redistribution, help to tether the growth rate to 
about 3% a year and make it hard to break through that level. Instead of trying 
to ‘reform’ BEE with a raft of further unrealistic requirements, the government 
should recognise that BEE is fatally flawed and cannot be made to work. …The 
government also needs to shift its ‘big idea’. For 18 years, the ANC has 
emphasised redistribution instead of promoting economic growth. But 
dividing up the existing economic pie without expanding it will never be 
enough to meet the needs of a growing population (Jeffery 2013).  
In the light of the above quotation, BEE is not helping the majority of the 
South African population which is poor. Government socio-economic policy 
should shift from enriching a few through BEE and focus on growing the 
economy. In other words, it does not make sense to want to redistribute 
from what is meagre instead of focusing on redistribution through economic 
growth. Jeffery’s critique is not only relevant to the South African context, 
rather it is a common problem in all of post-colonial African states where 
BEE/indigenisation policy has been implemented. Those who have legislated 
such an economic policy are in most cases the beneficiaries of it. In this 
regard it is this small group of politicians and their relatives who are the 
only ones who have been previously disadvantaged by Colonialism and 
Apartheid. The implementation of a policy such as BEE/indigenisation has 
actually made the majority of the previously disadvantaged worse off than 
what they were prior to independence. This situation is contrary to the usual 
main reason that is given in the official government justification of 
BEE/indigenisation – to enable the majority of the previously disadvantaged 
people to participate in the mainstream of the economy. The majority of the 
people who have been previously disadvantaged by colonialism and 
apartheid are still not participating in the mainstream of the economy. It is 
for this reason that BEE/indigenisation socio-economic policies do not 
promote the common good or welfarism. In the light of the above criticisms 
of BEE/indigenisation socio-economic policy, the question that arises is: Can 
BEE/indigenisation beneficiaries promote the common good? 
 
162 
 
6.3.1 BEE Beneficiaries and the Culture of Emulation 
As we have seen previously some African critics of BEE/indigenisation such 
as C laude Ake and Moeletsi Mbeki argued that the interests of the small 
class of beneficiaries of BEE/indigenisation policies converge with the 
interests of international capitalism. The reason is that their conspicuous 
accumulation of wealth sets them apart from the rest of the multitude of the 
previously disadvantaged. They share some common traits with 
international capitalists. For example, the first trait which was identified by 
Thorstein Veblen is what he called economic predation which is found 
mainly among the leisure class or those who are super rich or in the case of 
BEE beneficiaries in Africa, they are a small class of nouveaux riches whose 
accumulation of wealth is traced to a culture of political patronage instead 
of being rich through entrepreneurship. According to Veblen, “The predatory 
instinct and the consequent approbation of predatory efficiency are deeply 
ingrained in the habits of thought of those who have passed under the 
discipline of a protracted predatory culture” (Veblen 1931: 30). On the basis 
of the arguments that have been levelled by the critics of BEE against the 
beneficiaries of this socio-economic policy, one cannot help but to come to 
the conclusion that the beneficiaries of BEE are wholly immersed in ‘a 
protracted predatory culture’. The idea that the beneficiaries of BEE socio-
economic policy have remained the same individuals implies that their quest 
for wealth remains insatiable.  
Because of a continuous feeling of insatiability, the impulse to acquire more 
becomes a permanent trait amongst BEE beneficiaries. They end up behaving 
as if they are addicted to wealth. As Veblen puts it,  
The tendency in any case is constantly to make the present pecuniary 
standard the point of departure for a fresh increase of wealth; and this in turn 
gives rise to a new standard of sufficiency and a new pecuniary classification 
of one’s self as compared with one’s neighbours. So far as concerns the 
present question, the end sought by accumulation is to rank high in 
comparison with the rest of the community in point of pecuniary strength 
(Veblen 1931: 31). 
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The phrase ‘pecuniary standard’ which is used by Veblen in the above 
quotation implies acquiring wealth in such a way that the present acquisition 
remains a point of departure for further acquisitions. To a certain extent this 
gives us the logical explanation why the beneficiaries of BEE remain the same 
individuals who are the beneficiaries of this socio-economic system. These 
small BEE elite are competing in acquiring pecuniary strength within the 
same circle. This competition in pecuniary strength ends up excluding of the 
majority of people from benefiting from BEE. According to Veblen, the 
psychology of accumulation of wealth which is dominant among capitalists 
as a social class is that this class tends to compete among themselves in 
terms of accumulation of wealth. This accumulation of wealth is not aimed 
at benefiting the majority of the previously disadvantaged individuals (PDIs). 
Individuals who have been BEE beneficiaries for a long time are mostly 
preferred by companies when they are seeking black business partners. 
Previously Jack and Harris said that, “Companies seeking black ownership 
credentials frequently choose the same individuals and do not cast their nets 
wider in search of other Black people to partner with” (Jack and Harris  
2007: 60). The main reason why companies prefer to do BEE deals with the 
same individuals instead of new ones is that these companies can easily 
identify with these individuals’ pecuniary standards and their behavioural 
tendency towards conspicuous consumption. Companies and BEE 
beneficiaries do share the same trait of pursuing their own business 
interests at the expense of the community in general. Thus Veblen writes, 
“Their office is of a parasitic character, and their interest is to divert what 
substance they may to their own use, and to retain whatever is under their 
hand. The conventions of the business world have grown up under the 
selective surveillance of this principle of predation or parasitism” (Veblen 
1931: 39). 
 
Both BEE beneficiaries and companies that invite them for partnership do 
share the same principle of predation or parasitism on the wealth of the 
country. As we have seen previously, these BEE beneficiaries are only 
acquiring wealth for themselves and not for the promotion of the national 
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common good. For this reason, critics of BEE/indigenisation have sometimes 
called this socio-economic policy as the indigenisation of privatisation, thus 
implying that the policy itself has nothing to do with the promotion of the 
common good or enabling the majority of the PDI participate in the 
mainstream of the economy as is claimed most of the indigenisation acts. 
Another unethical practice that is rampant among BEE beneficiaries and old 
private national companies and multinational companies is that of business 
fronting.     
6.4 The Susceptibility of Indigenisation/BEE to Corruption 
Business fronting is a fraudulent practice whereby foreign companies use 
indigenous individuals as defined in the Indigenisation Act as BEE partners 
without which those companies would not qualify. Corruption has been 
defined as a tendency whereby one uses his or her privileged office or 
position in society or organisation to further one’s own personal interest to 
the detriment of the common good. The standard definition of corruption 
has been that of acting in such a way that one compromises the general 
wellbeing of the public by making sure that what one does in the office is 
mainly beneficial to him or her. John Mbaku observed that in Africa 
corruption is usually seen “in more practical terms” which in some instances 
is regarded as “prostitution of one’s public office in an effort to generate 
extra-legal income; capricious and selective enforcement of state laws and 
statutes in an effort to generate benefits for the office holder; and 
differential treatment of private business enterprises in the expectation of 
an illegal payment from the business owner whose enterprise is granted 
favourable treatment” (Mbau 2000: 12). This perception of corruption has 
been rampant in the implementation of the indigenisation/BEE socio-
economic policy. As we have seen in the preceding discussion, a few who are 
well connected politically have benefited from indigenisation/BEE policy. As 
we shall see in the following subsections, business fronting and the 
awarding of tenders have remained the manifestations of the most popular 
corrupt practices in the implementation of indigenisation/BEE policies. 
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6.4.1 Business Fronting as Corruption 
In fronting, a BEE partner is used as a puppet for a company. According to 
Jack and Harris, “Fronting is the practice of making unsubstantial broad-
based BEE claims, where the Black person has no real right to commensurate 
benefits claimed to have been given by the measured entity” (Jack and Harris 
2007: 470). In other words, a black person is used as a puppet in order for a 
company which previously benefited from apartheid or colonial economic 
injustice to gain BEE credibility and the benefits that are accrued from BEE. 
Jack and Harris went on to make the observation to the effect that, “Fronting 
takes two parties. It cannot be done by a white company alone; it needs a 
Black counter-party. The reason why Black people engage in fronting 
practices is the windfall of about 5-10% that accrues to them without much 
sweat on their part. The money involved can be substantial for the Black 
partner, making it attractive to front”. In other words, in fronting a black 
person is used not as a legitimate BEE partner, but as puppet to circumvent 
BEE requirements as stipulated in the South African Broad-Based Black 
Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) Act, (2003). Through fronting, a black 
person is thus paid substantial amounts of money for doing nothing. What 
prompts white owned companies to resort to fronting is the fact that the 
new post-apartheid South African government has made it mandatory that 
these companies should be rated on the basis of their achievements in 
implementing the equity legal requirements. Whilst I will not go into a 
detailed analysis of all types of fronting that can be found in the 
BEE/indigenisation socio-economic policy, my main concern in this chapter 
is that it is a corrupt practice which is resorted to by companies in order to 
circumvent the legal requirements of BEE compliance.  
 
Business fronting in BEE/indigenisation socio-economic policy cannot be 
seen exclusively as the practice of companies in their effort to circumvent 
this policy, the way how this policy has been formulated presence a fertile 
ground for fronting. Tapiwa Warikandwa and Patrick Osode identified 
several factors that give rise to business fronting in Zimbabwe. Some of 
those factors are: 
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a) disgruntled foreign investors who use 
corrupt and greedy well-connected business elites to retain the 
investments they lost and/or stand to lose in the face off the aggressive 
indigenization policy in Zimbabwe; 
b) unscrupulous and well-connected 
elites who seek to maximize their returns from the spoils of the haphazard 
indigenization programme; 
c) ordinary people who benefited from 
indigenization programme on merit, accidentally or through political 
patronage, and have realized that the indigenization programme lacks the 
necessary implementation-related financial support and is simply being 
used to score political points (Warikandwa and Osode 2017: 13). 
Among all those factors identified by Warikandwa and Osade, one can easily 
deduce that the BEE/indigenisation socio-economic policy is susceptible to 
corruption. Also, as we have seen previously from the critics of BEE, there is 
no moral justification for enacting a socio-economic policy that tends to 
benefit a few PDIs whilst the majority of the PDIs are living under deplorable 
conditions of excruciating poverty. Business fronting becomes an acceptable 
practice to both parties involved because BEE beneficiaries know that they 
are being made rich by their government in ways that are unethical and the 
business entity involved in fronting feels that the BEE Act which requires it 
to comply with equity is rather fraudulent. Warikanda and Osode went on to 
say that ordinary people realised that indigenisation has been used by 
politicians for populist purposes without tangible practical implementation 
on the part of the government. Thus they write, “This realisation has made 
the ordinary citizens who are beneficiaries of the indigenisation progamme 
comfortable with fronting for foreign business persons in return for huge 
sums of money which the government cannot offer them” (Warikandwa and 
Osode 2017: 133). In business fronting, the indigene person as defined in the 
Indigenisation Act uses the national indigenisation policy for private gain. In 
business fronting there in no genuine transfer of wealth into the hands of 
the majority who have been historically disadvantaged.  
In business fronting, the individual who gets financial benefits is not usually 
supposed to get those benefits because such financial benefits are supposed 
to be accrued for the whole nation. Other scholars such as Elly Twineyo-
167 
 
Kamugisha argued that “corruption hinders economic growth and 
development by discouraging investment and diverting funds meant for 
infrastructure and other things (Twineyo-Kamugisha 2012: 74). If these are 
some of the effects of corruption, business fronting contributes to 
corruption as this practice corners that which is supposed to promote the 
public good for individual pecuniary gain. Jack and Harris observed that,   
The major risk of fronting is that it sets the BEE process up to be another 
bubble in a stream of failures to integrate Black people into the mainstream of 
the economy. With fronting, Black people receive no substantive skills 
development. Fronting diverts the need for operational involvement of Black 
people in the strategic implementation of contracts that have been won on the 
back of Black participation. If fronting practices persist, Black people will be 
denied the opportunity to be involved in the technical and core aspects of the 
industry. Instead, it forces them to remain in the support functions or 
peripheral parts of that industry (Jack and Harris 2007: 481). 
According to Jack and Harris, those who suffer the most from business 
fronting in BEE are black people who end up remaining outside the 
mainstream of the economy because the practice inevitably deprives them of 
critical skills that are required for a meaningful participation in the 
economy. Business fronting supports the status quo of the inherited 
apartheid exclusive economic system. In this way, this practice is another 
form of corruption that compromises the objectives of BEE which is to 
enable the majority of the PDIs to participate in the mainstream of the 
economy. This also implies that business fronting defeats the purpose of 
indigenisation because in this practice it becomes only the individual who 
benefits from fronting. What is left out in the above implications of fronting 
is that it is corrupt practice. The South African Broad Based Black Economic 
Empowerment Amendment Act defined fronting as follows, ‘Fronting 
practice’ means a transaction arrangement or the act or conduct that 
directly or indirectly undermines or frustrates the achievement of the 
objectives of this Act or the implementation of any of the provisions of this  
Act, including but not limited to practices in connection with a B-BBEE 
initiative –  
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(a) in terms of which black persons who 
are appointed to an enterprise are discouraged or inhibited from substantially 
participating in the core activities of that enterprise; 
(b) in terms of which the economic 
benefits received as a result of the broad-based black economic empowerment 
status of an enterprise do not flow to black people in the ration specified in 
the relevant legal documentation; 
(c) involving the conclusion of a legal 
relationship with a black person for the purpose of that enterprise achieving a 
certain level of broad-based black economic empowerment compliance 
without granting that person the economic benefits that would reasonably be 
expected to be associated with the status or position held by that black 
person; or 
(d) involving the conclusion of an 
agreement with another enterprise in order to achieve or enhance broad-based 
black economic empowerment status in circumstance in which – 
(i) there are significant limitations, 
whether implicit or explicit, on the identity of suppliers, service providers, 
clients or customers; 
(ii) the maintenance of business 
operations is reasonably considered to be improbable, having regard to the 
resources available; 
(iii) the terms and conditions were not 
negotiated at arm’s length and on a fair and reasonable basis…(No 46, 2013). 
 
However, this amendment of BBEEE Act on fronting practice is vague about 
the active role of black people in fronting, because the main culprits in the 
practice of fronting are companies. Whilst this definition of fronting does 
not explicitly characterise the practice as corruption there is an implication 
in this definition that fronting is a fraudulent practice that undermines the 
goals of equity as envisaged in BEE. There is a strong implication in this 
definition of fronting that black people are used as tokens for business 
opportunistic purposes. But it is not black people who are used as tokens 
unwillingly, they also avail themselves to be used because they get 
something from this practice – thus fronting becomes lucrative for these 
black people because they end up reaping financial benefits for doing 
absolutely nothing. Like other acts of corruption, one gets financial or 
material benefits which in normal circumstances she or he is not supposed 
to get.  Another conduit for corruption in BEE/indigenisation policy is the 
tender system which is supposedly aimed at enabling the majority of the 
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historically disadvantaged black people to participate in the mainstream of 
the economy. 
6.4.2 A Symbiotic Relationship between Tenders and Corruption 
The main strategy or the most popular strategy which has been used by 
governments in post-colonial Africa to implement the policy of 
BEE/indigenisation is through the procurement of tenders. The awarding of 
tenders to the PDIs is aimed at enabling black people to participate in the 
mainstream of the economy. In The Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa the state has the right to legislate policies that favour the Previously 
Disadvantaged Individuals through procurement process. Thus Section 217 
of this constitution states that: 
(1) When an organ of state in the national, 
provincial or local sphere of government, or any other institution identified in 
national legislation, contracts for goods or services, it must do so in 
accordance with a system which is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive 
and cost-effective. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not prevent the 
organs of state or institutions referred to in that subsection from 
implementing a procurement policy providing for –  
a. categories of preference in the 
allocation of contracts; and  
b. the protection or advancement of 
persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. 
(3) National legislation must prescribe a 
framework within which the policy referred to in subsection (2) many be 
implemented. 
The Constitution of South Africa stipulates that the state should provide 
national legislation which will provide a framework for procurement national 
policy that will favour ‘persons or categories of persons’ that were 
previously excluded by discriminatory legislations of apartheid. The South 
African government came up with policies on how government officials are 
supposed to award contracts and tenders. PPPFA provides minimum BEE 
requirements that are expected from companies if they are to be awarded 
with contracts from government. As Jack and Harris put it, “If companies do 
not contribute to BEE they need to live with the possibility of not being 
awarded any contracts by the organs of the state. The question of fairness 
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and equitability in excluding those who do not contribute to BEE in any form 
is not something over which we should lose sleep at night” (Jack and Harris 
2007: 19-20). The need to be awarded with government tenders becomes the 
goal of any company to make sure that it fulfils the BEE requirements. In 
order to get these government tenders, the rules of procurement have been 
subverted by companies and BEE beneficiaries. Tembinkosi Zondi argued 
that corruption occurs in BEE through what he called the manipulation of 
tenders. He writes, 
The manipulation of the practice of state tenders is not only a moral problem 
but it could frustrate the achievement of BEE through the use of procurement 
by State organs. The failure (or the apparent lack) of political will to ensure 
that the issuing of tenders is conducted in a manner that is fair, transparent, 
competitive, above board and targets the intended beneficiaries will not only 
perpetuate the growing socio-economic gap but it also has a potential of 
entrenching a culture of ‘me-first and everybody-else-later’ (Zondi 2012: 65-
66). 
According to Zondi, tenders enable individuals to use BEE benefits for their 
own personal interest and not necessary with the intention of furthering 
national economic development. Recipients of tenders and those who 
administer those tenders on behalf of government regulations do end up 
being using this tender system for corrupt purposes. Twineyo-Kamugisha 
narrated a story that shows how tenders have become a source of corruption 
in post-colonial Africa as follows, 
A story has been told of an official in an East African country who demanded 
from a contractor a bribe equivalent to the value of two layers of road tarmac 
in order to win the tender for constructing a road. The road should have been 
built with no fewer than four layers. Financially constrained, the contractor 
was forced to construct the road with only two layers. The effects of this kind 
of corruption are various. First, you will have poor-quality roads, which have 
to be replaced after a short period. It also means limiting the carriage of goods 
on trucks transported on this road to the markets; loss of lives and goods; and 
a bigger medical bill. None of these deterred the official from obtaining the 
kickback he wanted (Twineyo-Kamugisha 2012: 75). 
This type of behaviour from a government official who was supposed to 
administer the government tender system had catastrophic economic 
consequences for the whole country in the sense that his demand for a bribe 
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from the would-be tender beneficiary resulted in the construction of a poor 
road since half of the funds that were allocated for the construction of a 
four layer tarmac road were given to the government official as a kickback 
for the received tender. Through corruption the nation is economically 
destroyed because the effects of corruption have tentacles that affect all the 
sectors of the economy. Through corruption, tenders have become costly to 
many post-colonial African economies. In this regard, corruption through 
tenders does not promote economic growth or empower the supposedly 
beneficiaries of indigenisation. The practice of kickbacks which has fanned 
corruption in the tender system has given rise to a situation whereby the 
socio-economic policy of indigenisation/ BEE has benefited a few who are 
politically connected and have the knowledge of how the tender system 
works.  
Sometimes what has made the tender system susceptible to corruption is the 
primacy that is given to the prestige motive in African cultures. Murove 
observed that in African culture there is a strong belief that one must always 
reciprocate a favour that has been received. As he puts it, “In Zulu one 
proverbs that one proverb exists which says, Izandla ziyagezana (hands 
wash each other). This proverb implies that one must always reciprocate in 
kind whenever a gift or a favour has been given” (Murove 2018: 149). The 
practice of kickbacks which is common in tenders might have its origins in 
this African culture which emphasises the need to reciprocate what has been 
received. The prestige motive in African culture can also imply that those in 
public office are most likely to offer tenders to their kith and kin as a way of 
demonstrating their good standing with their own relatives and friends. 
Popular media is full of stories of people who have been given tenders for 
construction of government law cost houses without any expertise in 
construction and civil engineering. Sometimes the recipient of such a tender 
end up subcontract another company which has the expertise in 
construction and civil engineering. Thus the beneficiary of such a tender 
ends up pocketing a lot of money for practically doing nothing. Sometimes 
the one who was awarded a tender gets 20% of the money which was 
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awarded for the project whilst the subcontracted company gets 80% for 
doing the job. It for this reason that corruption the practice of corruption 
which go hand-in-hand with tenders within the implementation of 
BEE/indigenisation impoverishes the majority of the previously 
disadvantaged people. The prevalence of corruption in the implementation 
of BEE/indigenisation socio-economic policy goes against welfarism or the 
promotion of the common good. 
6.5 BEE/Indigenisation and the Common Good 
Despite the problems of BEE/indenisation, it is evident that the spirit of this 
socio-economic policy was to promote the common good. As a policy that 
was intended to redress the economic colonial and apartheid injustices of 
the past where the majority of the black people were discriminated against 
from participating in the mainstream of the economy, BEE/indigenisation 
was envisaged as a socio-economic policy that would bring about an era 
where the majority of the previously disadvantaged can also participate in 
the capitalist economic system and contribute positively towards the 
appropriation of capitalism. However, the question that arises is whether 
capitalism and its inner logic and presumption about a human being as 
shown in Chapters 2 and 3 is compatible with the common good?  
There is no doubt the BEE/indigenisation socio-economic policy is based on 
the presumption that economic development and the general social welfare 
of post-colonial and post-apartheid African society can be fulfilled under the 
modern capitalist economic paradigm instead of the economic ideology of 
African socialism. The logic of modern capitalism which has been embraced 
in the by the post-colonial and post-apartheid Africa has an inherent 
tendency of excluding the poor from the mainstream of the economy. 
Modern capitalism “does not entertain any other human values besides the 
ideal of money-making and excludes any other values which might be the 
main source of social cohesion and identity” (Murove 2008: 137; also see 
Capra 2002: 123). In BEE/indigenisation socio-economic policy, there is also 
the belief that redistributive justice and the common realised by using the 
same modern capitalistic economic system in a way that benefits the 
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majority of the citizens who have been previously deprived by the injustice 
of the past – colonialism and apartheid. The South African government 
promulgated a macro-economic policy which was called Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution (GEAR). The belief behind this policy was 
that “a globally competitive and fast-growing economy will lead to a 
redistribution of wealth in favour of the poor” (Murove 2008: 138). The main 
presumption was that “when wealth has been accumulated, it will eventually 
trickle down to the poor 
(www.polity.org.za/html/govdocs/policy/growth.html). However, the belief 
that when wealth has been accumulated by a few elite it will eventually 
trickle down to the poor as some form of the promotion of the common 
good has come under heavy criticism because the majority of black people 
have remained poor. Diana Sanchez observed that BEE has not resulted in 
flourishing of the common good in post-apartheid South Africa because, as 
she puts it, 
…the South African economy has hindered the transfer of ownership. Indeed, 
as the economy is greatly dominated by large corporates, change of ownership 
requires massive amounts of capital, which, given the history of economic 
discrimination, are not available for the great majority of the black population. 
Furthermore, even when capital has been made available (with the support of 
government institutions or private finance), the usual result has been the 
inclusion of only a handful of individuals or groups (usually politically 
connected) into major established businesses with the majority remaining 
marginalised (www.hsrc.ac.za/en/research-data/ktree-doc/8470). 
In the light of the above observation, BEE has not led to the empowerment of 
the majority of the black South African population that was historically 
disadvantaged. This type of argument is also based on the salient 
presumption that by its own nature capitalism has never been a distributive 
economic system. As we have seen in chapter 2, modern capitalism thrives 
on the understanding that individuals will always relate to each other on the 
basis of pursuing their own self-interest or which economic theory regards 
as utility maximisation. For this reason, Charles Wilber observed that,  
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Economic theory attempts to provide a rigorous demonstration that rational 
individuals, left free to engage in voluntary exchange, will construct competitive 
market institutions that yield optimal levels of individual freedom and material 
welfare. In the absence of market failures this economic theory of individual 
rationality indicates that intervention by public authorities lowers efficiency and 
thus the level of output (Wilber 1987: 245).  
If individuals are solely self-interested, it means any government 
intervention which favours certain individuals will not necessarily lead to the 
redistribution of wealth in a way that will promote welfare. Those 
individuals who are favoured by government policy will use that opportunity 
to further their own individual interests and not the welfare of the 
community or the common good. By nature, capitalism is not distributive. 
Rather, it is accumulative in a way that impoverishes the majority of the 
citizens. Philip Wicksteed stated it pragmatically that capitalism was not an 
economic system which can used to redress the injustices of the past. Thus 
he writes, “...the economic forces and relations have no inherent tendency to 
redress social wrongs or ally themselves with any ideal system of 
distributive justice. ...The economic relation, then, or business nexus, is 
necessarily alike for carrying on the life of the peasant and the prince, the 
saint and the sinner, of the apostle and the shepherd, of the most altruistic 
and the most egoistic of men” (Wicksteed 169-171). In this way of thinking, 
Wicksteed is telling us that capitalism is not an economic system which one 
should expect to redress historical distributive injustices because this 
economic system is not built on the foundations of morality. In this way of 
think one can deduce that it is rather preposterous to expect a socio-
economic policy such as that of indigenisation/BEE which is based on 
capitalistic foundations to redress the economic historical injustices of 
colonialism and apartheid in post-colonial Africa. In this capitalistic way of 
thinking, post-colonial governments should not interfere with the 
functioning of the economy with the aim of creating a class of African 
capitalists who will help in the economic development for the good of the 
country. A real capitalist according to capitalistic rationale will always act in 
a way that maximises his or her self-interest. 
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Rahel Jaeggi proffered a moral critique of capitalism by focusing on the 
consequences which capitalism has on society in general. These 
consequences, according to Jaeggi, show that modern capitalism cannot 
promote the common good. Thus his critique of capitalism runs as follows, 
The moral or justice-oriented argumentation, as I said, protests that 
capitalism is premised upon injustice, accordingly producing and 
reproducing an unjust societal structure. In seeking out such a dimension of 
the critique of capitalism, it is obviously bound up with the theorem of 
exploitation. …According to this critique, capitalism thus exploits human 
beings by depriving them of the fruits of their own labour in an unfair and 
unjust way, and they are forced, as if by extortion, into enslavement by a 
system that in a variety of ways defrauds them of that to which they are 
entitled [his emphasis] (https://www.philosophic.hu-
berlin.de/de/lehrbereiche). 
According to Jaeggi, capitalism was about the exploitation of human beings 
by other human beings. Thus in this way of thinking there is no way 
capitalists can be benefactors of society. Their relations with the rest of 
society is exploitative or parasitic. The same argument was raised by 
Moeletsi Mbeki in chapter 4 when he referred to BEE beneficiaries as 
parasitic and not contributing anything significant to the nation’s economic 
development. What makes capitalism morally deplorable is that it thrives in 
a situation of abject poverty for the majority whilst a few of those who are 
filthy rich enjoy obscene luxurious life styles.  
Other scholars have proffered a theory of positive externalities as a plausible 
theory that can help us to account for the common good within a capitalistic 
economic system. In other words, positive externalities are the good things 
which can be enjoyed by society from an economic system which is 
originally unethical. The creation of good things which can be enjoyed by 
society at large is something that occurs even though it was not intended by 
the individual capitalist. This type of thinking is derived from the economic 
writings of Bernard de Mandeville and Adam Smith. Bernard de Mandeville 
already poeticised the modern capitalistic rationale behind the theory of 
positive externalities when he poeticised the working of the liberal 
capitalistic economy as follows,  
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Fraud, Luxury and Pride must live  
While we the Benefits receive 
Do we not owe the Growth of Wine  
To the dry shabby crooked Vine? (Mendeville 1924: 36). 
 
In the light of the above stanza, we might condemn capitalistic economic 
activities is unethical but, Mandeville reminded us that society actually 
derives good benefits from this immoral economic system. Whilst a 
capitalistic person might be only interested in enriching himself, his pursuit 
for self-enrichment actually ends benefiting the whole of society. Human 
vices such as fraud, luxury and pride do end up generating some benefits for 
society. It those benefits which were not originally intended by a capitalist 
person that modern economic theory regard as positive externalities – they 
are not the primary intended outcomes of the capitalist’s intentions. The 
same allusion to the modern capitalistic theory of positive externalities was 
also made by Adam Smith in his most quoted passaged in Wealth of Nations 
when he said, 
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the backer, that 
we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their self-interest. We address 
ourselves not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them 
of our own necessities, but of their advantages. Nobody but a beggar chooses 
to depend chiefly upon the benevolence of his fellow citizens (Smith 1976: 27). 
In the above quotation Smith is saying that whilst the butcher and the backer 
are only self-interested in undertaking their daily business activities, society 
ends up benefiting from these self-interested activities. Society does not 
benefit from the generosity of the butcher and the backer, but from the 
pursuit of their self-interest. When we talk to them, we should not appeal to 
their humanity and our own need to be helped, but on the basis of what they 
are going to gain. Whilst the butcher and the backer are solely self-interested 
in their businesses, the products we get from them such as meat and bread 
are positive externalities in as far as our consumption of these products 
results in the nourishment of our bodies. The nourishment to our bodies 
which we derive from our consumption of their products is something 
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external to their primary intention which is about making profits from 
selling meat and bread.  
Positive externalities that promote the common good from the point of view 
of market economists are things such as education and health which should 
be subsidized by government. The commodities benefit the whole of society 
because it is to the good of society to have educated and healthy citizens 
(Wilber 1987: 250-251). Those who protested that BEE/indigenisation policies 
were only benefiting a few individuals who are politically connected are 
more interested in seeing the majority of the previously disadvantaged black 
people benefiting from the policies of transformation. This was the main 
argument that was advanced by the critics of indigenisation. A policy that 
benefits a few to the exclusion of the majority is detrimental to the common 
good. The common good presupposes an understanding of the individual as 
originally social by nature and that his or her ultimate wellbeing is 
inseparable from the wellbeing of society as a whole. In this regard, the role 
of government is not to promulgate policies that enrich a group of 
individuals to the exclusion of the majority of the majority of the other 
members of society or the community. However, as we have seen in chapter 
4, there were other African nationalists who argued that African traditional 
values were collectivist, hence the common good in post-colonial Africa 
could only be realised through what they called African socialism. We have 
also seen that the implementation of African socialism in many of the post-
colonial African states have resulted into a situation of chronic economic 
underdevelopment. For this reason many African states have abandoned the 
African socialism experiment and opted for the indigenisation of capitalism 
– promoting the common good through the capitalistic modes of production. 
This is what most of the post-colonial African states have devoted 
themselves to achieve. However, there is no empirical evidence that 
BEE/indigenisation socio-economic policy will ultimately lead to the 
appropriation of capitalism for the advancement of the common good.   
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6.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter I continued discussing some of the problems that are related 
to the implementation of BEE/indigenisation as a socio-economic policy for 
the appropriation of modern capitalism in post-colonial and post-apartheid 
Africa. Some of the problems related to the implementation of indigenisation 
policy is that it create social inequality within society and that the policy of 
indigenisation does not reduce economic dependence. The problem of 
dependence is reinforced by the fact that post-colonial policies of economic 
indigenisation have failed to bring about effective competitiveness through 
productivity and innovation. Internal dependence is also perpetuated by the 
fact that through the preferential awarding of tenders, the policy of 
indigenisation has failed to create genuine capitalists as business persons 
who got their because of hard work and frugality. The beneficiaries of 
indigenisation have remained the same individuals who are well politically 
connected.  
The socio-economic policy of indigenisation militates against the spirit of 
entrepreneurship. To use one’s political networks as a way of enriching 
oneself implies being corrupt. In this instance, one uses an 
indigenisation/BEE legislation to enrich oneself. Thus one finds that those 
who have managed to get rich through BEE deals or tenders are 
euphemistically referred to as ‘tenderpreneurs’ – implying that they are not 
real entrepreneurs or capitalists who happened to get rich through hard 
word. It is important to note that for Mbeki the term Previously 
Disadvantaged Individuals is deceptively used because it implies that all the 
majority of black South Africans who were disadvantaged by apartheid were 
the beneficiaries of BEE. The PDI have, in actual fact remained the political 
elite who are benefiting from BEE, not the majority of the PDI. This has been 
the main argument against BEE/indigenisation in many parts of Africa where 
this socio-economic policy has been implemented. 
It is in such critiques of BEE/indigenisation that one can easily conclude that 
this socio-economic policy remains a setback towards the appropriation of 
capitalism. The spirit of entrepreneurship remains pivotal to capitalistic 
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development and the appropriation of capitalism. Here we have a 
discrepancy between policy formulation which cannot be implemented for 
its realisation. As it has been the case all over Africa with socio-economic 
policy of BEE/indigenisation, there has been a general lack of framework to 
guide its practical implementation. In the case of Zimbabwe, Matikinye went 
on to argue that BEE/indigenisation did not create entrepreneurs, but a class 
of parasitic individuals who thrived on their political connectivity to amass 
wealth for themselves without regard for critical economic issues such as 
those of national economic development. 
It is in such critiques of BEE/indigenisation that one can easily conclude that 
this socio-economic policy remains a setback towards the appropriation of 
capitalism. The spirit of entrepreneurship remains pivotal to capitalistic 
development and the appropriation of capitalism. Here we have a 
discrepancy between policy formulation which cannot be implemented for 
its realisation. As it has been the case all over Africa with socio-economic 
policy of BEE/indigenisation, there has been a general lack of framework to 
guide its practical implementation. In the case of Zimbabwe, Matikinye went 
on to argue that BEE/indigenisation did not create entrepreneurs, but a class 
of parasitic individuals who thrived on their political connectivity to amass 
wealth for themselves without regard for critical economic issues such as 
those of national economic development. 
The way how BEE policy has been formulated leaves the door open for the 
individual to remain a BEE beneficiary as long as he or she wants to. Since 
there is no sunset clause on when individuals should stop being 
beneficiaries, it all depends entirely on the individual beneficiary’s 
discretion. The main reason why companies prefer to do BEE deals with the 
same individuals instead of new ones is that these companies can easily 
identify with these individuals’ pecuniary standards and their behavioural 
tendency towards conspicuous consumption. Companies and BEE 
beneficiaries do share the same trait of pursuing their own business interest 
at the expense of the community in general. Another unethical practice that 
is rampant among BEE beneficiaries and old private national companies and 
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multinational companies is that of business fronting. Business fronting is a 
fraudulent practice whereby foreign companies use indigenous individuals 
as defined in the indigenisation act as BEE partners without which those 
companies would not qualify. In fronting, a BEE partner is used as a puppet 
for a company. Business fronting is synonymous with corruption. Business 
fronting in BEE/indigenisation socio-economic policy cannot be seen 
exclusively as the practice of companies in their effort to circumvent this 
policy, the way how this policy has been formulated presence a fertile 
ground for fronting. Apart from the contribution of business fronting to 
corruption in the indigenisation/BEE policy, another conduit for corruption 
in this policy is the tender system which is supposedly aimed at enabling the 
majority of the historically disadvantaged to participate in the mainstream 
of the economy.  
The need to be awarded with government tenders becomes the goal of any 
company to make sure that it fulfils the BEE requirements. In order to get 
these government tenders, the rules of procurement have been subverted by 
companies and BEE beneficiaries. The practice of kickbacks which has 
fanned corruption in the tender system has given rise to a situation whereby 
the socio-economic policy of indigenisation/ BEE has benefited a few who are 
politically connected and have the knowledge of how the tender system 
works. The prevalence of corruption in the implementation of 
BEE/indigenisation socio-economic policy goes against welfarism or the 
promotion of the common good. Among capitalistic liberal economists the 
common good is regarded as a positive externality in the sense that though a 
capitalist person is only concerned with the pursuit of his or her own 
interest, he ends up promoting certain essential societal services such as 
education and health. However, in this study I have argued that capitalism 
has never been good in promoting the common good. The common good 
presupposes an understanding of the individual as originally social by 
nature and that his or her ultimate wellbeing is inseparable from the 
wellbeing of society as a whole. In this regard, the role of government is not 
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to promulgate policies that enrich a group of individuals to the exclusion of 
the other members of society or the community. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: GENERAL CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
7. 1 General Conclusion 
This chapter provides is a conclusion and recommendations that are 
extracted from the study as a whole as it is a synthetic view of all the 
conclusions and observations that have been made in the preceding chapters 
of the study. It should be understood as a summary of the whole study and 
the recommendations that follow theretofore.  The problem that was 
identified in this study is that whilst BEE/indigenisation has been chosen as 
a socio-economic policy for the appropriation of capitalism, there is no 
empirical evidence that support this claim, on the contrary the 
indigenisation/BEE socio-economic policy is actually hurting the post-
colonial African economy because such a policy is susceptible to the 
institutionalisation of corruption. 
Those few Africans who have become rich through indigenisation/BEE socio-
economic policy cannot be seen as entrepreneurs because as beneficiaries of 
indigenisation/BEE socio-economic policy, they got their wealth through 
political connectivity and as a result indigenisation/BEE has not benefited 
the majority of the population that also suffered the brand of apartheid or 
colonial economic exclusion. This raised the issue of whether indigenisation 
can promote the common good. For an authentic treatment of the topic 
under investigation, the study provided an historical analysis of 
indigenisation with specific reference to the quest of for the appropriation of 
the spirit of capitalism in post-colonial Africa. To achieve this objective, the 
study gave attention to the critical voices of indigenisation or capitalism on 
one hand and the voices of those who see indigenisation as the most viable 
socio-economic policy for the appropriation of capitalism in post-apartheid 
and post-colonial Africa.  
The discourse of indigenisation/BEE as a socio-economic policy is regarded 
as integral to African business ethics. An issue of ethical concern is that 
indigenisation/BEE as a socio-economic policy does not promote the 
common good because of its susceptibility to corruption and the inherent 
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tendency to benefit a few individuals at the expense of the majority. To put 
it succinctly, the study was a critique of indigenisation/BEE as a socio-
economic policy for the appropriation of modern capitalism in post-colonial 
and post-apartheid Africa. Since the study is partly an historical analysis of 
capitalism in Africa, in chapter 2 my concern was to make a comparative 
investigation between modern capitalistic Western and North American 
values that were considered to be indispensable to the evolution of 
capitalism in those parts of world. The chapter started by arguing that there 
was a symbiotic relationship between modern capitalism as it was mediated 
to Africa from the West and colonialism. Because of this symbiotic 
relationship between modern capitalism and colonialism, I have argued that 
one the argument that was proffered by African nationalists was that African 
traditional values of collectivism were incompatible with modern capitalism, 
hence an economic system that was based on socialism was more 
commensurate with African traditional values of collectivism. I have also 
observed that the argument of African socialism can be seen as an attempt 
by African nationalist to indigenise capitalism or to make it relevant in the 
context of post-colonial Africa through the argument that was made by most 
of the African nationalists that pre-colonial African society was collectivist. 
However, I went on to discuss modern capitalist values which some Western 
sociologists such as Marx Weber have identified as the explanatory reason 
for the ascendency of modern capitalism in Western societies and North 
America. Weber identified these historical modern capitalist values as thrift, 
hard work and frugality. I went to argue that the argument that was 
proffered by scholars is that in post-colonial Africa colonialists did not 
pursue their economic activities on the basis of these Weberian values since 
capitalism within the colonial African context was mainly about 
expropriating African people of their natural resources and labour. In the 
light of the above observations, I discussed whether modern capitalist values 
as their originated from the West and North America were commensurate 
with African traditional values. In this regard it was observed that the 
modern capitalist values that evolved from the West and North America were 
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mainly based on an individualistic ontology of society. This individualistic 
ontology of society differed sharply with the African communitarian 
ontology of society on the grounds that in Africa the individual’s wellbeing 
was indispensable from the wellbeing of the community. This claim was 
authenticated in my discussion of the individual ontology that is embedded 
in the ethic of Unhu/Ubuntu. The Southern African concept of Unhu/Ubuntu 
has been integral to the post-colonial Southern African discourse on 
indigenisation and the appropriation of capitalism in that part of Africa. 
In chapter 3 I went on to discuss the African ethic of Ubuntu and the 
appropriation of modern capitalism as this discourse was partly integral to 
the efficacy of African collectivist values to contemporary African economic 
realities. Other scholars have wrote about the African ethic of Ubuntu with 
specific reference to its relevance to modern capitalism within post-colonial 
Africa. Other scholars have maintained that the ethic of Ubuntu has some 
relevance within the global modern neo-liberal capitalist economic system. It 
was observed that some African scholars such as Mogobe Ramose believed 
that the global neo-liberal capitalism cannot be appropriated, rather Ubuntu 
remains the main ethical resource for resistance against the contemporary 
neo-liberal economic system. This resistance towards neo-liberal capitalism 
is deemed to be self-evident in the implied human solidaristic social 
existence that is embedded in the African ethic of Ubuntu. On the other 
hand it was shown that other scholars such as Wim van Binsbergen being 
sceptical towards the efficacy of Ubuntu and the appropriation of modern 
capitalism. This scepticism came out succinctly when he euphemistically 
characterised the whole discourse on Ubuntu as ‘Ubuntu industry’ – thus 
implying that those who see the ethic of Ubuntu as suitable for the 
appropriation of modern capitalism are doing is for business purposes that 
are contrary to the real ontological meaning of the ethic of Ubuntu. 
Regardless of the sceptical voices against the efficacy of the African ethic of 
Ubuntu and the appropriation of modern capitalism, the current discourse 
on the appropriation of modern capitalism in modern Africa has been 
related to economic indigenisation discourse and the post-colonial 
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government economic policy efforts. The idea that the individual’s identity is 
communal by nature played a central role in the African post-colonial 
discourses and policies of indigenisation as a way of appropriating modern 
capitalism. Chapter 4 discussed some of the critical issues that have been 
central to the discourse of appropriation of capitalism in post-colonial sub-
Sahara Africa. In this chapter I have argued that what has been found 
problematic in the quest for the appropriation of modern capitalism is that 
this economic system is weaved around an understanding of a person as 
individualistic and selfish who actions are solely motivated by utility 
maximisation. On the basis of this presumption, modern capitalism theory 
postulates that the individual quest for material possessions is insatiable. 
On the basis of a succinct summary of modern capitalistic understanding a 
human being and his or her economic relations, I went on to discuss the 
problem of incommensurability between African traditional values and 
modern capitalism. The argument of the incommensurability between 
African traditional values and modern capitalism gave rise to post-colonial 
African socialism experiment. African nationalists such as Kwame Nkrumah, 
Julius Nyerere, Leopold Senghor, Tom Mboya, Kenneth Kaunda and Canaan 
Banana, just to mention a few argued in their various ways that socialism 
was indigenous to African values. On the basis of this presumption, the 
economic developmental orientation became that of indigenising socialism 
instead of capitalism. Thus capitalism was to be rejected mainly on the 
grounds that it was based on values of individualism which these African 
nationalists considered to be foreign to African indigenous values. 
On the basis of a succinct summary of modern capitalistic understanding a 
human being and his or her economic relations, I went on to discuss the 
problem of incommensurability between African traditional values and 
modern capitalism. The argument of the incommensurability between 
African traditional values and modern capitalism gave rise to post-colonial 
African socialism experiment. African nationalists such as Kwame Nkrumah, 
Julius Nyerere, Leopold Senghor, Tom Mboya, Kenneth Kaunda and Canaan 
Banana, just to mention a few argued in their various ways that socialism 
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was indigenous to African values. On the basis of this presumption, the 
economic developmental orientation became that of indigenising socialism 
instead of capitalism. Thus capitalism was to be rejected mainly on the 
grounds that it was based on values of individualism which these African 
nationalists considered to be foreign to African indigenous values. 
It was also argued in this chapter that the African socialism economic 
discourse in postcolonial Africa was not about the appropriation of 
capitalism, but the outright rejection of capitalism as it was deemed to be 
incommensurate with African indigenous values. The African socialism 
argument was not so much about economic development, rather it was 
politically motivated in the sense that the salient aim was to rebel against 
capitalism because of its historical symbiotic relationship with colonialism. 
In support of the above argument, there are other post-colonial African 
scholars who argued that the African socialism experiment ruined the 
economies of all those states in which it was implemented as a national 
developmental economic policy. 
This chapter also raised the argument of the appropriation of capitalism in 
post-colonial Africa. The argument about the appropriation of capitalism in 
post-colonial Africa was discussed in relationship with Weberian theory of 
the Protestant ethic and its causal influence to the rise of modern capitalism 
in Western societies. Some scholars argued that Christianity and Islam 
facilitated the appropriation of capitalism in colonial Africa. These religious 
are regarded to have promoted the capitalistic ethic of individualism by 
emphasising the idea of individual responsibility as well as dissociation of 
individuals from communal obligations – thus focusing solely on their 
entrepreneurial activities. These foreign religions are regarded to have 
taught Africans capitalistic values such as thrift, frugality, discipline and 
hard work. In this regard, we found that these scholars who have adopted 
the Weberian Protestant ethic theory tend to forge some convergence of 
thought on the idea that African traditional or indigenous religion was 
incompatible with the spirit of modern capitalism. 
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Finally, in chapter 4 I have shown that there are some anthropologists who 
have maintained that African traditional society cannot be regarded as a 
culturally suitable foundation for the appropriation of capitalism. In support 
of this argument some scholars maintained that capitalistic entrepreneurial 
practices have often been associated with witchcraft in the sense that a 
successful entrepreneur is suspected of practising witchcraft against the 
community. Another argument that was made against the appropriation of 
the spirit of capitalism was that the African economic outlook was rather 
based on subsistence instead of thriving for endless accumulation of wealth 
as it is the case in modern capitalism. It is for this reason, the scholars who 
proffered this argument deduced that the prominence that is given to 
morality in indigenous African cultures had a retarding effect towards the 
appropriation of modern capitalism in post-colonial Africa as well as the 
conceptual association of capitalism with colonialism and imperialism. In 
Chapter 5 my aim is to discuss how the quest for the appropriation of 
capitalism in post-colonial Africa has led to the contemporary discourse of 
economic indigenisation or Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) policies.    
 
Chapter 5 provided a critical analysis of indigenisation/BEE with specific 
reference to post-colonial Africa’s quest for the appropriation of modern 
capitalism. The implementation of indigenisation/BEE was mainly motivated 
by what African politicians regarded as the need to redress the economic 
inequalities that have been perpetuated by colonialism and apartheid in the 
case of South Africa. Proponents of indigenisation have argued that 
capitalism can only be appropriated through the active participation of the 
majority of of the African population in the mainstream of the economy. It is 
further argued that political power without economic power amounts to the 
perpetuation of colonialism. The main idea behind BEE/indigenisation is not 
to come up with a new form of economic ideology, but to create an 
environment through legislation that will enable black people to have a 
control of the economy     
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 This chapter started by problematizing the concept of indigenisation after 
which it was shown that the word indigenisation is an adjective that is 
derived from the noun – indigenous. The word indigenous means someone 
who is native to the land or who originated from the land. I argued that a 
problematic issue that arises in the concept of indigenous is related to other 
peoples who are not African but are born and raised in Africa and their 
ancestors were born and buried in Africa. Some scholars have argued that in 
different epochs all over the world indigenisation was integral to the 
evolution of modern capitalism. In post-colonial and post-apartheid Africa, is 
used as an economic policy that is aimed at transferring economic power 
from the hands of the white minority into the hands of the majority of black 
people who were previously disadvantaged. Specific countries that were 
discussed in greater detail with regards to economic indigenisation are 
Zimbabwe and South Africa. In its Indigenisation and Economic 
Empowerment Act, the Zimbabwean government defined Indigenous 
Zimbabwean as referring to someone who was subjected to discrimination 
on the basis of race. The act was intended to make such people the main 
beneficiaries of all the economic activities that take place in Zimbabwe by 
stipulating that fifty-one per centum of the shares of every public company 
and any other business was to be given to indigenous Zimbabweans. The 
South African government refers to indigenisation as Black Economic 
Empowerment – implying all those population groups that were previously 
discriminated against by the apartheid government. The spirit of BEE policy 
is aimed at equitably transferring ownership and management of South 
Africa’s resources to the majority of the South African citizens. In this 
regard, indigenisation is aimed at promoting economic nationalism. 
Indigenisation has been envisaged as a plausible economic policy that can 
help post-colonial African countries to exercise some degree of economic 
independence. A situation of economic independence from yester colonisers 
and imperialists is deemed plausible on the grounds that post-colonial 
Africa must create a class of indigenous capitalists. These indigenous 
capitalists are to adapt the imported technology and production processes 
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to the local condition as compared to foreign capitalists. The ability to adapt 
foreign technology to local conditions implies that indigenous capitalists 
enjoy an advantageous comparative position for the appropriation of 
capitalism. I have shown in this chapter that some scholars have argued that 
indigenisation has not succeeded in bringing about some economic 
independence, rather, this socio-economic policy has created a situation of 
economic dependence and underdevelopment. It was argued in this chapter 
that there is no evidence that indigenisation/BEE has successfully created a 
class of indigenous bourgeoisie who have succeeded in contributing 
positively to the appropriation of capitalism. Indigenisation policies were 
critiqued for being an impediment to the accruing of Foreign Direct 
Investment. The negative economic consequences of economic 
indigenisation outweigh the benefits. For this reason, it was argued that 
indigenisation/BEE socio-economic policy is mitigating against the 
appropriation of modern capitalism. 
 
Chapter 6 continued discussing some of the problems that are related to the 
implementation of indigenisation as a socio-economic policy for the 
appropriation of modern capitalism. Some of the problems related to the 
implementation of indigenisation policy is that it create social inequality 
within society and that the policy of indigenisation does not reduce 
economic dependence. The problem of dependence is reinforced by the fact 
that post-colonial policies of economic indigenisation have failed to bring 
about effective competitiveness through productivity and innovation. 
Internal dependence is also perpetuated by the fact that through the 
preferential awarding of tenders, the policy of indigenisation has failed to 
create genuine capitalists as business persons who got their because of hard 
work and frugality. The beneficiaries of indigenisation have remained the 
same individuals who are well politically connected. The socio-economic 
policy of indigenisation militates against the spirit of entrepreneurship. To 
use one’s political networks as a way of enriching oneself implies being 
corrupt. In this instance, one uses an indigenisation/BEE legislation to enrich 
oneself. Thus one finds that those who have managed to get rich through 
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BEE deals or tenders are euphemistically referred to as ‘tenderpreneurs’ – 
implying that they are not real entrepreneurs or capitalists who happened to 
get rich through hard word. It is important to note that for Mbeki the term 
Previously Disadvantaged Individuals is deceptively used because it implies 
that all the majority of black South Africans who were disadvantaged by 
apartheid were the beneficiaries of BEE. The PDI have, in actual fact 
remained the political elite who are benefiting from BEE, not the majority of 
the PDI. This has been the main argument against BEE/indigenisation in 
many parts of Africa where this socio-economic policy has been 
implemented. 
 
It is in such critiques of BEE/indigenisation that one can easily conclude that 
this socio-economic policy remains a setback towards the appropriation of 
capitalism. The spirit of entrepreneurship remains pivotal to capitalistic 
development and the appropriation of capitalism. Here we have a 
discrepancy between policy formulation which cannot be implemented for 
its realisation. As it has been the case all over Africa with socio-economic 
policy of BEE/indigenisation, there has been a general lack of framework to 
guide its practical implementation. In the case of Zimbabwe, Matikinye went 
on to argue that BEE/indigenisation did not create entrepreneurs, but a class 
of parasitic individuals who thrived on their political connectivity to amass 
wealth for themselves without regard for critical economic issues such as 
those of national economic development. The way how BEE policy has been 
formulated leaves the door open for the individual to remain a BEE 
beneficiary as long as he or she wants to. Since there is no sunset clause on 
when individuals should stop being beneficiaries, it all depends entirely on 
the individual beneficiary’s discretion. The main reason why companies 
prefer to do BEE deals with the same individuals instead of new ones is that 
these companies can easily identify with these individuals’ pecuniary 
standards and their behavioural tendency towards conspicuous 
consumption. Companies and BEE beneficiaries do share the same trait of 
pursuing their own business interest at the expense of the community in 
general. 
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Another unethical practice that is rampant among BEE beneficiaries and old 
private national companies and multinational companies is that of business 
fronting. Business fronting is a fraudulent practice whereby foreign 
companies use indigenous individuals as defined in the indigenisation act as 
BEE partners without which those companies would not qualify. In fronting, 
a BEE partner is used as a puppet for a company. Business fronting is 
synonymous with corruption. Business fronting in BEE/indigenisation socio-
economic policy cannot be seen exclusively as the practice of companies in 
their effort to circumvent this policy, the way how this policy has been 
formulated presence a fertile ground for business fronting. 
 
It was argued that business fronting is a fraudulent practice in which foreign 
companies use indigenous individuals as defined in the indigenisation act as 
BEE partners without which those companies would not qualify. In fronting, 
a BEE partner is used as a puppet for a company. Business fronting is 
synonymous with corruption. Business fronting in BEE/indigenisation socio-
economic policy cannot be seen exclusively as the practice of companies in 
their effort to circumvent this policy, the way how this policy has been 
formulated presence a fertile ground for fronting. Apart from the 
contribution of business fronting to corruption in the indigenisation/BEE 
policy, another conduit for corruption in this policy is the tender system 
which is supposedly aimed at enabling the majority of the historically 
disadvantaged to participate in the mainstream of the economy.  
 
The need to be awarded with government tenders becomes the goal of any 
company to make sure that it fulfils the BEE requirements. In order to get 
these government tenders, the rules of procurement have been subverted by 
companies and BEE beneficiaries. The practice of kickbacks which has 
fanned corruption in the tender system has given rise to a situation whereby 
the socio-economic policy of indigenisation/ BEE has benefited a few who are 
politically connected and have the knowledge of how the tender system 
works. The prevalence of corruption in the implementation of 
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BEE/indigenisation socio-economic policy goes against welfarism or the 
promotion of the common good. Among capitalistic liberal economists the 
common good is regarded as a positive externality in the sense that though a 
capitalist person is only concerned with the pursuit of his or her own 
interest, he ends up promoting certain essential societal services such as 
education and health. However, in this study I have argued that capitalism 
has never been good in promoting the common good. The common good 
presupposes an understanding of the individual as originally social by 
nature and that his or her ultimate wellbeing is inseparable from the 
wellbeing of society as a whole. In this regard, the role of government is not 
to promulgate policies that enrich a group of individuals to the exclusion of 
the other members of society or the community. 
 
7. 3 Recommendations 
In this study I have argued that the post-colonial quest for 
BEE/indigenisation of modern capitalism has been implemented in many 
post-colonial African states in their attempt to appropriate the spirit of 
capitalism. Since the implementation of this economic policy has not shown 
any positive results in the appropriation of modern capitalism in post-
colonial Africa, this policy should be abandoned. Since there is no empirical 
evidence that indigenisation/black economic empowerment has benefited 
the majority of those who were previously marginalised economically under 
colonialism or apartheid, economic empowerment should be pursued from 
the grassroots going upwards instead of a trickle down approach towards 
indigenisation which tends to benefit a few of those who are well connected 
politically. In this study it was shown that indigenisation/black economic 
empowerment policy has not let to national economic growth. There is a 
need to adopt an economic policy that opens up the whole of post-colonial 
African economy to economic growth by removing protectionist policies 
because a genuine capitalistic economic system is characterised by a spirit of 
competition in the creation and allocation of the national resources. 
In this chapter some critics of indigenisation/black economic empowerment 
policy have argued strongly that such a policy has not helped to cultivate a 
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culture of entrepreneurship which is indispensable to the appropriation of 
modern capitalism. If this socio-economic policy is ever going to cultivate a 
culture of entrepreneurship among those who are beneficiaries, there is 
imperative that participation in BEE business opportunities should be availed 
on the precondition that BEE participants do provide a detailed future 
entrepreneurial business plans. The future participation in BEE business 
opportunities should be made conditional on one’s business achievements 
as a result of participating in BEE progammes. In other words, beneficiaries 
of BEE should be made to understand it as an opportunity for empowerment 
to start their own businesses that will survive without any further 
government assistance. 
Another argument that was advanced by the critics of BEE is that it benefits 
the same individuals to the exclusion of the majority of those who were 
previously disadvantaged by colonial and apartheid policies of racial 
inequality. Companies should be recognised as having fulfilled their BEE 
legal requirements when they undertake activities that economically 
empower the majority of people in rural areas instead of enriching a few 
individuals. The provision of schools, hospitals and other projects that 
promote self-reliance in poor communities should be legally recognised by 
government as a company’s fulfilment of its BEE obligation. 
BEE/indigenisation policies should be subjected to continuous review so that 
an objective view of the efficacy of these policies towards the appropriation 
of modern capitalism can be ascertained without prejudice.  
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